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INTRODUCTION
Innovation activities performed by rms and their economic impacts are of central interest
to economists and policy-makers. Analysis of these issues requires both knowledge of the
factors that a¤ect rms ability to innovate and knowledge of the impact of innovation
activities on rm performance through changes in both demand and costs.
This dissertation studies two of the most relevant research issues on Economics of Inno-
vation: (i) cooperation in innovative activities, and (ii) the relationship between innovation
and productivity. In doing this, I use data at the rm level from the Third Community
Innovation Survey (CIS3) and from the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE).
The Community Innovation Surveys take place every 4 years in European countries to in-
vestigate innovation activities performed by rms. In 2001, the third wave was conducted
and covered the period 1998 to 2000. The ESEE is an unbalanced panel survey of Span-
ish manufacturing rms with 10 or more workers, starting in 1990 and sponsored by the
Ministry of Industry. A detailed description of these surveys can be found in each chapter.
This introduction is organized in three parts. Firstly, I introduce the two issues at
stake: cooperation in innovative activities and the relationship between innovation and
productivity. I focus on contextualizing both topics in the current development of literature
on innovation, as well as on specifying my contributions to this literature. Secondly, I present
the structure of the dissertation, summarizing the contents of each chapter. Finally, the
last part of this introduction is concerned with the main policy implications of the issues
covered by this dissertation.
Issues at stake
Cooperation in innovative activities
The innovative activities of a rm partly depend on the variety and structure of its links to
sources of information, knowledge, technologies, and human and nancial resources. Each
of these links connects the innovating rm with other actors in the innovation system: com-
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mercial laboratories, universities, policy departments, regulators, public research institutes,
competitors, suppliers, and customers. These ows of knowledge between rms and other
organisations have an important role in both the development and di¤usion of innovations.
The Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) identies three types of external linkages: (i) open
information sources, (ii) acquisition of knowledge and technology, and (iii) cooperation in
innovative activities. Firstly, open information sources provide openly available information
that does not require the purchase of technology or intellectual property rights, or interac-
tion with the source. Secondly, acquisition of knowledge and technology are purchases of
external knowledge and capital goods (machinery, equipment, software) and services em-
bodied with new knowledge or technology that do not involve interaction with the source.
Thirdly, cooperation in innovative activities is active cooperation with other actors in the
innovation system (for example, universities, rms or public research institutes) with the
objective of performing innovation activities. These activities constitute agreements by
which rms share the costs and returns of innovative projects, sometimes with other rms
and sometimes with research institutions. In what follows, I focus on this type of external
linkage.
With the ultimate interest of stimulating innovation, a lot of attention has recently been
paid to the subject of cooperative innovative activities among rms (see, among others,
Dodgson (1994), Hagedoorn et al. (2000), Hagedoorn (2002), and Tyler and Steensma
(1995)).
Moreover, an important feature of this kind of cooperative activity is its interactions
with competition policy. Since the seminal work by Schumpeter (1943), the relationship
between market competition and innovation has been a question of interest for economists
and policy-makers. Competition heavily inuences the way technology and innovation are
started and di¤used, and the analysis of the dynamics of technology is one of the most
important parts of this broad area of interest.
Economic analysis suggests the existence of several di¢ culties for the innovative activities
to be carried out at an optimal level in a fully competitive environment1. The character of
1See Martin (2002, Chapter 14). This author ,after reviewing the literature, observes that a market
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the input knowledge(freely usable when displayed), the presence of important xed -and
often sunk- costs associated with innovative activity investments, and the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the results coming out of these activities are likely to provide few incentives to
rms to allocate enough resources to an activity that shows important positive externalities
towards other rms and consumers. But, at the same time, as many empirical studies have
shown2, competitive pressure seems in many circumstances to strongly stimulate innovative
activities and the introduction of innovations by rms3.
In this context, cooperation in innovative activities, from a positive point of view, is likely
to show mechanisms by which rms can protably appropriate free ows of knowledge and
protect them. Hence, these agreements are an interesting guide to normative regulation,
which must try to consolidate mechanisms of incentives and at the same time avoid harming
market competition.
To sum up, cooperative innovative activity summarizes many of the questions at stake
in the economics of innovation literature, such as, appropriability, spillovers, the relative
roles of rivalry and cooperative outcomes, inuence and role of public policy. Therefore,
it is a topical policy issue, in the context of technology transfer (most prominently from
universities to business), and in its interactions with competition policy. Both the OECD
and the European Union support the idea of strong industry-science linkages to maximize
the returns from both private and public research investments, and recognize a role for
policy (OECD (2004a), OECD (2004b), European Commission (2004)).
In this context, it is important to understand which types of rms tend to engage in co-
operative innovative activities, the motivations for such activity and whether public policy
is e¤ective in increasing collaborative research. The rst two chapters of this dissertation
system results in an insu¢ cient level of innovation relative to the second-best optimum. Moreover, theories
of industrial organization typically predict that innovation should decline with competition, as more com-
petition reduces the monopoly revenues that reward entry by new successful innovators (see, among others,
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Aghion and Howitt (1992)).
2See Geroski (1995), Nickell (1996), and Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999).
3See Aghion et al. (2005) for recent empirical evidence on an inverted -U relationship between competition
and innovation.
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present evidence about the determinants of cooperation in innovative activities. The rst
explores the determinants for the Spanish manufacturing sector, while the second one inves-
tigates cooperative innovative activity in four major European countries, France, Germany,
Spain and the UK, using internationally comparable rm-level data for manufacturing and
service sectors.
Innovation and productivity growth
The poor productivity performance of European countries relative to the US has been an
important focus for government policy. In this sense, the Lisbon Strategyintends to deal
with the low productivity and stagnation of economic growth in the EU. As pointed out by
Sapir et al. (2003): In the EU, there has been a steady decline of the average growth rate
decade after decade and per-capita GDP has stagnated at about 70% of the US level since
the early 1980s.
In the rst three decades after World War II, Europe established an enviable reputation
for both high growth and a high level of social protection. The long post-war expansion had
been built on the basis of the generalisation of an already mature technological trajectory
with well known organisational implications and rapid di¤usion of the best practice. In
short, Europe was catching up with the US both through investment and factor accumula-
tion, and through imitation of leading-edge technologies.
In this sense, Sapir et al. (2003) emphasizes the fact that post-war growth in Europe
was largely based on imitation and driven by capital accumulation. Europes unsatisfactory
growth performance during the last few decades is a symptom of its failure to transform into
an innovation-based economy. A system built around the assimilation of existing technolo-
gies, mass production generating economies of scale, and an industrial structure dominated
by large rms with stable markets and long term employment patterns no longer delivers in
the world of today, characterised by economic globalisation and strong external competition
(Sapir et al. (2003)).
What is needed now for European countries is to shift towards growth-based on innova-
tion. Once European countries had moved closer to the technology frontier and also with
the occurrence of new technological revolutions in communication and information, growth
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was driven to a greater extent by innovation and fast adaptation to technical progress.
Innovation inuences rm performance through a variety of channels that range from the
e¤ects of innovation on sales and market shares to changes in productivity and e¢ ciency.
Furthermore, important impacts of innovation at industry and national levels are, among
others: changes in international competitiveness and in total factor productivity, emergence
of knowledge spillovers of rm-level innovations, and an increase in the amount of knowledge
ows through networks.
Academics and policy-makers have emphasised the importance of investment in research
and development (R&D) as a contributor to long-term productivity growth. Regarding
academic literature on this issue, since Griliches (1979), many empirical studies have focused
on the link between R&D and productivity4 and on the role of technological process and
product innovations as productivity shifters5. In response to these concerns, the European
Union has set itself the target of increasing R&D expenditure to 3% of the GDP by 2010
(this is part of the Lisbon Strategy).
However, a framework broader than technological product and process innovation is
needed. In this sense, the third edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) expands the
denition of innovation to include, besides product and process innovations, two additional
types of innovations, organisational innovation and marketing innovation. Including mar-
keting and organisational innovations gives a more complete framework that is better able
to capture the changes that a¤ect rm performance and contribute to the accumulation of
knowledge.
The third chapter of this dissertation contributes to the literature on innovation and
productivity by analyzing the e¤ect of organizational innovation on productivity. An or-
ganisational innovation (see OECD, 2005) is the implementation of a new organisational
method. These can be changes in (i) a rms business practices (i.e., the implementation of
new methods for organising routines and procedures of the conduct of work), (ii) workplace
4See Griliches (1995) for a survey.
5Crépon et al. (1998) propose a structural model that describes the link between R&D expenditure,
innovation output and productivity.
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organisation (i.e., the implementation of new methods for distributing responsibilities and
decision-making autonomy among employees, for the division of work as well as new con-
cepts for the structuring of activities), or (iii) external relations (i.e., the implementation
of new ways of organising the relations to other rms or public institutions).
Changes in organisational methods can improve the e¢ ciency and quality of rmsop-
erations, thereby increasing demand or reducing costs. There are an increasing number of
studies that suggest a signicant and positive e¤ect of various measures of organizational
innovation on productivity. For example, one of the most signicant ndings on the rela-
tionship between organizational innovation and growth is given by Black and Lynch (2004).
These authors nd that as much as 30 percent of output growth from 1993-1996 in US
manufacturing might be accounted for organizational practices (specically for workplace
practices and re-engineering e¤orts).
The third chapter focuses on the role of one of the most relevant organizational methods,
outsourcing. In this sense, the third edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) considers
outsourcing or subcontracting of business activities in production, procuring, distribution,
recruiting and ancillary servicesa new organisational method in a rms external relations.
Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is organized in three chapters. The rst chapter explores the determi-
nants of R&D cooperation using a sample of Spanish manufacturing rms. The data used
correspond to the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3; period 1998-2000), carried
out in Spain by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) under the name Encuesta de
Innovación Tecnológica en las Empresas. This chapter focuses on the impact of informa-
tion ows or spillovers on R&D cooperation, but also explores the role of the traditionally
considered factors (rm size, cost and risk sharing, complementarities). The estimation
methods used allow testing the endogeneity for the explanatory variables, which in other
papers are assumed to be endogenous a priori. I nd that the choice of an appropriate
structureof endogeneity has important consequences for the estimates: only in this case
do cost-risk sharing and complementarities have the expected positive e¤ect. I also nd that
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the overall picture of the importance of the explanatory variables depends on the estimation
method. In this sense, two-step procedures overestimate the importance of spillovers. With
a more e¢ cient procedure, I nd that cost-risk sharing is the most important determinant
of R&D cooperation in Spain. Finally, the overall results on the importance of spillovers
are consistent with the existing literature, but I nd that a greater level of legal protection
in the industry has a negative e¤ect on R&D cooperation.
Di¤erent versions of this study have been presented at the European Summer School on
Industrial Dynamics (ESSID) in August 2003, at the VII Encuentro de Economía Aplicada
in June 2004, at the 32nd EARIE meeting in September 2005 and at the I Escuela de
Economía de la Innovación in July 2006. A version of this chapter has been accepted for
publication in the International Journal of Industrial Organization.
The second chapter investigates cooperative innovative activity in four major European
countries, France, Germany, Spain and the UK, using internationally comparable rm-level
data for manufacturing and service sectors. Again, the source of the data is the Third
Community Innovation Survey. The chapter examines the roles of knowledge ows, cost-
and risk-sharing and public nancial support in rms decisions to collaborate. Results
suggest that rms which place greater value on external information ows are more likely
to cooperate with the research base than with other rms, and that rms facing appro-
priability problems are more likely to cooperate with the research base and with upstream
and downstream rms than with direct competitors. I nd evidence for Spain to suggest
that rms collaborate to overcome risks and nancial constraints. I also nd that receipt
of public support is positively related to undertaking collaborative innovation. In line with
the focus of policy, this relationship is strongest for cooperation with the research base.
I presented a preliminary version of this chapter at the 33rd EARIE meeting in August
2006. The current version, in collaboration with Laura Abramovsky, Elisabeth Kremp,
Tobias Schmidt and Helen Simpson, has been accepted for publication in Economics of
Innovation and New Technology.
The third chapter is aimed at analyzing the relationship between organizational inno-
vation and productivity. I focus on the role of one of the most relevant organizational
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methods, outsourcing. Outsourcing is a make or buy decision and implies the modication
of the boundaries of the rm. It must be seen as part of the organizational innovation
process, carried out in the search for increasing exibility and e¢ ciency. Specically, this
chapter deals with outsourcing at the rm level and focuses on the role of contracting
out of manufacturing activities. To address it, I develop and estimate a simple theoret-
ical framework justifying the addition of outsourcing measures to the specication of a
traditionalproduction function. The framework developed leads to the estimation of a
production function depending on traditional inputs (labor, capital and materials) and an
index of production subcontracting. Specically, both the e¤ect of rst-time outsourcing on
productivity and the e¤ect of the intensity of production subcontracting can be analyzed.
Using an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing rms from the Encuesta sobre
Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), I nd that for manufacturing as a whole, both the
outsourcing decision and its intensity have a positive e¤ect on productivity. When analyzing
industry level results, I nd that outsourcing intensity has a positive e¤ect on productivity,
mainly for rms belonging to light industries, while the decision of starting (stopping)
outsourcing has the expected positive (negative) e¤ect on productivity.
The simple theoretical framework presented in section 3.2 has shortcomings. These lim-
itations are overcome in the last part of the chapter. In this sense, the third chapter ends
with a rst attempt at modelling and estimating a more structural framework for the spec-
ication of a production function considering the possibility of production subcontracting.
This framework allows us to identify two uses for labour (labour used directly in the
production of the nal output and labour used in the production of the intermediate input).
Results presented in the last section show plausible values for the elasticities of both labour
uses, capital and intermediate consumptions.
Di¤erent versions of this study have been presented at the XX Jornadas de Economía
Industrial in September 2004, at the 32nd EARIE meeting in September 2005, at the IX
Encuentro de Economía Aplicada in June 2006 and at the Fourth CEPR School on Applied
Industrial Organisation in May 2007.
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Policy implications
Productivity analysis performed at the aggregate level systematically shows a slower
growth of the EU economy in the 90s when compared with the US (see, for example, Scar-
petta et al. (2000)). This, although particularly strong for certain services sectors that
intensively use information telecommunications technologies, has been the cause of greater
concern and discussion on the ability of the European economy to develop, di¤use and apply
the new technologies, and their capabilities of transforming them into an engine of growth.
The Lisbon Strategy, a policy response to this challenge, embodied a broad set of struc-
tural reform targets, with the strategic economic goals of creating the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010. The development of these policies continues
today, being a subject of primary attention. The results of this dissertation, focussed on
the understanding of cooperation in innovative activities and the e¤ect of innovation on
productivity, have some general implications for these policies.
The premise is, as my results show, that innovative activity enhances productivity. The
question is how to reinforce the best realisations of this fact. The research done on innovation
and productivity has contributed to the literature by analyzing the e¤ect of a particular
form of organizational innovation on productivity.
Cooperation in innovative activities emerges from my results as a way, still very unequally
developed across European countries, to face the challenges of technological developments
by enhancing protable innovation. This is a timely subject. Both the OECD and the
European Union support the idea of developing stronger industry-science linkages. In this
sense, in 2003, the British government conducted a major review of the extent of business-
university collaboration, which suggested ways to improve government support for such ac-
tivity6. The UK currently operates a number of schemes aimed at encouraging collaborative
innovative activity between businesses and research institutions, and business-to-business
linkages. In Germany, a signicant amount of public funding for innovative activity is now
directed towards research consortia comprising private businesses and scientic research
institutions, and policies in France and Spain also emphasise public-private sector collabo-
6HM Treasury (2003).
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ration7.
My ndings support the idea that both the presence of incoming spillovers and the
ability to appropriate the returns from innovation stimulate cooperation, which means
that the enlargement of collaborative practices can strengthen innovation and this can
be policy-promoted. In fact, the results already show some positive association between
cooperation and public support, which possibly stresses the presence of an already active
supporting policy.
7See Abramovsky et al. (2004) for a summary for the UK, Fier et al. (2006) for information on the
direction of funding in Germany, Acosta and Modrego (2001) for further information for Spain, and MNRT
(2005) for further information for France.
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CHAPTER 1. DETERMINANTS OF R&D COOPERATION: EVIDENCE
FROM SPANISH MANUFACTURING FIRMS
1.1. Introduction
In the ultimate interest of stimulating innovation, much attention has recently focused
on the subject of cooperative rm R&D. These agreements, from the positive point of view,
are likely to embody mechanisms by which rms can protably appropriate free ows of
knowledge and protect them. Hence, they are an interesting guide to normative regulation,
which must try to consolidate mechanisms of incentives and at the same time avoid harming
market competition.
R&D cooperation has thus become a major topic for policy makers. Most E.U. and
national public funding for R&D is directed at stimulating cooperation between rms, and
between rms and public institutions8. The rationale behind this policy is to generate or
improve information ows or spillovers between these economic agents, as these spillovers
are assumed to essentially lead to more economic growth9 and a better performance of the
national system of innovation.
Given this growing interest, the literature has recently paid attention to the relation-
ship between R&D cooperation activity and spillovers. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002),
henceforth CV, nd that the rmsexternal information sources (incoming spillovers) and
the ows out of the rms measured by the ability of rms to appropriate the returns from
innovation (appropriability) have important and separately identiable e¤ects on the prob-
ability of R&D cooperation. Other works have studied the relationship between spillovers
and R&D cooperation; see, for example, Belderbos et al. (2004) for evidence on this rela-
8See Acosta and Modrego (2001) for an example of public funding in Spain, and Abramovsky, Harrison
and Simpson (2004) for a summary for the UK.
9See Griliches (1992) for a survey on the empirical evidence on the relationship between R&D spillovers
and growth, and Romer (1990) for a theoretical discussion.
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tionship from the Netherlands, and Kaiser (2002a) for evidence from the German service
sector.
Besides knowledge ows, the literature has identied three major classes of motives for
rms to become involved in R&D cooperation: cost and risk sharing10, complementarities
or skill-sharing11, and factors related to the absorptive capacity of the rm12. Firstly,
cooperative R&D agreements may be used by rms to set cost and risk-sharing rules in
high-cost and risky settings. Hence, when cost and risk are important innovation hampering
factors, rms would tend to make cooperative R&D agreements. Secondly, cooperative R&D
is a vehicle for rms to learn skills and capabilities from their partners. As such, the greater
the availability of technological know-how within the rm, the more likely it is to have
complementarities between partners in a cooperative R&D agreement. Finally, one other
determinant that is closely related to knowledge ows and complementarities is the idea
of absorptive capacity. A rms absorptive capacity is derived from its own R&D e¤orts
and is a measure of its ability to benet from other rmsR&D activity. The higher the
absorptive capacity of the rm, the higher the benets from R&D cooperation.
This chapter develops evidence about the determinants of R&D cooperation using a
sample of Spanish manufacturing rms, focusing mainly on the importance of spillovers.
The study is based on the model introduced by CV, although it departs from these authors
to explore some econometric and substantial issues.
The contribution of this study to the empirical literature on R&D cooperation is three-
fold. First, I show that an adequate treatment of endogeneity matters a great deal. I nd
evidence supporting the existence of an important e¤ect of spillovers on R&D cooperation,
although cost and risk sharing is the most important determinant for cooperation in Spain.
In obtaining these results, I apply a complete treatment for endogeneity. Two alternative
estimation methods are used: Two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) and
Conditional maximum likelihood (CML). These techniques allow me both to test for the
10See, among others, Belderbos et al. (2004), Hagedoorn (1993), Miotti and Sachwald (2003), Tether
(2002), Tyler and Steensma (1995).
11For example, Hagedoorn (1993), Sakakibara (1997), Tyler and Steensma (1995).
12See, among others, Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Röller et al (2002), Sakakibara (1997), Tether (2002).
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endogeneity of the explanatory variables which in other papers are assumed to be endoge-
nous a priori and to obtain e¢ cient estimates. I nd that the choice of an appropriate
structureof endogeneity is crucial and has important consequences for the estimates. I
also nd that, depending on the estimation method, a di¤erent picture of the importance of
the explanatory variables is obtained. In this sense, two-step procedures overestimate the
importance of spillovers and underestimate the impact of cost and risk sharing reasons on
the probability of R&D cooperation.
Second, I obtain new insights on the topic due to the sample employed. On the one
hand, I use a large sample of 2518 rms, in contrast with the 411 observations used by
CV. This sample size allows me to obtain more accurate estimations and more precision
applying hypothesis tests. On the other hand, compared with most European countries, the
Spanish system of innovation is in an earlier stage of development. Compared with France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, Spain presents the lowest proportion of rms with
innovation expenditures and with intramural R&D. The R&D intensity (ratio of intramural
R&D expenditure over total turnover) of Spanish rms performing R&D is, approximately,
one third of the e¤orts of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Spain also presents
the lowest share of rms with R&D cooperation agreements13. As R&D cooperation is an
important vehicle for improving the innovation performance of rms, this gap makes the
study of those factors that may stimulate cooperation in R&D more interesting. Moreover,
the structure of the Spanish manufacturing sector is characterized by a large share of small
and low-technology rms, while the general nding in the literature is that rms from
high-technology sectors and big rms are more likely to cooperate in R&D. It is worthy of
exploring cooperation in such a context of small and low-technology rms.
Third, I extend CVs framework to the analysis of the determinants of R&D cooperation
with competitors and I pay more attention to the relationship between cooperation and the
e¤ectiveness of di¤erent legal methods for protecting inventions or innovation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the data and
13See Abramovsky et al. (2004) for a detailed comparison in the innovation activities and performances
at the national level for France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.
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presents some descriptive analysis of the sample. Section 1.3 introduces the framework for
the analysis. The econometric specication is shown in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents
the results. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2. Data and descriptive analysis
The data used correspond to the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3; period
1998-2000), carried out in Spain by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) under the
name Encuesta de Innovación Tecnológica en las Empresas. The Community Innovation
Surveys take place every 4 years in European countries to investigate a rms innovation
activities. In 2001, the third wave was conducted and covered the period 1998 to 2000. The
CIS3 follows the recommendations of the OSLO Manual on performing innovation surveys
(see OECD and Eurostat, 1997).
Table 1.1. Characteristics of CIS3 in Spain
Responsible national authority INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadstica)
Participation Compulsory
Target population (number of employees) 10
Frame population O¢ cial INE register of rms (DIRCE)
Covered sectors1 C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, N, O
Stratication Size, sectors
Sample 11778
Non-response analysis no
1According to NACE classication: C (mining and quarrying), D (manufacturing), E (electricity,
gas and water supply), F (construction), G (wholesale, retail trade, repair of motor vehicles), H (hotels),
I (transport, storage and communication), J (nancial intermediation), K (real estate, renting and business
activities), N (health and social work), O (other community, social and personal service activities).
The Spanish CIS3 collected data on 11778 rms14. The population target was rms with
146094 in Manufacturing (NACE 15-37), 4778 in Services (NACE from 50 to 95), and the rest in Mining
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Table 1.2. Sample Statistics
(Number and percentage of rms)
Manufacturing Firms 6026
Innovating Firms 2518 (41:8%)1
Non-cooperating Firms 2042 (81:1%)2
Cooperating Firms (at least one cooperative R&D agreement) 476 (18:9%)2
Firms Cooperating with Competitors 184 (7:3%)2
Firms Cooperating with Suppliers or Customers 316 (12:5%)2
Firms Cooperating with Research Institutions 425 (16:9%)2
1percentage with respect to manufacturing rms
2percentage with respect to innovating rms
10 or more employees. A rm is dened as the smallest combination of legal units that is an
organizational unit producing goods or services. Participation is compulsory for rms and
is based on stratied samples by size and sector. Unit non-response analysis is not carried
out. Table 1.1 summarizes the main features of the survey for Spain.
The nal sample of the manufacturing sector includes 6026 rms15, 41.8% (2518 rms)
of which report having introduced innovations during the reference period. This work
restricts the attention to this subsample of innovating manufacturing rms. Innovating
rms are dened as those which report having introduced product or process innovations,
having ongoing innovation activities, or having abandoned innovation activities, and, at the
same time, present a positive amount spent on innovation during the period 1998-2000.
Table 1.2 reports some sample statistics. It turns out that 476 rms in my sample of 2518
innovating rms (18.9%) have at least one cooperative R&D agreement. It is helpful to
further distinguish among di¤erent types of cooperative R&D agreements depending on the
kind of partner: 184 rms cooperate with competitors, 316 rms cooperate with suppliers
or customers (vertically-related rms), and 425 rms cooperate with research institutions.
and quarrying (NACE 10-14), Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE 40-44) and Building (NACE 45).
15 In this exercise, I drop a total of 68 manufacturing rms because of partially incomplete data.
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Table 1.3. Cooperative R&D Agreement Combinations
(Number and percentage1of rms)
Cooperating rms with three types of agreements 159
(33:4%)
Cooperating rms with one or two types of agreements
Competitors Suppliers or Customers Research Institutions
Competitors 7 9 9
(1:5%) (1:9%) (1:9%)
Suppliers or Customers   35 113
(7:3%) (23:8%)
Research Institutions     144
(30:2%)
1percentage with respect to Cooperating Firms (rms with at least one cooperative R&D agreement)
Table 1.3 shows that most rms maintain cooperative R&D agreements with di¤erent
partners. Sixty-one percent of rms have agreements with at least two types of partners,
and 33.4% cooperate with all three types. It is important to keep this in mind when
analyzing cooperation by type of partner. For example, just 144 rms which cooperate
with research institutions have agreements exclusively with these institutions, while the
other 281 rms also maintain agreements with at least one other type of partner.
Table 1.4 shows the distribution of the sample of innovating manufacturing rms across
industries and size. The sample presents a larger number in small rms (fewer than 200
employees) than in big rms (200 or more workers); 1748 and 770 rms, respectively. With
respect to sector distribution, the sample shows a higher share of rms in low-technology
sectors (63.9% of the rms belong to low-technology sectors). These facts are consistent
with the Spanish manufacturing sector characteristics shown in the introduction. Focusing
on R&D cooperation activity, innovative rms in high-technology manufacturing sectors
and big rms are more likely to engage in cooperative activity.
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Table 1.4. Number of innovating manufacturing rms by size and sector1;2
Less than 200 employees 200 or more employees
Transport equipment 85 (14) 96 (38)
Chemicals 150 (49) 109 (52)
Machinery 139 (17) 46 (13)
Electrical 196 (36) 88 (39)
High-technology sectors 570 (116) 339 (142)
Food, beverages and tobacco 166 (15) 126 (33)
Textile and leather 197 (9) 45 (8)
Wood and paper 228 (10) 50 (11)
Rubber and plastic 81 (6) 37 (9)
Non-metallic mineral products 106 (11) 50 (22)
Metallic products 219 (24) 93 (39)
NEC and recycling 181 (16) 30 (5)
Low-technology sectors 1178 (91) 431 (127)
Manufacturing rms 1748 (207) 770 (269)
1number of innovating manufacturing rms with at least one cooperative R&D agreement between
brackets
2Transport equipment (NACE 34-35); Chemicals (NACE 23-24); Machinery (NACE 29); Electrical
(NACE 30-33); Food, beverages and tobacco (NACE 15-16); Textile and leather (NACE 17-19);
Wood and paper (NACE 20-22); Rubber and plastic (NACE 25); Non-metallic mineral products
(NACE 26); Metallic products (NACE 27-28); NEC and recycling (NACE 36-37)
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1.3. A framework for the analysis
Based on the literature reviewed in the introduction, this chapter models the probability
of cooperation as depending on spillovers, as well as the traditional variables which are
thought to a¤ect R&D cooperation (cost-risk sharing, complementarities, absorptive capac-
ity of the rm, etc.). I include three variables related to the measure of spillovers, i.e.,
incoming spillovers (measured by the importance of publicly available information for the
rms innovation process), appropriability (measured by the e¤ectiveness of the di¤erent
strategic protection methods of innovations, the converse of which can be thought of as the
extent of outgoing spillovers) and a measure of the importance of legal methods for pro-
tecting inventions or innovation at the industry level16. Detailed denitions of all employed
variables can be found in Appendix 1.A.
Let me briey comment on the expected e¤ects of the explanatory variables.
Incoming spillovers are expected to have a positive e¤ect on the probability of cooperation.
The higher incoming spillovers are, the greater the scope for learning within cooperative
R&D agreements, and hence the marginal prot to be derived from cooperation.
The sign of the e¤ectiveness of strategic and legal protection methods (appropriability
and industry level of legal protection), however, is not so clear a priori. The literature
suggests two opposite e¤ects of this variable on the probability of cooperation. The net
e¤ect will then depend on their relative importance. On the one hand, a low level of
e¤ectiveness increases the scope for the internalization of information ows between rms
through cooperation in R&D. But, on the other hand, incentives to become a free rider on
other rmsinvestments will reduce protability and the stability of cooperative agreements.
The cost-risk variable, given the hypothesis of cost and risk sharing, is expected to show a
positive e¤ect on cooperation. To test for complementarities, a variable which measures the
availability of technological know-how within the rm is included. This variable is expected
16As far as legal protection can be considered an industry variable rather than a rm-specic characteristic,
only the average industry score for legal protection is employed. The industry is dened at the NACE 2-digit
sector level.
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to have a positive e¤ect on cooperation.
Benets from R&D cooperation depend on the absorptive capacity of the rm. In this
sense, the higher the rms absorptive capacity, the higher the returns that the rm can
expect from access to external resources. On the one hand, theoretical models explicitly in-
corporate the need for a rm to conduct its own R&D in order to realize spillovers from other
rmsR&D activity (Gri¢ th, Redding and Van Reenen, 2003; Kaiser, 2002b; and Kamien
and Zang, 2000). On the other hand, empirical studies, such as Cohen and Levinthal (1989,
1990); Gri¢ th, Redding and Van Reenen (2003, 2004), have shown that rmsabsorptive
capacity depends on their own R&D intensity (R&D expenditures/turnover)17. So, R&D
intensity is included as a measure of the absorptive capacity of the rm.
Additionally, rms size is also included as a measure of the absorptive capacity of the
rm. Therefore, I should expect a positive e¤ect of the rms size on the probability of
cooperation. Size squared is considered to allow for a nonlinear e¤ect of rm size.
The specication also includes the level of cooperation at the industry level, which is
assumed to pick up unobserved industry-specic attributes that contribute to the decision of
engaging in a cooperative R&D agreement. Table 1.5 summarizes the theoretical predictions
along with the empirical ndings at the end of Section 1.5.
17 In the empirical literature, other variables have been used in order to measure the absorptive capacity
of the rm. For example, Belderbos et al. (2004); and Fritsch and Lukas (2001) measure the R&D intensity
by the ratio of R&D personnel to total personnel. Ja¤e (1986) uses both the ratio of R&D expenditures
on capital and the level of R&D expenditures. While Miotti and Sachwald (2003) and CV use a dummy
variable for permanent R&D as an indicator of the absorptive capacity.
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1.4. Econometric specication
1.4.1. The problem of endogeneity
My concern is that some of the explanatory variables introduced in the former section
are, in fact, endogenous. A priori, as in CV, I will consider the possible endogeneity of
incoming spillovers, appropriability and R&D intensity. Additionally, in a departure from
CVs paper, the cost-risk variable will also be taken as a possible endogenous variable.
Endogeneity can arise in two di¤erent ways: omitted variables that I cannot include in the
model and simultaneity in the decisions.
The propensity to cooperate in R&D can be correlated with unobserved factors that are
also systematically correlated with some of the explanatory variables. First, concerning
demand side factors, I can include managing capacity and quality, the choice of governance
mode of R&D activities, the extent to which the rm is open to new ideas, the permeability
of the rm, reputation, outward-looking style of management and tacitness of the rms
knowledge assets. For example, it is reasonable to think that the higher the managers
openness to new ideas, the higher the propensity to R&D cooperation. Additionally, the
culture of openness to new ideas seems to a¤ect, among others, the use of public sources of
information (incoming spillovers) and the managers risk aversion. Second, as for supply-
side factors, I can consider the geographical proximity and the accessibility to an intensive
technological area18. Third, of supply-demand interaction factors, I can include repeated
interactions with the same partner, the length of the cooperation relationship and previous
R&D cooperation agreements.
In addition to the omitted variables problem, spillovers, R&D intensity and cost-risk are
also expected to be endogenous variables due to a simultaneity problem. Firstly, cooperative
R&D agreements can be used to manage external knowledge ows19, which implies that
18These factors can a¤ect R&D cooperation simultaneity and variables such as R&D intensity, incom-
ing spillovers, the e¤ectiveness of strategic protection methods (appropriability) and the accessibility to
appropriate sources of nance.
19See, for example, Kamien, Müller and Zang (1992).
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the decision to cooperate can inuence incoming spillovers as well as the e¤ectiveness of
appropriation strategies. Secondly, several studies20 have found evidence supporting the
endogeneity of R&D intensity when analyzing the R&D cooperation decision because of
simultaneity in the decisions. In this sense, R&D intensity may increase if R&D cooperation
makes own R&D expenditures more e¤ective. Finally, when rms use cooperative R&D
agreements to share cost and risk, the e¤ects of cooperation can inuence the importance
given to these variables as obstacles to innovation.
1.4.2. System of simultaneous equations
Due to the endogeneity of a number of variables, I consider a system of simultaneous
equations (see Appendix 1.B for details). The model is composed of a structural equation
that is of primary interest (the cooperation equation) and a set of reduced form equations for
the potential endogenous explanatory variables (incoming spillovers, appropriability, R&D
intensity and cost-risk variable). The unobservable propensity to cooperate in R&D (y1) is
assumed to be a linear function of a set of observed exogenous explanatory variables (z1);
such as the rms size and the industry level of legal protection methods, a set of (possible)
endogenous explanatory variables (y2) and an error term (u1). Let y1 equal 1 if the rm
cooperates.
y1 = z11 + y21 + u1 (1.1)
y1 = 1 [y

1 > 0] (1.2)
I assume that the endogenous explanatory variables are functions of the exogenous variables
that determine cooperation (z1), a set of other exogenous variables (z2) and an error term
(v2).
y2 = z121 + z222 + v2 = z2 + v2 (1.3)
The arguments I presented before suggest that u1 and v2 are correlated. The model de-
scribed by equations (1:1)  (1:3) is applicable when y2 is correlated with u1 due to omitted
20See, among others, Becker and Dietz (2004), Colombo and Garrone (1996), and Veugelers (1997).
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variables and when y2 is correlated with u1 because y2 is determined jointly with y1 if y1
appears in a linear structural equation for y221.
I assume that u1and v2 have a joint normal distribution with mean zero and nite positive
covariance matrix:

 
24 2u1 u1v2
v2u1 v2v2
35 (1.4)
Under joint normality of (u1;v2), I can write.
u1 = v21 + e1 (1.5)
where 1 =  1v2v2v2u1
1.4.3. Estimation methods
Once the endogeneity of some variables is recognized, it is clear that the estimation of the
model by OLS or other techniques that do not allow for the endogeneity is inappropriate
and has important consequences, i.e., in applying OLS, I will not be able to consistently
estimate any of the coe¢ cients of equation (1:1). For instance, in the empirical literature,
the importance of cost and risk as obstacles to innovation has typically been considered an
exogenous determinant for R&D cooperation. However, considering this variable as exoge-
nous, it is hard to reach any broad generalization on the relation between R&D cooperation
and cost-risk sharing22. Therefore, a proper treatment of endogeneity is necessary to obtain
consistent estimates.
21 In this case, y2 has the reduced form given by equation (1:3) (for a further discussion of this topic, see
Maddala, 1983, Chapter 7; and Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 15). In my case, notice that the variables used
are contemporaneous, so it is plausible to think that the propensity or intention to cooperate (y1), and not
the actual action (y1), should be used as an explanatory variable for y2.
22Miotti and Sachwald (2003) nd that sharing costs and risks is not a signicant determinant of the
probability of R&D cooperation, while Tether (2002) nd a positive and signicant e¤ect. Moreover, CV
nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of the importance of cost as a hampering factor for the innovation
process of the rm, and, at the same time, the importance of risks has a negative and signicant e¤ect on
R&D cooperation.
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Moreover, the fact of considering an explanatory variable to be exogenous or endogenous
can yield very di¤erent pictures of its importance23.
Due to its importance, my choice is to apply a complete treatment for the endogeneity
problem. Instead of, as in CV, assuming the endogeneity of some explanatory variables and
using less e¢ cient two-step procedures to obtain the nal estimates, the methods applied
in this study allow me, at a slight computational cost, to both test for the endogeneity of
some explanatory variables of interest and obtain more e¢ cient estimates. I use maximum
likelihood estimation in order to present the nal ndings, while a two-step approach is
used for the initial exogeneity test of some explanatory variables.
Firstly, estimating this model, I use a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood method
(2SCML). This approach is due to Rivers and Vuong (1988).24 A convenient feature of this
procedure is that it provides an estimate of 1that can be used to test for the endogeneity
of y2. This method is a two-step estimation procedure. In the rst step, the (assumed)
endogenous variables (y2) are regressed on all the (assumed) exogenous variables (z). In the
second step, the residuals of the rst-step regressions (bv2) are used as independent variables
in the cooperation equation (joint with z1and y2). The usual probit t-statistic of bv2 is a
valid test of the null hypothesis that y2 is exogenous. The Rivers-Vuong approach is used
for the initial test of whether y2 is exogenous25.
Once the exogeneity of some explanatory variables is tested, the system of equations is
estimated by conditional maximum likelihood (CML)26. The log likelihood function for an
23For example, CV considers the importance of publicly available information sources as endogenous and,
using a two-step procedure, nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of this variable on R&D cooperation. On
the other hand, considering public incoming spillovers as exogenous, Belderbos et al. (2004) nd no evidence
on the e¤ect of this variable on the probability of R&D cooperation.
24See Wooldridge (2002) for a recent review of this method.
25Note that if 1 6= 0, we have only estimated the coe¢ cients up to scale.
26The CML estimator is a full-information maximum likelihood estimator. It is based on the entire system
of equations, treats all equations and parameters jointly and gives direct estimates of the coe¢ cients. System
methods of estimation (CML) are preferred to and asymptotically better than limited information methods,
or single-equation methods (2SCML), since the latter neglect information contained in other equations
while the former bring e¢ ciency gains. Moreover, the use of full information or system methods in model
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individual in this model is (see Appendix B for details).
logL = yi1 log
0@zi11 + yi21 + (yi2   zi2)1 
1  p1v2v21
 1
2
1A (1.6)
+(1  yi1) log
241 
0@zi11 + yi21 + (yi2   zi2)1 
1  p1v2v21
 1
2
1A35
 m
2
log(2)  1
2
log jv2v2 j  
1
2

(yi2   zi2) 1v2v2 (yi2   zi2)p

1.4.4. Identication strategy and identication assumptions
The specication described above requires a set of variables (z2 in the notation I have
been using) that are exogenous determinants of the endogenous explanatory variables but
that are not determinants of the probability of cooperation. I have included in z2 the
basicness of R&D, export intensity, industry level of incoming spillovers, industry level of
appropriability, industry level of R&D intensity and industry level of cost-risk. In what
follows, I dene these variables, and I present the economic intuition behind these exclusion
restrictions and the cases when they are included.
Kamien and Zang (2000) propose a model in which the benet that rms obtain from
incoming spillovers depends on their own R&D approach. Firms with a basic R&D approach
are more likely to benet from incoming spillovers. Following this argument, one can expect
that the more basic the R&D is, the higher the score on incoming spillovers will be. The
basicness of R&D is approximated by the importance of information from universities and
research institutes for the innovation process. When incoming spillovers are considered an
endogenous variable, basicness of R&D is included in z2.
The strategic protection variable can be inuenced by the competitive environment of the
rm. Export intensity is used as a measure of the competitive environment of the rm. The
underlying premise is that competition is higher in international markets than in domestic
ones, and only the most productive rms are able to make positive prots from exporting,
and so there is self-selection into these markets (see Melitz, 2003). The export market is
estimation makes use of the cross-equation correlations of the disturbances.
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one of substantial dynamism and exports are an important driver of rm performance (see
Bernard and Jensen, 1999). So, the higher the export intensity, the higher the competition.
When appropriability is considered an endogenous variable, export intensity is included in
z2.
Also included in z2 as exclusion restrictions are industry-level measures (at the 2-digit
NACE level) of the potentially endogenous variables27. These 2-digit NACE level vari-
ables are intended to capture the e¤ect of unobserved industry-specic attributes on the
corresponding potentially endogenous rm-specic variable.
The relevance and validity of these instruments are discussed in the next section.
1.5. Results
In this section, the basic model of cooperation is estimated, and the endogeneity of some
explanatory variables and the relevance and validity of the instruments are tested. Once
a structureof endogeneity is determined, the importance of di¤erent motives for partic-
ipating in cooperative R&D is discussed without distinguishing the type of partner. Next,
separate models for cooperation with competitors, cooperation with suppliers or customers,
and cooperation with research institutions are estimated. Before this, Table 1.6 gives de-
scriptive statistics on the main variables. As expected, most of the mean values are higher
for cooperating than for non-cooperating rms.
1.5.1. Dealing with endogeneity
Table 1.7 shows the estimated coe¢ cients of the independent variables for probit models.
Standard errors are estimated for these coe¢ cients. Regression a ignores endogeneity and
shows the results of a one-step probit model (single-equation probit), regressions b to d show
the results of 2SCML estimations, while regression e shows the results of CML estimation.
27The idea of using industry levels as instruments is conventional in microeconometric literature (see, for
example, Pakes, 1983).
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Testing the endogeneity
Three di¤erent structuresof endogeneity are considered a priori. Firstly, and following
CV, regression b shows the 2SCML estimations considering incoming spillovers, appropri-
ability and R&D intensity to be endogenous variables. Coe¢ cients accompanying residuals
of rst-step regressions for incoming spillovers and appropriability are signicant. Hence,
exogeneity of these two variables is rejected. Meanwhile, the exogeneity of R&D intensity
cannot be rejected.
Secondly, in regression c, I also consider cost-risk an endogenous variable. Again, I reject
the exogeneity of incoming spillovers and appropriability, while the exogeneity of R&D
intensity cannot be rejected. The exogeneity of cost-risk is rejected.
Finally, and due to the previous results, in regression d I consider incoming spillovers,
appropriability and cost-risk to be endogenous variables. Consistent with the previous
ndings, the exogeneity of these three variables is rejected.
Note that, when estimating the model by the CML exogeneity of incoming spillovers,
appropriability and cost-risk are also rejected (see regression e). This is the preferred
structureof endogeneity and the one used to obtain the marginal e¤ects.
Does the structure of endogeneity matter?
The structureof endogeneity is crucial and has important consequences for the signif-
icance and sign of the estimated coe¢ cients.
Firstly, considering cost-risk to be an endogenous variable has an important e¤ect on its
sign. When it is correctlyconsidered to be an endogenous variable, I nd that it has a
positive and signicant e¤ect (see regressions c, d and e), while, this variable presents a
negative and signicant e¤ect when it is taken as exogenous (see regression b). Additionally,
the sign of the variable complementarities seems to depend on the endogeneity of cost-risk. It
has a positive and signicant e¤ect if cost-risk is correctlyconsidered to be an endogenous
variable (see regressions c, d and e), while it shows a negative and signicant e¤ect when
the endogeneity of cost-risk is not taken into account (see regressions a and b).
Secondly, the character of R&D intensity also seems to a¤ect the results. When it is
38
Table 1.7. Results of Regressions for Cooperation. Testing the Endogeneity1
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation
(Single-Eq. Probit) (2SCML) (2SCML) (2SCML) (CML)
Constant  4:524  4:621  7:366  7:609  3:849
(0:406) (0:505) (1:162) (1:197) (0:473)
Incoming Spillovers 0:217 2:662 1:822 2:124 0:717
(0:109) (0:518) (0:576) (0:504) (0:386)
Appropriability 0:432 3:081 2:671 2:875 1:319
(0:096) (0:746) (0:770) (0:731) (0:473)
Ind. Level Legal Protection 0:075  4:016  3:323  2:977  1:281
(0:860) (1:038) (1:075) (1:039) (0:650)
R&D Intensity 3:136 6:558 6:407 2:039 0:873
(0:814) (4:343) (4:178) (0:720) (0:614)
Size 1:989 1:510 1:974 1:886 0:888
(0:326) (0:378) (0:412) (0:408) (0:284)
Size squared  0:287  0:219  0:289  0:279  0:132
(0:072) (0:077) (0:081) (0:082) (0:062)
Cost-Risk 0:293  0:572 2:749 2:903 1:953
(0:116) (0:139) (1:266) (1:318) (0:553)
Complementarities  0:220  0:242 1:094 1:220 0:817
(0:111) (0:132) (0:521) (0:539) (0:224)
Ind. Level Cooperation 2:887 2:599 2:520 2:850 1:209
(0:321) (0:492) (0:470) (0:363) (0:283)
incom ing sp illovers    2:958  2:117  2:418  0:848
(0:535) (0:591) (0:522) (0:405)
appropriab ility    2:774  2:358  2:561  1:184
(0:751) (0:775) (0:736) (0:417)
R&D intensity    4:280  4:127    
(4:375) (4:209)
cost-risk      2:578  2:736  1:883
(1:269) (1:321) (0:564)
LL  998:411  895:287  891:401  891:867  2217:254
2 332:41 449:63 459:81 451:53  
N 2518 2518 2518 2518 2518
signicant at 1%, signicant at 5%, signicant at 10%
1standard errors between brackets.
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correctlyconsidered to be an exogenous variable, I nd that it has a positive and signi-
cant e¤ect on the probability of cooperation (see regression d), while this variable loses its
signicance when it is considered to be endogenous (see regressions b and c).
Also, the sign and signicance of the industry level of legal protection depend on con-
sidering the endogeneity problem. The single-equation probit is the only case where this
variable is not signicant, while the other estimates show a negative and signicant e¤ect.
Finally, and fortunately, the character of cost-risk and R&D intensity does not seem to af-
fect the sign and signicance of incoming spillovers and appropriability (compare regressions
b, c, d and e).
Testing the relevance and validity of instruments
A plausible instrument must satisfy two conditions: relevance and validity. The relevance
condition can be tested by examining the results of the rst-step regressions. Table 1.A1
(see Appendix 1.C) shows the rst-step regressions from which the residuals of incoming
spillovers, appropriability and cost-risk for regression d in Table 1.7 have been obtained.
As expected, each instrument is signicant in the rst-step regression in question. The
F tests for joint signicance of the exclusion restrictions in the rst-step regression for
incoming spillovers, appropriability and cost-risk are, respectively, 66:57, 16:40 and 13:87,
which allows me to reject the null hypothesis.
In addition, Table 1.A1 shows two di¤erent R2 as measures of the relevancy of instru-
ments, i.e., the partial R2 (R2p) and the corrected partial R
2 (R
2
p)
28. For the appropriability
and the cost-risk regressions, our estimations yield larger values for R
2
p than for R
2
p. In the
case of incoming spillovers regression, R2p is slightly greater than R
2
p. Showing these results,
I can conclude that the instruments have enough relevance to explain all the endogenous
regressors.29
In my estimation framework, testing the orthogonality condition is more problematic.
28The R2p (see, for example Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995) is the R
2 of the rst-step regressions with
the included instruments partialled out (note that equations (1.1) and (1.3) include common exogenous
variables). The R
2
p, proposed by Shea (1997) takes the correlations among the instruments into account.
29See Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman (2003) for a comparative interpretation of R2p and R
2
p:
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The usual tests of overidentifying restrictions applied in IV or GMM estimation are not
valid in a probit estimation framework. To test the orthogonality condition, a regression of
the generalized residuals obtained from estimate d in Table 1.7 on the exclusion restrictions
is shown in Table 1.A2 (see Appendix 1.C). Only the industry level of cost-risk is weakly
signicant (with an associated t-ratio equal to 1:64). This regression gives some faith in
the instruments used. However, the validity of this regression for testing the orthogonality
condition is not conclusive, and other tentative experimentshave not been so optimistic30.
I assume that it is di¢ cult to nd perfectly exogenous instruments within the CIS, where
every question is closely related and, moreover, cross-section data is used. In what follows,
and taking this caveat into account and having found some evidence about the orthogonality
of the instruments, I will assume the validity of the instruments and the results obtained
will be conditional on this assumption.
Additionally, two arguments are in my favor. Firstly, when the instruments used are
not perfectly exogenous, the inconsistency of IV estimates depends on the relevance of the
instruments31. The lower the relevance, the higher the inconsistency. And thus, the high
relevance of my instruments can mitigate the inconsistency with not-perfectly exogenous
instruments. Secondly, assuming the existence of invalid instruments, Hahn and Hausman
(2005) nd that the 2SLS has a smaller nite sample bias and MSE than the OLS under a
wide range of conditions. So, in such a context of not-perfectly exogenous instruments, the
2SLS does better than the OLS in many cases32.
30Considering the case of a linear probability model, the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions rejects
the joint null hypothesis of correct model specication and the validity of the overall set of instruments.
31See, for example, Buse (1992); Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox (1996); Nelson and Startz (1990a, 1990b);
and Staiger and Stock (1997) for the study of the consequences of low relevance of instruments in an
instrumental variables estimation context.
32The conditions under which the 2SLS is still preferred to the OLS are derived for a linear model with
one endogenous variable, and I cannot check them in my framework.
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1.5.2. Determinants of cooperation
Table 1.8 shows the impact of the explanatory variables considered throughout this study
on the probability of R&D cooperation. Regression a pays no attention to endogeneity
problems, while regressions b and c estimate the model by 2SCML and CML respectively,
considering incoming spillovers, appropriability and cost-risk to be endogenous variables.
The preferred outcome is estimate c. Estimates a and b are used for checking the importance
of the estimation method on the results. I nd that the overall picture of the importance
of the explanatory variables depends on the estimation method. In this sense, two-step
procedures overestimate the importance of spillovers.
I can conclude that incoming spillovers and appropriability have a positive and signicant
impact on the probability of cooperation, although the impact of the e¤ectiveness of strategic
methods is almost double. In the rst place, the higher incoming spillovers are, the greater
the scope for learning within cooperative R&D agreements, and hence the marginal prot
to be derived from cooperation. Secondly, the more e¤ective strategic protection is, the
better rms control the outow of commercially sensitive information, and the more likely
they are to engage in cooperative agreements. Fortunately, the sign and signicance of
these variables do not depend on the estimation method, but the magnitudes clearly vary
according to the method. Above all, 2SCML and CML yield very di¤erent pictures of the
impact of incoming spillovers on R&D cooperation.
It seems that the industry level of legal protection has a negative e¤ect on R&D coopera-
tion. A high level of legal protection methods in an industry may hamper the internalization
of information ows between rms through cooperation in R&D, and hence their negative
e¤ect on this kind of practice. Taking this together with the ndings on appropriability, it
may be that cooperative activity is a method of internalizing outgoing knowledge ows in
industries where legal protection methods are weak, and for rms for whom more strategic
methods of appropriating returns are more important.
Cost-risk sharing is the most important determinant for cooperation33. This variable
33This fact is clear when estimating by CML (see regression c). 2SCML estimation does not yield a
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Table 1.8. Results of Regressions for Cooperation. Marginal E¤ects1
(a) (b) (c)
Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation
(Single-Eq. Probit) (2SCML) (CML)
Incoming Spillovers 0:049 0:440 0:252
(0:024) (0:106) (0:130)
Appropriability 0:097 0:596 0:464
(0:021) (0:150) (0:164)
Ind. Level Legal Protection 0:016  0:617  0:451
(0:194) (0:216) (0:226)
R&D Intensity 0:709 0:423 0:307
(0:186) (0:150) (0:213)
Size 0:450 0:391 0:312
(0:071) (0:082) (0:098)
Size squared  0:064  0:057  0:046
(0:015) (0:016) (0:022)
Cost-Risk 0:066 0:602 0:687
(0:026) (0:273) (0:213)
Complementarities  0:049 0:253 0:288
(0:025) (0:111) (0:086)
Ind. Level Cooperation 0:653 0:591 0:425
(0:071) (0:109) (0:090)
LL  998:411  891:867  2217:254
2 332:41 451:53  
N 2518 2518 2518
signicant at 1%, signicant at 5%, signicant at 10%
1standard errors between brackets. The coe¢ cients are the marginal e¤ect of the independent
variable on the probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus.
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has the greatest impact on the probability of cooperation (with a marginal e¤ect equal to
0.687). This fact possibly stresses the lack of external private nance for innovative activity
and the lack of venture capital investment, which is particularly true in Spain.
The e¤ect of rm size is positive and signicant, with evidence of a concave relation. In
this case, the estimated marginal e¤ect is similar among the estimation methods.
The hypothesis that rms with a higher availability of technological know-how are more
likely to cooperate is conrmed. Finally, R&D intensity seems to lose signicance when
estimating by CML (the associated t-ratio is 1.42).
1.5.3. Determinants of cooperation with di¤erent types of partners
As shown in Section 1.2, most rms in the sample maintain agreements with di¤erent
partners. For example, it is important to take into account that when I am analyzing the
subsample of rms that cooperate with research institutions, I am considering almost the
whole sample of cooperating rms.
Table 1.9 presents the marginal e¤ects for CML estimations of separate models for coop-
eration with di¤erent types of partners. I consider incoming spillovers, appropriability and
cost-risk to be endogenous variables34.
The e¤ectiveness of strategic protection has a signicant and positive e¤ect on cooperation
with the three types of partners. The higher the control over the information ows out of
the rm (through strategic protection methods), the higher the probability of cooperation
with any type of partner. Moreover, apart from the level of cooperation in the industry,
appropriability is the most important determinant for cooperation with competitors. Only
clear picture about the importance of the determinants for R&D cooperation. When estimating by 2SCML,
appropriability, cost-risk and industry level of cooperation have impacts around 0.6 (see regression b).
34Table 1.A3 (see Appendix 1.C) shows the tests for endogeneity. In some cases, I nd only weak evidence
for endogeneity of incoming spillovers and appropriability. However, for consistency, I still consider these
variables endogenous. Note that, when analyzing the pooled cooperation decision, the exogeneity of R&D
intensity is not rejected with an estimated coe¢ cient accompanying residuals of the rst-step regression for
R&D intensity smaller than its estimated standard error (see regressions b and c in Table 1.7).
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Table 1.9. Results of Regressions for Cooperation with di¤erent types of partners.
Marginal E¤ects1
(a) (b) (c)
Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation
with with Suppliers with Research
Competitors or Customers Institutions
(CML) (CML) (CML)
Incoming Spillovers 0:145 0:152 0:219
(0:096) (0:117) (0:131)
Appropriability 0:247 0:445 0:485
(0:140) (0:150) (0:161)
Ind. Level Legal Protection  0:186  0:347  0:437
(0:211) (0:220) (0:226)
R&D Intensity 0:213 0:327 0:180
(0:200) (0:188) (0:177)
Size 0:163 0:239 0:331
(0:087) (0:092) (0:097)
Size squared 0:017  0:031  0:052
(0:018) (0:020) (0:021)
Cost-Risk 0:414 0:591 0:740
(0:278) (0:241) (0:200)
Complementarities 0:154 0:249 0:315
(0:116) (0:099) (0:081)
Ind. Level of Cooperation 0:587    
with Competitors (0:120)
Ind. Level of Cooperation   0:438  
with Suppliers or Customers (0:111)
Ind. Level of Cooperation     0:398
with Research Institutions (0:099)
LL  1848:246  2062:711  2114:616
N 2518 2518 2518
signicant at 1%, signicant at 5%, signicant at 10%
1standard errors between brackets. The coe¢ cients are the marginal e¤ect of the
independent variable on the probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus.
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those rms with very e¤ective strategic protection methods will share knowledge with
their competitors.
Coinciding with CVs ndings, incoming spillovers seem to have an e¤ect only on coop-
eration with research institutions. Firms which nd publicly available information more
important for their innovation process are more likely to benet from cooperation with
research institutions.
The e¤ectiveness of the industry level of legal protection methods has a signicant and
negative e¤ect only on cooperation with research institutions. It seems that a high level of
these types of protection methods hampers the internalization of information ows between
rms and research institutions more than with the other types of partners.
For cooperation with suppliers and customers and cooperation with research institutions,
cost-risk sharing is the most important determinant for cooperation. Also, availability of
technological know-how has a positive and signicant e¤ect on cooperation.
For cooperation with suppliers or customers, I nd a positive and (weak) signicant
e¤ect of R&D intensity. This variable loses signicance for cooperation with competitors
and cooperation with research institutions. For the three types of cooperative agreements,
rm size is an important determinant for R&D cooperation.
The empirical results are summarized and compare to the hypothesis in Table 1.5.
1.6. Conclusions
This chapter is aimed at exploring the determinants of R&D cooperation using a sample
of Spanish manufacturing rms. A rst step focuses on studying the endogeneity of the
explanatory variables which in other papers are assumed to be endogenous a priori. I nd
evidence supporting endogeneity of spillovers and the importance of cost-risk as a hampering
factor for the innovation process. The choice of an appropriate structureof endogeneity
is revealed to be crucial in the signicance and sign of some of the estimated e¤ects. In
this sense, cost-risk sharing and complementarities have only the expected positive e¤ect
on R&D cooperation when the appropriate structureof endogeneity is imposed, while if
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this structureis not imposed, these variables have a negative e¤ect.
I also nd that the overall picture of the importance of the explanatory variables on the
probability of R&D cooperation depends on the estimation technique. Specically, two-step
procedures overestimate the importance of spillovers and underestimate the impact of cost
and risk-sharing reasons. So, in obtaining the nal estimated e¤ects, I apply a more e¢ cient
method, i.e., CML estimation.
Evidence supporting the existence of important and separately identiable e¤ects of in-
coming spillovers and appropriability on R&D cooperation is obtained: the higher incoming
spillovers are and the more e¤ective the strategic appropriation methods of the returns from
innovation is, the higher the probability of R&D cooperation. However, and in a departure
from other empirical works, the level of legal protection in the industry has a negative e¤ect
on R&D cooperation.
In spite of the importance of spillovers, I nd that cost-risk sharing is the most impor-
tant determinant for R&D cooperation. This fact possibly stresses the lack of external
private nance for innovative activity and the lack of venture capital investment, which is
particularly true in Spain.
Results also show that rm size and the availability of technological know-how within the
rm are signicant and positive determinants of R&D cooperation.
The results are not so clear when analyzing cooperation with each di¤erent type of part-
ner. Most rms have simultaneous agreements with di¤erent types of partners and this
makes identication di¢ cult. However, two principal ideas can be advanced. First of all,
for cooperation with suppliers and customers and cooperation with research institutions,
cost-risk sharing is the most important determinant for cooperation. Secondly, e¤ectiveness
of strategic protection methods is the most important determinant for cooperation with
competitors.
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Appendix 1.A. Variable denitions
Appropriability: Sum of the scores of the following strategic methods for protecting inven-
tions or innovations (number between 1 (high) and 4 (not used)): Secrecy; Complexity of
design; Lead-time advantage on competitors. Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 (high).
Basicness of R&D: Sum of the scores of importance of the following information sources
for innovation process (number between 1 (high) and 4 (not used)): Universities; government
or private non-prot research institutes. Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 (high).
Complementarities: Importance of lack of information on technology as an obstacle to
innovation (number between 1 (high) and 4 (not relevant). Rescaled between 0 (high) and
1 (not-relevant).
Cooperation: Variable which takes the value 1 if the rm cooperates with suppliers, cus-
tomers, competitors, commercial laboratories/R&D enterprises, universities, or government
or private non-prot research institutes.
Cooperation with Competitors: Variable which takes the value 1 if the rm cooperates
with competitors.
Cooperation with Research Institutions: Variable which takes the value 1 if the rm
cooperates with commercial laboratories/R&D enterprises, universities, or government or
private non-prot research institutes.
Cooperation with Suppliers or Customers: Variable which takes the value 1 if the rm
cooperates with suppliers or customers.
Cost-Risk: Sum of the scores of importance of the following obstacles to innovation
process (number between 1 (high) and 4 (not relevant)): Innovation costs too high; Lack
of appropriate sources of nance; Excessive perceived economic risks. Rescaled between 0
(not relevant) and 1 (high).
Export intensity: Export share in total turnover.
Incoming Spillovers: Sum of the scores of importance of the following information sources
for innovation process (number between 1 (high) and 4 (not used)): Professional conferences,
meetings and journals; Fairs and exhibitions. Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 (high).
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Industry Level of Appropriability: Mean of Appropriability at the industry level. Industry
is dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Cooperation: Mean of Cooperation at the industry level. Industry is
dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Cooperation with Competitors: Mean of Cooperation with competitors
at the industry level. Industry is dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Cooperation with Research Institutions: Mean of Cooperation with
research institutions at the industry level. Industry is dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Cooperation with Suppliers or Customers: Mean of Cooperation with
suppliers or customers at the industry level. Industry is dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Cost-Risk: Mean of Cost-risk at the industry level. Industry is dened
at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Incoming Spillovers: Mean of Incoming Spillovers at the industry level.
Industry is dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of Legal Protection: Mean of Legal Protection at the industry level. Legal
Protection is the sum of the scores of the following legal methods for protecting inventions
or innovations (number between 1 (high) and 4 (not-used)): Patents; Registration of design
patterns; Trademarks; Copyright. Rescaled between 0 (not-used) and 1 (high). Industry is
dened at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Level of R&D intensity: Mean of R&D intensity at the industry level. Industry
is dened at 2-digit NACE.
R&D intensity: Ratio between intramural R&D expenditure and turnover.
Size: Log of number of employees.
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Appendix 1.B. Econometric details
Let y1 represent a rms unobservable propensity to cooperate in R&D. y1 is assumed to
be a linear function of the previously observed explanatory variables. Let y1 equal 1 if the
rm cooperates.
I assume that the (possible) endogenous explanatory variables (y2) are a function of the
exogenous variables that determine cooperation (z1), a set of other exogenous variables (z2),
and an error term (v2).
So, the model can be written as follows:
y1 = z11 + y21 + u1 (1.a.)
y2 = z121 + z222 + v2 = z2 + v2 (2.a.)
y1 = 1 [y

1 > 0] (3.a.)
Where z1;y2; z2 and z are 1  p; 1 m; 1  k and 1  (p+ k) vectors, respectively. Note
that 21;22 and 2 are pm; k m and (p+ k)m matrices, respectively.
u1and v2 have a joint normal distribution with mean zero and nite positive covariance
matrix:

 
24 2u1 u1v2
v2u1 v2v2
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The most convenient normalization is:
2u1 = V ar(u1) = 1
This is the normalization imposed by Wooldridge (2002), and is di¤erent from that used by
Rivers and Vuong (1988), who use the normalization
V ar(y1 j z; y2) = 2u1   p1v2v21 = 1
Under joint normality of (u1;v2), I can write
u1 = v21 + e1 (4.a.)
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where 1 =  1v2v2v2u1 . To obtain the joint distribution of (y1;y2), conditional on z, recall
that
f (y1;y2 j z) = f (y1 j y2; z) f (y2 j z) (5.a.)
Since v2 has a joint normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix v2v2 , the
joint density f (y2 j z) is easy to write down:
f (y2 j z) = (2) 
m
2 jv2v2 j 
1
2 exp

 1
2
(y2   z2) 1v2v2 (y2   z2)p

(6.a.)
I can also derive the conditional density of y1 given (y2; z). Because of joint normality
of (u1;v2), e1 is also normally distributed with E(e1) = 0 and V ar(e1) = V ar(u1)  
p1v2v21 = 1  p1v2v21
Since (1:a:) and (4:a:), I can write
y1 = z11 + y21 + v21 + e1 (7.a.)
e1 j z;y2;v2 s N
 
0; 1  p1v2v21

(8.a.)
Since v2 = y2   z 2 and y1 = 1 [y1 > 0]
P (y1 = 1 j y2; z) = 
0@z11 + y21 + (y2   z2)1 
1  p1v2v21
 1
2
1A (9.a.)
Let w denote the term inside  () in equation (9:a:). Then I derive
f (y1 j y2; z) = f ()gy1 f1  ()g1 y1 (10.a.)
Substituting (6:a:) and (10:a:) in (5:a:), I can write
f (y1;y2 j z) = f ()gy1 f1  ()g1 y1 (2) 
m
2 jv2v2 j 
1
2 (11.a.)
exp

 1
2
(y2   z2) 1v2v2 (y2   z2)p

and so the log likelihood for observation i is
yi1 log (wi) + (1  yi1) log [1  (wi)] (12.a.)
 m
2
log(2)  1
2
log jv2v2 j  
1
2

(yi2   zi2) 1v2v2 (yi2   zi2)p

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where I understand that wi depends on the parameters (1;1;2;1):
wi  zi11 + yi21 + (yi2   zi2)1 
1  p1v2v21
 1
2
Summing expression (12:a:) across all i and maximizing with respect to all parameters gives
the MLEs of 1;1;2;v2v2 ;1. The estimate of 1 can be used to test for endogeneity
of y2.
Notice that, if u1 and v2 are uncorrelated and thus 1 = 0, the log likelihood function in
equation (12:a:) can be broken into two terms. The rst line would be the log likelihood
function for a single equation probit associated with y1, and the second line would be the
log likelihood function for the normal linear least-squares model associated with y2. Thus,
if 1 = 0 , there is no gain in considering the simultaneous equation model. If 1 6= 0,
however, the single-equation model and the simultaneous equation model can yield very
di¤erent coe¢ cient estimates.
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Appendix 1.C. Additional tables
Table 1.A1. Resu lts of rst-step regressions used for constructing the reduced form residuals
of Incom ing Spillovers, Appropriab ility and Cost-R isk of Table 1.7 , regression (d)1
(a) (b) (c)
Incom ing Spillovers Appropriab ility Cost-R isk
S ize  0:070 0:082  0:120
(0:056) (0:061) (0:057)
Size squared 0:008  0:009 0:015
(0:012) (0:015) (0:013)
Ind . Level Legal P rotection 0:044 0:068  0:087
(0:226) (0:247) (0:217)
R&D Intensity 0:001 0:047 0:072
(0:021) (0:082) (0:033)
Complem entarities  0:053  0:041  0:414
(0:018) (0:018) (0:018)
Basicness of R&D 0:371 0:171 0:135
(0:023) (0:027) (0:021)
Export intensity  0:016 0:126  0:006
(0:023) (0:027) (0:022)
Ind . Level of Coop eration  0:104  0:102 0:032
(0:077) (0:078) (0:078)
Ind . Level of Incom ing Spillovers 0:901 0:077 0:003
(0:126) (0:128) (0:129)
Ind . Level of Appropriab ility  0:073 0:768 0:084
(0:198) (0:214) (0:195)
Ind . Level of Cost-R isk 0:030 0:071 0:850
(0:179) (0:193) (0:167)
Constant 0:124  0:163 0:484
(0:123) (0:130) (0:116)
R2p 0:104 0:037 0:018
R
2
p 0:081 0:061 0:180
F(11, 2506) 34:90 20:41 66:96
F(5, 2506)2 66:57 16:40 13:87
N 2518 2518 2518
sign icant at 1% , sign icant at 5% , sign icant at 10%
1Estim ation m ethod: OLS. Robust standard errors b etween brackets.
2F test for jo int sign icance of the exclusion restrictions: basicness of R&D , export intensity,
industry level o f incom ing sp illovers, industry level o f appropriab ility and industry level o f
cost-risk .
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Table 1.A2. Results of the regression of the generalized residuals
of estimate d in Table 1.7 on the exclusion restrictions1
Generalized Residuals
Basicness of R&D 0:037
(0:028)
Export intensity 0:025
(0:029)
Ind. Level of Incoming Spillovers  0:169
(0:122)
Ind. Level of Appropriability  0:129
(0:125)
Ind. Level of Cost-Risk 0:183
(0:111)
R2 0:002
F(5, 2513) 1:35
N 2518
signicant at 1%, signicant at 5%, signicant at 10%
1Estimation method: OLS. Robust standard errors between brackets.
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Table 1.A3. Resu lts of Regressions for Coop eration w ith d i¤erent typ es of partners.
Testing the Endogeneity1
(a) (b) (c)
Coop eration Coop eration Coop eration
w ith w ith Suppliers w ith Research
Competitors or Custom ers Institutions
(CML) (CML) (CML)
Constant  4:161  3:932  3:958
(0:645) (0:560) (0:464)
Incom ing Spillovers 0:648 0:502 0:624
(0:529) (0:418) (0:389)
Appropriab ility 1:105 1:467 1:381
(0:661) (0:517) (0:469)
Ind . Level Legal P rotection  0:832  1:146  1:243
(0:971) (0:746) (0:649)
R&D Intensity 0:953 1:078 0:513
(0:957) (0:654) (0:509)
Size 0:730 0:789 0:943
(0:364) (0:307) (0:286)
Size squared  0:075  0:102  0:147
(0:077) (0:065) (0:062)
Cost-R isk 1:852 1:950 2:107
(0:886) (0:662) (0:510)
Complem entarities 0:690 0:821 0:897
(0:384) (0:270) (0:204)
Ind . Level of Coop eration 2:630    
with Competitors (0:690)
Ind . Level of Coop eration   1:447  
with Suppliers or Custom ers (0:434)
Ind . Level of Coop eration     1:132
with Research Institutions (0:307)
i n c om in g s p i l l o v e r s  0:716  0:541  0:767
(0:540) (0:428) (0:411)
a p p r o p r ia b i l i ty  0:936  1:242  1:240
(0:656) (0:512) (0:466)
c o s t - r i s k  1:597  1:759  2:049
(0:938) (0:686) (0:519)
LL  1848:246  2062:711  2114:616
N 2518 2518 2518
sign icant at 1% , sign icant at 5% , sign icant at 10%
1standard errors b etween brackets.
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CHAPTER 2. UNDERSTANDING COOPERATIVE INNOVATIVE
ACTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
2.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the extent to which European rms engage in cooperative inno-
vation, and aims to shed light on the determinants of such activity. Cooperative innovative
activity is a topical policy issue, in the context of technology transfer (most prominently
from universities to business) and in its interactions with competition policy. Both the
OECD and the European Union support the idea of strong industry-science linkages to
maximise the returns from both private and public research investments, and recognise a
role for policy intervention35.
In 2003, the UK government conducted a major review of the extent of business-university
collaboration, which suggested ways to improve government support for such activity36. The
UK currently operates a number of schemes aimed at encouraging collaborative innovative
activity between businesses and research institutions, and business-to-business linkages.
In Germany a signicant amount of public funding for innovative activity is now directed
towards research consortia comprising private businesses and scientic research institutions,
and policies in France and Spain also emphasise public-private sector collaboration37. In
this context it is important to understand which types of rms tend to engage in cooperative
innovative activities, the motivations for such activity and whether public policy is e¤ective
in increasing collaborative research.
In this study I focus (similar to Chapter 1) on the roles of knowledge ows, cost- and
risk-sharing and public nancial support in inuencing rmsdecisions to enter into coop-
35OECD (2004a,b), European Commission (2004a).
36HM Treasury (2003).
37See Abramovsky et al. (2004a) for a summary for the UK, Fier et al. (2006) for information on the
direction of funding in Germany, Acosta and Modrego (2001) for further information for Spain, and MNRT
(2005) for further information for France.
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erative innovation agreements. To do this, I build on the framework developed in Cassiman
and Veugelers (2002) (henceforth CV) that looks at the e¤ects of information ows, both
incoming and outgoing knowledge spillovers, on the likelihood of engaging in cooperative
innovative activity, using data from the 1st Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for Belgian
manufacturing rms.
I contribute to the literature by extending the analysis in CV in a number of ways. First,
I provide a comparison of the characteristics of rms engaging in cooperative innovation
activities across four major European countries (France, Germany, Spain and the UK),
using internationally comparable rm-level data from the 3rd Community Innovation Survey
(CIS3). Second, I include the service sector in the analysis, which is rarely considered in
empirical studies. Using the CIS is particularly appealing for this purpose as it focuses on
a wide concept of innovation activities likely to be more applicable to the service sector
compared to the narrower denition of R&D expenditure. Finally, I extend the analysis in
CV by considering cooperative innovation with competitors in addition to with the research
base and with rmssuppliers and customers, and also consider the relationship between
receipt of public nancial support for innovation and the likelihood of collaboration.
I nd that rms which place a higher value on external information ows, or incoming
knowledge spillovers, are more likely to engage in cooperative innovative arrangements.
Moreover, incoming spillovers are found to play a more important role in collaborative
arrangements with research institutions than with other rms, which is consistent with the
evidence presented in CV. I nd that rms which potentially face di¢ culties in appropri-
ating the returns to their innovative e¤orts, and which are reliant on strategic protection
methods such as secrecy to limit outgoing knowledge spillovers, are more likely to engage in
collaborative innovation with the research base and with upstream and downstream rms
than with rms with which they are in direct competition. This is consistent with free-riding
being a more serious problem within agreements between rivals.
I also nd some evidence, in particular for rms in Spain, that cooperative innovative
arrangements are motivated by a need to overcome nancial constraints, potentially reect-
ing di¤erences in capital markets across countries. Finally, as might be expected given the
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orientation of public support for innovation towards university-business technology transfer,
I nd a positive relationship between receipt of nancial public support for innovative activ-
ities and the probability of cooperating with the research base, and to a lesser extent with
the probability of cooperating with other rms. The relationship between receipt of pub-
lic support and cooperation is the weakest with respect to collaboration with competitors,
where competition policy concerns might be the most likely to come into play.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses reasons why rms might
engage in collaborative innovative activity, including the relationship with both incoming
and outgoing information ows. Section 2.3 describes the data, presents some cross-country
descriptive statistics on the degree to which innovative rms engage in cooperative innova-
tion, and denes the variables used in estimation. Section 2.4 presents empirical results on
the rm characteristics associated with cooperative activity, looking separately at coopera-
tion with di¤erent partners, in each country. I attempt to deal with potential endogeneity
concerns using instrumental variable methods. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Why do rms undertake collaborative innovative activity?
Firms may engage in collaborative innovative activity for a variety of reasons38. In this
study I focus on the roles of inward and outward knowledge ows, cooperation as a means
of overcoming constraints and the direction of public policy schemes. I discuss each of these
factors in turn and consider how their inuence might vary with the characteristics of the
collaborative partner39.
The analysis of knowledge spillovers and R&D cooperation has a long tradition in the the-
oretical literature40. Economic theory argues that R&D cooperation can help to internalise
knowledge spillovers arising from inventive activity and as a result increase social welfare.
38See, inter alia, Hagedoorn (1993), Glaister and Buckley (1996), Narula and Hagedoorn (1999), Cassiman
and Veugelers (2002), and Miotti and Sachwald (2003).
39This discussion is closely related to that presented in Chapter 1.
40See, inter alia, Kamien et al. (1992), DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Katz (1986), and Katsoulacos
and Ulph (1998).
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Recent empirical literature has been inspired by these ndings and has increasingly paid
attention to the relationship between R&D cooperation and knowledge spillovers41. Almost
all empirical studies conrm that generating or preventing a range of knowledge ows is a
motive for rms to cooperate. The analysis in CV has been particularly inuential. They
focus on the inuence of two types of knowledge ows on the likelihood of cooperation, rst
the extent of incoming spillovers, that is benecial knowledge ows from external sources;
and second appropriability, that is rmsability to capture the returns to their innovative
activity, the converse of which can be thought of as the extent of outgoing spillovers. CV
nd that these two types of knowledge spillovers have important and separately identiable
e¤ects on the probability that rms engage in cooperative R&D.
Firms that place a higher value on incoming spillovers and externally generated knowledge
in their innovative activity might exhibit greater scope for learning, and be more likely
to gain from knowledge exchange within a cooperative agreement. Hence they would be
expected to be more likely to undertake collaborative innovative activity. CV conrm the
existence of a positive relationship between the magnitude of incoming knowledge spillovers
and the probability of cooperation, in particular when analysing collaboration with research
institutions. It might be expected that rms which are able to capitalise on a diverse set
of external knowledge might be more likely to engage in collaborative ventures with the
research base or with rms outside their own industry. The extent to which di¤erent
motives for collaboration vary with di¤erent partners, especially the relationship between
rms and universities, has recently gained increasing importance in the literature42 and in
public policy formation43.
The degree to which rms value incoming spillovers will depend on their absorptive ca-
pacity, hence it is important to control for this factor in an empirical analysis. Cohen and
Levinthal (1989, p.569) dene absorptive capacity as a rms ability to identify, assimilate,
and exploit knowledge from the environment.Absorptive capacity will inuence the extent
41See, for example, Belderbos et al. (2004) for evidence for the Netherlands, Kaiser (2002) for evidence
for the German service sector, and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) for Belgium.
42See, inter alia, Belderbos et al. (2004), Bönte and Keilbach (2005), and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002).
43See, for example, HM Treasury (2003).
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to which rms can use external knowledge ows either to imitate or to innovate, depending
on a rms position relative to the technological frontier. Firms with higher absorptive
capacity might be more likely to be successful innovators, which could make them more
attractive cooperation partners for other rms. However, how a rms absorptive capacity
a¤ects its own incentives to engage in cooperative R&D is ambiguous. On the one hand,
rms that are better at accessing and using external knowledge can more easily benet from
the knowledge available to them for free and might thus have lower incentives to cooperate.
On the other hand, if they are also better able to prot from the knowledge exchanged
within a cooperative agreement, their incentives to cooperate could be higher44. Evidence
on the importance of absorptive capacity in determining rmsdecisions to cooperate on
innovation activities is found, for example, in Sakakibara (1997), Tether (2002) and Bay-
ona et al. (2001). In my analysis below I control for absorptive capacity using a measure
of R&D intensity, (which may capture R&D aimed at imitative or at innovative activity),
along with a measure of rm size.
The inuence of appropriability problems on rmsincentives to engage in collaborative
innovative activity is ex-ante ambiguous, and might be expected to vary with the type
of collaborative partner. On one hand, in the face of appropriability problems rms might
try and internalise outgoing spillovers by forming explicit collaborative relationships, rather
than conducting innovation activities on their own. On the other, an inability to appropriate
the returns to ones own innovative e¤orts, even inside a collaborative arrangement, might
lead to free-riding either inside45 or outside46 collaborative agreements and hence decrease
the likelihood of such agreements occurring, by reducing the incentives for rms to form
them.
44Hagedoorn (1993) argues that access to complementary knowledge and technologies is one of the most
important motives for rms to engage in cooperative research. The resource based view supports this (see,
for instance, Mowery et al. (1998)).
45Kesteloot and Veugelers (1995), for example, found that the incentive to cheat within a cooperative
agreement increases if outgoing spillovers are high, thus decreasing the incentive to cooperate in the rst
place.
46See Greenlee and Cassiman (1999).
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I might expect incentives to free-ride to be most prevalent within collaborative arrange-
ments with competitor rms, where appropriability problems might be most severe. Hence
rms facing appropriability problems might be less likely to engage in this type of agree-
ment compared to agreements with more dissimilar partners where free-riding may be less
feasible, and the incentives to do so much lower since they are not competing face-toface
in the same market. Appropriability problems, by causing cooperation to break down, may
lead to collaborative agreements between rival rms being less prevalent. Veugelers and
Kesteloot (1994) provide an analysis of the design of stable research joint ventures, empha-
sising conditions under which incentives to cheat are reduced. They highlight the role of
complementary capabilities between partner rms and the degree to which rms can keep
their own knowledge proprietary within an agreement as important factors in generating
stable agreements.
Other important motives for cooperative innovative activity identied in the literature are
sharing both the costs and risks associated with an R&D project, leading to higher expected
prots than if the projects were carried out individually. This argument is supported, for
example, by the evidence provided in Belderbos et al. (2004), Hagedoorn (1993), Miotti and
Sachwald (2003), Sakakibara (1997), Tether (2002) and Tyler and Steensma (1995). Ba-
sic research projects tend to be riskier than applied, more commercially oriented projects.
Hence, I might expect cost and risk sharing motivations to be more important for coop-
eration agreements with the research base if the innovative activity undertaken is more
orientated towards basic research compared to that carried-out within agreements with
other rms.
While rms may undertake collaborative innovative activities to overcome nancial con-
straints or to pool risks, they may nonetheless face other constraints to cooperative activity,
for example, the presence of market failures, such as co-ordination or information failures.
These may rationalise the existence of public support programmes to encourage coopera-
tive R&D and technology transfer between universities and rms, and rms and rms alike.
Supporting cooperation and knowledge sharing among actors in the national, regional or
local innovation system may increase social welfare and enhance the innovative capacity of
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rms. In order to achieve a high level of knowledge sharing among actors, public funding
for R&D and innovation activities is increasingly linked to cooperative innovation activities,
and aims to facilitate cooperative innovation by rms that would otherwise not engage in
such activity.
As discussed in more detail in Section 2.4, this public funding is primarily targeted
at university-rm collaboration, where institutional incentives for university scientists to
engage in technology transfer to rms might otherwise be weak. I therefore expect to
nd the strongest relationship between receipt of public support and cooperation with the
research base47. Moreover I might expect to nd a much weaker relationship with respect
to cooperation with competitors. Public support is less likely to be directed at this form
of collaboration since it may raise policy concerns of a quite di¤erent nature, in terms of
restrictions on the degree of product market competition ex-post.
Indeed anti-trust concerns might be a further reason why I might expect to observe fewer
agreements between competing rms. Much of the literature on R&D cooperation has fo-
cussed on models of rival rms. Katz and Ordover (1990) provide a discussion of policy
towards collaborative research in the context of potential e¤ects on competition. Their
analysis emphasises that the welfare e¤ects of ex-ante cooperation hinge on the environ-
ment in which R&D cooperation and product market competition take place, for example
the extent of technological spillovers and whether the rmsproducts are market substi-
tutes or complements. Related to this, DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) analyse e¤ects
dependent on the degree of knowledge spillovers, and Kamien et al. (1992) carry out a wel-
fare analysis of di¤erent types of R&D competition and cooperation, incorporating di¤erent
models of product market rivalry. As discussed above incentives to free-ride might also be
strongest within agreements between rivals, and problems due to incomplete contracts (the
di¢ culties of contracting on, observing and verifying all relevant potential actions within an
47While I would expect to nd a positive correlation between cooperative R&D activity and receipt of
public support, this does not necessarily imply that policies are generating additional cooperative research. It
maybe that some of those rms receiving support would have engaged in some form of cooperative innovative
activity in any case.
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R&D partnership) might also lead to agreements between competitors being less frequent
in practice.
The discussion above highlights that the extent to which rms benet from incoming
spillovers, the extent to which they can appropriate the returns to their innovative activity,
and whether or not they face constraints in their innovation activities may themselves
depend on whether or not rms engage in cooperative innovation, in addition to other rm
and industry-specic factors. Following CV, my empirical framework, outlined in Section
2.4.1, attempts to take account for this potential endogeneity. Before turning to results, I
next present some descriptive statistics on the propensity of innovative rms to undertake
cooperative innovative activity, and on the characteristics of rms that do so.
2.3. Data and descriptive statistics
As in the previous chapter, the source of the data is the 3rd Community Innovation Survey
(CIS3, carried out in 2001). At this point I focus on a comparison of the characteristics of
CIS3 across France, Germany, Spain and the UK. Table 1.2 summarizes the main features of
the survey in each of the four countries considered. The questionnaire - including denitions
- which was sent by post to the rms is harmonised across countries and includes some core
as well as some optional questions. Beyond the questionnaires, statistical survey methods,
as well as data mining and analytical methods are co-ordinated by Eurostat.
CIS3 covers all enterprises with 10 or more employees. In France however, the target
population covers rms with 20 or more employees, hence for comparability I restrict the
analysis to rms with more than 20 employees in each country. Appendix 2.A provides a
list of the manufacturing and services industries included in my analysis48.
48A more detailed description of the survey can be found in European Commission (2004b). Abramovsky
et al. (2004b) provides a description of the surveys and sampling methodology in France, Germany, Spain
and the UK.
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CIS 3 is based on stratied samples of the total rm population in each country, typically
applying disproportional drawing probabilities by size class and sector. While for most
countries carrying out the CIS 3, participation in the survey is voluntary for rms (such as
in Germany and the UK), some countries have set CIS3 as compulsory (such as France and
Spain).
Net sample sizes (i.e. the number of rms returning a completed questionnaire) vary
considerably among the four countries. Although Germany has the largest total population
of rms, the net sample size is the lowest. This is caused by a small sampling frame due
to nancing restrictions of the German CIS survey and a low response rate as a result of
voluntary participation combined with a general somewhat greater reluctance of German
rms to participate in surveys. The largest net samples are available for France and Spain
as a result of compulsory surveys. The sampling ratios range from 3.4 % (Germany), 7.9 %
(UK) and 13.7 % (Spain) to 18.6% (France). In order to control for a response bias in the
net sample, non-response analyses (NRA) have been carried out in Germany. A stratied
random sample of rms in the gross sample that did not respond to the questionnaire was
asked on a few questions relating to core innovation activities, using a computer-assisted
telephone interview technique. The sample size of the NRA was about the same size as
the net sample in order to compensate for the low sample ratio. According to the Euro-
stat methodology, the results of the NRA were used to adjust weighting factors for each
responding rm in order to represent di¤erences in the response behaviour of innovating
and non-innovating rms.
I dene rms that undertake cooperative innovative activity using the following question
from the CIS3:
Did your enterprise have any cooperation arrangements on innovation activities with
other enterprises or institutions during 1998-2000?49
In the questionnaire this is qualied to ensure that rms only answer yeswhere the
cooperation agreement involves genuine collaborative innovative e¤orts rather than purely
contracting out of R&D. If the rm responds positively, it is then asked to specify the types
49Question 8.1. Eurostat, Third Community Innovation Survey Harmonised Questionnaire.
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of partner with whom they collaborated. Using this information I distinguish between three
di¤erent types of external cooperative innovation arrangements50:
 Cooperation with the research base: cooperation arrangements with universities, gov-
ernment or private non-prot research institutes, and commercial laboratories or R&D
enterprises.
 Cooperation with suppliers or customers: cooperation arrangements with customers
or clients, or with suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software, (vertical
cooperation).
 Cooperation with competitors: cooperation arrangements with competitors or other
rms from the same industry, (horizontal cooperation).
The following two tables show the extent to which innovative rms in the four EU coun-
tries I consider undertake cooperative activity. Throughout the chapter I dene innovative
rms as rms that have either introduced a product or process innovation, or have ongo-
ing innovation activities or have abandoned innovation activities and have spent a positive
amount on innovation activities during the period 1998-200051. In both tables I weight
the data to be representative of the population of rms in each country. Table 2.A1 in
Appendix 2.B contains information for the national samples.
In Table 2.2 I use a broad denition of cooperative activity that includes cooperation
with suppliers and customers, with competitors and with the research base.
The table shows that the proportion of innovative rms undertaking any of these three
forms of cooperative innovative activity is highest in France and the UK, followed by Ger-
many and then Spain. Interestingly, in Germany and Spain there is little di¤erence between
the manufacturing and service sectors in the proportion of innovative rms engaging in co-
operative activity, whereas in the UK and to an even greater extent in France, innovative
50 I do not consider cooperation within the rm, i.e. across units belonging to the same enterprise group,
because this type of collaboration is less relevant for policy.
51 In the surveys for France, Germany and Spain it is only innovative rms that answer questions about
cooperative innovative activity. Given the very broad denition of innovative rms used this should not
present a selection problem. Indeed in the UK survey this information is available for all rms. I nd that
only around 4% of non-innovative rms reported that they were involved in cooperative innovative activities.
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Table 2.2. Percentage of innovative rms with cooperation agreements by sector
1998-20001
Sector France Germany Spain U.K.
Manufacturing 29% 19% 13% 25%
High-technology sectors 36% 28% 22% 32%
Low-technology sectors 24% 13% 10% 20%
Services 18% 17% 15% 20%
Total 26% 18% 14% 23%
1Calculations are weighted (using national CIS3 weights) to be representative of the population of
innovative rms in each country. Populations are innovative rms with 20 or more employees.
High-technology manufacturing sectors are dened as: Chemicals (NACE 23, 24), Machinery (29),
Electronics, Computer equipment (30, 31, 32, 33), and Vehicles (34, 35). Low-technology manufacturing
sectors are: Food and Tobacco (15, 16), Textiles (17, 18, 19), Wood and wood products (20, 21, 22),
Plastics (25), Nonmetallic mineral products (26), Metallic mineral products (27, 28), Manufacturing
n.e.c. (36, 37). Service sectors are: Wholesale trade (51), Transport (60, 61, 62, 63), Telecoms (64),
Finance (65, 66, 67) Computer, R&D, and Other technical services (72, 73, 74.2, 74.3)
rms in the manufacturing sector are more likely to cooperate than those in the service
sector. Within the manufacturing sector in all four countries on average innovative rms in
high-tech manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, electronics and computer equipment are
more likely to engage in cooperative activity than those in low-tech manufacturing sectors52.
It is interesting to look at whether cross-country di¤erences in the extent of overall collab-
orative activity are driven by di¤erences in cooperative arrangements with specic partners.
Table 2.3 shows the percentages of innovative rms with di¤erent types of cooperative
arrangements. In the UK and France the most common type of cooperative innovative
activity is with suppliers or customers. In Spain the most common form of cooperative
activity is with universities or research laboratories, and in Germany, cooperative activi-
52See Abramovsky et al. (2004b) for further international comparisons, including whether collaborative
agreements are with national or international partners, and full sector-level breakdowns.
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Table 2.3. Percentage of innovative rms with di¤erent types of
cooperative agreements. 1998-20001
Type of cooperative agreement France Germany Spain U.K.
Agreements with the research base
Manufacturing 18% 13% 12% 16%
Services 10% 9% 10% 10%
Total 16% 11% 12% 14%
Agreements with suppliers or customers
Manufacturing 21% 13% 7% 21%
Services 14% 11% 13% 18%
Total 19% 12% 9% 20%
Agreements with competitors
Manufacturing 7% 6% 4% 4%
Services 5% 8% 6% 6%
Total 7% 7% 5% 5%
1Calculations are weighted (using national CIS3 weights) to be representative of the
population of innovative rms in each country. Populations are innovative rms with
20 or more employees. Manufacturing and service sectors are dened as in Table 2.2.
ties with suppliers or customers and with universities or research laboratories are equally
common. In line with the discussion in Section 2.2, I nd that in all countries cooperation
arrangements with competitors are the least frequent type of collaborative innovative ac-
tivity. Despite the recent policy concern in the UK the proportion of innovative rms with
cooperative arrangements with universities or research laboratories does not appear to be
particularly low compared to the other countries.
Across all four countries cooperative arrangements with the research base appear to be
more prevalent in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector. However when looking
at business-to-business cooperation (both vertical and horizontal) in some countries these
types of arrangements are more widespread in the service sector, in particular in the case
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of cooperative innovation arrangements with competitors.
I also looked briey at whether, among innovative rms, those with cooperative innovation
arrangements perform di¤erently to those without. First, looking at labour productivity,
I found that across all four countries in the manufacturing sector innovative rms that
engaged in cooperative innovation tended to have higher labour productivity than those
that did not. Those that entered into cooperative agreements also reported that a higher
proportion of their sales were due to innovative products introduced between 1998 and
2000. While these performance characteristics may be the direct outcome of undertaking
cooperative innovation, it may also be the case that these types of rms are more likely to
enter into cooperative agreements in the rst place53. In the service sector the picture was
more mixed, for example there was no clear correlation between labour productivity and
cooperative activity.
2.3.1. Characteristics of innovative rms that engage in cooperative innova-
tion
The characteristics I focus on in my analysis are measures of incoming spillovers, appro-
priability, constraints on innovation (a combination of cost and risk factors that hamper
innovation), and whether or not rms received nancial public support for innovative activ-
ities. I also control for rm R&D intensity and size. I use information from the CIS3 survey
to construct rm-level and industry-level variables. For comparability, as far as possible,
I construct my variables in line with those used in CV54 ;55. In what follows I dene the
53 In the analysis below, I include a rm-level measure of R&D intensity to control for the rms innovative
capabilities and absorptive capacity.
54 I have modied the variable denitions in CV in some cases in order to construct measures that are
comparable across the four countries in the current study. For example, when measuring appropriability I
use a count of the number of protection methods used (rescaled between zero and one) rather than using
information on the intensity of use (rescaled between zero and one), which was not available in all four
countries. However, for the countries where the full information was available I checked that constructing
the appropriability variable in this way does not change the overall pattern of results.
55Variable denitions are similar to those used in Chapter 1. I have modied the variable denitions in
some cases in order to construct measures that are comparable across the four countries.
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main variables and present some descriptive statistics. A full set of denitions is provided
in Appendix 2.A.
I measure the extent of incoming spillovers by a continuous variable bounded between 0
and 1, where a higher value implies that rms placed more value on public sources of infor-
mation in carrying out their innovation activities. The measure is derived from a question
that asks rms to rate the importance of di¤erent information sources for their innovation
activity during the period 1998-2000. The information sources considered include profes-
sional conferences, meetings, journals or technical/trade press and fairs and exhibitions.
My measure of appropriability is based on information on the extent to which rms use
strategic methods to protect their innovations. The question rms are asked is, During the
period 1998-2000, did your enterprise, or enterprise group, make use of any of these meth-
ods to protect inventions or innovations developed in your enterprise?56. The strategic
methods I consider are secrecy, complexity of design and lead-time advantage on competi-
tors. This measure is again scaled between 0 and 1 and is increasing in the number of the
methods used. Higher values indicate that rms faced greater appropriability problems. I
also construct an industry-level measure of the extent of use of di¤erent legal protection
methods such as patents and trademarks. This takes the form of an index measure between
0 and 1, which increases in the number of methods used and captures the scope for using
formal protection methods to appropriate the returns to innovative activity.
I construct a measure that combines the extent to which rms are hampered in their
innovation activities by cost and risk factors. This variable is called constraints and includes
the extent to which the availability and cost of nance and excessive perceived risks impeded
rmsability to innovate. The index measure varies between 0 and 1 and is increasing in the
extent to which these factors are declared to impose a constraint. CV include measures of
the cost and risk factors separately. But in order to construct comparable variables across
countries I have had to combine this information into a single measure. The precise variable
56CV base their measure on how rms rate the e¤ectiveness of these methods, but unfortunately this is
not how the question is phrased in CIS3, which increases concerns about endogeneity with regard to this
variable.
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used for the French analysis is slightly di¤erent, due to a di¤erence in the questionnaire in
France. It takes a value of 1 if the rm was constrained in its innovation activities and 0
otherwise.
I also construct a measure of whether rms received public support for innovation activ-
ities (public support). This is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the rm has
received any kind of public nancial support for innovation activities from local or national
sources and takes the value 0 otherwise. Note that this public support need not have been
directed specically at cooperative innovative activity.
I include two further rm characteristics as controls. First, I construct a measure of
the rms internal innovative activity and absorptive capacity. The variable is called R&D
intensity, and is dened as the ratio of intramural (internal) R&D expenditure to turnover
in the year 200057. It should be noted that this variable will also capture R&D expenditure
on any collaborative project. Second, I construct a measure of rm size dened as the log
of the number of employees.
Table 2.4 presents the sample mean values, for both rms that engage in cooperative
innovative activity and for those that do not, for each of the variables that I consider.
Within countries the mean values of all variables are signicantly di¤erent across cooperative
and non-cooperative rms. The only exception is that for the UK, there is only a weakly
signicant di¤erence (at the 10% level) between the two groups in terms of the extent to
which they perceive constraints (cost and risk factors) to be a barrier to innovative activity,
however in the other three countries those rms that undertook cooperative innovation
appeared to be signicantly more constrained by these factors.
Across all four countries, rms with cooperation arrangements typically place greater
importance on incoming spillovers (incoming spillovers), and on the use of strategic methods
57 Ideally I would like to use a measure for 1998, but this was not possible due to large numbers of missing
values in the data. However it is likely that rmsR&D expenditures are highly persistent. In CV, rms
internal R&D capabilities were measured by a dummy variable that took the value of 1 if a rm engaged in
R&D on a continuous basis. CV also used a measure of whether the rm lacked technological know-how.
I omit this variable, as it is not available in the French data. However, it is generally not signicant when
included in the regressions for the other three countries.
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Table 2.4. Characteristics of cooperative (C) and non-cooperative (NC) innovative
rms. Mean values1
France Germany Spain U.K.
C NC C NC C NC C NC
Number of observations 1,286 2,304 408 775 612 2135 324 821
% of total observations 36% 64% 34% 66% 22% 78% 28% 72%
Incoming spillovers 0.40 0.28 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.36
Appropriability 0.37 0.19 0.57 0.34 0.41 0.26 0.79 0.66
Industry level legal protection 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.46 0.42
Constrains2 0.34 0.19 0.61 0.54 0.52 0.45 0.51 0.47
Public support 0.44 0.18 0.63 0.26 0.60 0.31 0.23 0.09
R&D intensity 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01
Size 5.67 4.86 5.46 4.96 2.32 2.00 5.19 4.78
1The sample in each country comprises innovative rms in both manufacturing and service sectors
dened as in Table 2.2. C = cooperating rms, NC = non cooperating rms.
2For France, dummy =1 if rm is constrained.
for appropriating the returns to innovation (appropriability) and are typically in industries
where greater importance is placed on legal methods of protecting the returns to innovation.
Firms that engage in cooperative innovative activity also exhibit higher R&D intensity and
are on average larger than those that do not. These ndings are also in line with those in
CV for Belgian manufacturing rms. Firms that undertake cooperative innovation are also
more likely to receive public support.
I also looked at whether there were signicant di¤erences in the mean values of these
variables across countries within the two categories of rms e.g. comparing cooperative
rms in France with cooperative rms in Germany. I nd that in the vast majority of cases
there are signicant di¤erences across countries. For example, rms in Germany that have
cooperative innovation arrangements place more importance on incoming spillovers than
those in Spain, the UK and France. Innovative rms in the UK, both those that engage in
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cooperative innovation and those that do not, place more importance on strategic methods
of protection (appropriability), and formal methods of protection than their counterparts
in Germany, France and Spain. Among cooperative innovative rms R&D intensity is
highest in Spain and lowest in the UK. The proportion of cooperative innovative rms that
receive public support for innovation is highest in Germany and Spain at around 60% and
signicantly lower in the UK at just over 20%. Indeed innovative rms in France, Germany
and Spain that were not involved in cooperative innovation were also more likely to receive
public support than non cooperating rms in the UK.
2.4. Empirical results
Before presenting instrumental variables estimates, I rst examine the relationship be-
tween these characteristics and the likelihood of cooperation by estimating a probit model
for each country, where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the rm is engaged
in a cooperative agreement. Table 2.5 shows the results of this exercise. The gures shown
are the marginal e¤ects of each of the explanatory variables on the probability of undertak-
ing a cooperative agreement. For each country I also include, as an explanatory variable,
an industry-level measure of the extent of cooperative activity, to control for unobserved
industry characteristics associated with this decision.
In all four countries, conditional on other factors, rms that use strategic protection
methods (appropriability) were more likely to be engaged in cooperative innovative activity,
which is in line with the ndings in CV. Also, in all countries I nd a positive association
between the likelihood that rms have received nancial public support and the probability
of being engaged in cooperative innovative activities. In the UK and France I nd that
rms that are involved in cooperative arrangements place greater importance on incoming
knowledge spillovers in their innovative activities, however the results are not statistically
signicant for Germany and Spain.
Turning to the measures of the extent to which constraints such as cost and risk factors are
perceived as an obstacle to innovative activity, I nd that in particular in Spain and France
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Table 2.5. Characteristics of rms that have cooperative
innovation arrangements
Dependent variable = 1 if rm has a cooperative arrangement
France Germany Spain U.K.
Incoming spillovers 0.242 0.009 0.031 0.174
(0.032) (0.056) (0.026) (0.062)
Appropriability 0.195 0.242 0.079 0.078
(0.025) (0.040) (0.018) (0.038)
Industry level legal protection 0.101 -0.195 -0.040 -0.133
(0.178) (0.215) (0.131) (0.147)
Constrains 0.090 0.101 0.104 0.053
(0.021) (0.055) (0.026) (0.055)
Public support 0.227 0.313 0.151 0.231
(0.020) (0.031) (0.017) (0.046)
R&D intensity 0.186 0.638 0.180 0.371
(0.087) (0.344) (0.089) (0.251)
Size 0.004 0.126 0.342 0.022
(0.044) (0.050) (0.083) (0.740)
Size squared 0.007 -0.005 -0.038 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.007)
Industry level of cooperation 0.699 0.744 0.733 0.943
(0.071) (0.160) (0.071) (0.178)
LL -1,910.54 -599.16 -1,171.87 -611.57
No. observations 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145
signicant at 1% level, signicant at 5% level, signicant at 10% level. The
numbers reported are the marginal e¤ect of the independent variable on the probability
of cooperation. Standard errors in parentheses.
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rms engaged in cooperative research are more likely to see these factors as hampering
innovation. Finally, rms are more likely to be engaged in cooperative arrangements the
higher their R&D intensities, although this variable is not signicant in the case of the UK.
There is also evidence for Germany and in particular for Spain that larger (although not
necessarily the largest) rms are more likely to engage in cooperative innovation.
As discussed above there are reasons to believe that the variables appropriability, in-
coming spillovers, constraints and R&D intensity are endogenous. In the next section I
present instrumental variables estimates, following the approach applied in CV to attempt
to control for potential endogeneity bias.
2.4.1. Instrumental variables results
I consider the variables incoming spillovers, appropriability, constraints and R&D in-
tensity as potentially endogenous due to simultaneity or reverse causality. For example,
following the discussion in Section 2.2, in the case of constraints it may be that cooperative
agreements alleviate constraints that were present ex-ante58. I attempt to deal with the
problem of endogeneity using a two-step approach. First the potentially endogenous ex-
planatory variables are regressed on a set of (assumed) exogenous variables. The predicted
values of the potentially endogenous variables are obtained from the rst step regression
and are used in place of the endogenous variables in the second step regression.
I use the same set of assumed exogenous variables as CV as instruments. The instrument
set includes industry-level measures of the potentially endogenous variables, i.e. incoming
spillovers, appropriability, constraints and R&D intensity. These are intended to capture the
e¤ect of unobserved industry-specic attributes related to the specic endogenous variables,
but not to the probability of cooperating, at the 2-digit level. It also includes a rm-
level measure of export intensity (exports as a proportion of total sales). This aims to
58See Chapter 1 and López (2008) for a detailed discussion of the problem of endogeneity. Schmidt (2005)
considers this issue in the context Germany. For an analysis of R&D cooperation in France using the CIS2
see Miotti and Sachwald (2003).
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capture the intensity of competition which rms face, thought to be highly correlated with
appropriability conditions higher competition being associated with lower appropriability,
and a greater reliance on strategic protection methods. In addition, I also include a rm-
level measure of the extent to which the rms R&D activity is orientated towards basic
research. This is derived from questions on the extent to which rms source information
for research activities from the research sector (see Appendix 2.A). I might expect this
variable to be positively correlated with a rms innovative capabilities (R&D intensity) and
absorptive capacity and the extent to which they can capitalise on incoming spillovers more
generally. Finally, the instrument set contains the (assumed) exogenous variables included
in the second step regressions, such as rm size, the industry level of legal protection and
industry level of cooperation. The results of the rst step regressions are given in Table
2.A2 in Appendix 2.B59 ;60.
Table 2.6 shows the results of the second step regressions for the national samples.
Comparing the results in Table 2.6 for general cooperation to the results from the simple
probit estimation in Table 2.5, it can be seen that the marginal e¤ects of the incoming
spillovers and the appropriability variables increase substantially in the IV specications 
59 I use the same assumed exogenous instrument set as CV. Since the variables are contemporaneous this
may be a strong assumption, but it is di¢ cult to nd a set of truly exogenous and powerful instruments in
the CIS data. For example the measure of the extent to which a rms R&D activity is orientated towards
basic research may be inuenced by their decision to cooperate with the research base. As shown in Table
2.A2, this variable is important for the power of our instruments. If it is excluded, the statistical signicance,
and in some cases the magnitude, of the estimated coe¢ cients is a¤ected. For example, for cooperation with
the research base in the case of the UK, the marginal e¤ects (standard errors) on the incoming spillovers,
appropriability and legal protection variables become 0.117 (0.405), 0.224 (0.157), -0.227 (0.145) respectively,
compared to those in table 6, (the marginal e¤ects and signicance of the other variables are una¤ected).
Also, as noted by CV, the IV approach used could introduce multicollinearity between the predicted values
of the endogenous variables, reducing the signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients.
60 It should be noted that the original explanatory endogenous variables exhibit rm-level variation as
well as industry-level variation. In the rst step regressions it can be seen that in some cases a substantial
amount of the predictive power for each variables tted value comes from the industry-level variables. This
means that the tted values provide more industry variation than rm-level variation.
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Table 2.6. Understanding cooperative innovative activity.
Second-step results
Dependent variable = 1 if rm has a cooperative arrangement
France Germany Spain U.K.
Incoming spillovers (I) 0.854 1.214 0.575 0.633
(0.107) (0.244) (0.106) (0.196)
Appropriability (I) 0.358 0.456 0.438 0.252
(0.168) (0.191) (0.134) (0.180)
Industry level legal protection -0.092 -0.759 -0.744 -0.248
(0.195) (0.285) (0.184) (0.186)
Constrains (I) 0.115 -0.410 0.357 -0.066
(0.163) (0.350) (0.163) (0.330)
Public support 0.149 0.340 0.071 0.228
(0.023) (0.038) (0.017) (0.047)
R&D intensity (I) -0.410 -0.788 -0.067 -0.585
(0.205) (0.482) (0.149) (0.663)
Size -0.001 0.046 0.331 -0.040
(0.045) (0.059) (0.093) (0.076)
Size squared 0.006 -0.001 -0.039 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.007)
Industry level of cooperation 0.674 1.044 0.782 0.972
(0.085) (0.223) (0.091) (0.199)
LL -1,900.34 -592,22 -1,087.92 -606.20
No. observations 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145
signicant at 1% level, signicant at 5% level, signicant at 10% level.
The numbers reported are the marginal e¤ect of the independent variable on the
probability of cooperation. Standard errors in parentheses. (I) indicates instrumented.
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though appropriability is insignicant for the UK. The increase in the marginal e¤ects could
be due to endogeneity bias, or potentially due to measurement error. For example, the fact
that the marginal e¤ect on the incoming spillovers variable increases after instrumenting
suggests that rms that ex-ante place more importance on the use of publicly available
information are more likely to benet from cooperative arrangements, but once such rms
are engaged in cooperative innovation they may substitute the use of publicly available in-
formation for information generated within the partnership and hence place less importance
on other external knowledge.
Findings for the e¤ects of incoming spillovers and appropriability show very few depar-
tures from the original ndings in CV for Belgium. However I nd some evidence, contrary
to the ndings in CV, that cooperation is less likely in industries where legal methods of
protecting innovations are more e¤ective. Taking this together with the ndings on appro-
priability for France, Germany and Spain, it may be that cooperative activity is a method
of internalising outgoing knowledge ows in industries where legal protection methods are
weak and for rms for whom more strategic methods of appropriating returns are more
important.
A further point to note is that after instrumenting I nd no statistically signicant re-
lationship between the perception of cost and risk constraints and cooperative innovation,
apart from in Spain. The marginal e¤ect on this variable increases in the case of Spain,
and I might have expected the marginal e¤ects to be biased downwards in Table 2.5 had
cooperative R&D activity been undertaken in order to alleviate cost and risk constraints.
It is also only in the case of Spain where I nd that rm size is positively related to the
probability of undertaking cooperative innovation.
After instrumenting, the marginal e¤ects on the R&D intensity variable decrease com-
pared to Table 2.5. I do not nd that higher intramural R&D intensity increases the like-
lihood of engaging in cooperative innovative activities amongst innovative rms. Indeed, if
anything the results for France suggest the opposite. It may be that ex-ante rms choosing
to collaborate perceive cooperative innovation as a substitute for carrying out R&D activity
purely in house  those rms with strong internal capabilities may have less need to en-
83
gage in collaborative innovation. I explore what is driving this nding when I di¤erentiate
between cooperative innovative activities with di¤erent partners and between cooperation
in the manufacturing and service sectors below. Finally, in all cases I continue to nd a
positive relationship between having received public nancial support and the likelihood of
cooperating.
Cooperation with di¤ erent partners
Table 2.7 shows the results for cooperation with each of the three di¤erent partners - the
research base, customers and suppliers, and competitors. The ndings in CV for Belgium
suggest that incoming spillovers are an important factor in determining cooperation with
research institutions, but not vertical cooperation with suppliers or customers, and that
while appropriability is an important factor in determining vertical cooperation, it is not
for cooperation with research institutes.
Findings for incoming spillovers are in line with those in CV. I nd that the extent to which
rms value incoming spillovers is positively associated with the probability of undertaking
collaborative research with universities, and that the relationship is stronger with respect
to cooperation with the research base than with other rms. This indicates that being able
to benet from external information ows is a more important determinant of whether a
rm enters into a collaborative agreement with the research base compared to a potentially
more near marketor developmental commercial agreement with another business. Indeed,
there is a stronger relationship between incoming spillovers and the likelihood of vertical
cooperation than horizontal cooperation, implying a stronger link between the value rms
place on external information ows and the probability of cooperating with rms outside
the same industry, which are likely to possess a more diverse set of knowledge.
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Findings for appropriability di¤er somewhat from those in CV. I nd evidence that rms
facing appropriability problems, (i.e. rms that are more reliant on strategic protection
methods such as secrecy), are more likely to engage in collaborative innovation with the
research base and with suppliers and customers. However, the relationship is much less
evident for cooperation with competitors. The magnitude of the estimated marginal e¤ects
is much smaller for this type of partner, and only statistically signicant in the case of
Spain. Limiting outgoing spillovers to direct competitors might be much more important
compared to limiting information ows to upstream or downstream rms or noncommercial
research institutions.
Hence the fact that the evidence does not point towards rms facing appropriability
problems as being likely to engage in collaborative projects with competitors is in line with
the idea that free-riding might be more prevalent in this type of cooperative relationship.
Turning to the relationship between constraints and collaborative innovative activity, I
nd that for Spain and to a lesser extent for France, for all three types of partner it is
those rms that report being constrained in their innovation activity, for example due to
nancial constraints, that are more likely to be engaged in cooperative innovative activity.
Furthermore, I nd that the relationship is stronger and more signicant for cooperation
with the research base, in fact for France this is the only case where it is signicant. This
may be due to the type of projects undertaken in conjunction with the research base being
riskier, or more di¢ cult to obtain external nance for, than those typically undertaken with
other rms.
Receipt of public support is positively related to the probability of cooperating with
all three types of partners in Germany and France and Spain, but in the UK I nd no
relationship with the probability of cooperating with competitors61. In all countries the
marginal e¤ects are highest with regard to cooperating with the research base. This nding
is consistent with the aims of policy in this area in terms of encouraging cooperation between
rms and universities and facilitating technology transfer from the public sector, and reects
61See also the study by Negassi (2004), which nds a positive e¤ect of public funding on the likelihood of
cooperation on innovation activities.
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the focus of the policies in operation in all four countries.
For example, in France, the Ministry of Research puts a lot of emphasis on developing
R&D cooperation between the public and private sectors. There are two main forms of
support: the RRIT (R&D and Technology Innovation Networks), which aim to improve
partnerships between public sector R&D and rms  there were 15 at the end of 2004;
and the CNRTs (National Centres of Technological Research), which support collaboration
between public R&D labs and labs in large manufacturing rms - 18 centres have been
created since 200062. Since 1980 Germany has seen a signicant rise in the proportion of
publicly funded R&D projects that involve collaborative networks (from around 30% of
spending in 1980-89 to nearly 90% by 2004), which has been driven by a substantial in-
crease in publicly funded projects that involve collaboration between business and scientic
research institutions63. In Spain, the National R&D plan was adopted in 1988. One of the
instruments of technology policy included in this plan is known as the Industrial Research
Concerted Projects. The objective of this national initiative is to nance precompetitive
research projects developed by industrial rms, which must include the participation of
universities, public research centers or research and technology organisations64. In the UK
during the period covered by data (1998 to 2000), the LINK and Faraday Partnerships
schemes provided grant-based funding for research consortia including university partners,
for research into pre-market areas and technology transfer.
Turning briey to the other control variables, in France and Germany evidence suggests
that rms with lower intramural R&D intensity are actually more likely to engage in coop-
erative innovation with the research base. This might imply that they are doing so to access
expertise that they do not have in-house at a lower cost. For Spain I also nd a signicant
relationship between rm size and the likelihood of undertaking cooperative innovation with
all three types of partner.
62See MNRT (2005) for further details.
63See Fier et al. (2006) for further details.
64See Acosta and Modrego (2001) for further details.
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Di¤erences between manufacturing and services
As a nal exercise I looked at the manufacturing and service sectors separately to see if
any of the relationships above di¤ered across the two sectors and whether there were any
interesting di¤erences across countries within each of the two sectors. I detail the main
points of interest below.
First, nding in Table 2.6 that in Germany and Spain cooperation is less frequent in
industries where legal protection methods are used more intensively is largely driven by
the manufacturing sector. This pattern of a negative relationship with the extent of indus-
trylevel legal protection in manufacturing sectors but not in services is common across all
four countries, and suggests that whereas cooperative innovation may act as a substitute
to patenting innovations in the manufacturing sector, it may not be used as a substitute to
formal protection methods such as trademarks and copyright in the service sector.
There are also some interesting di¤erences within and across sectors between the four
countries. First, there is some evidence that appropriability problems, i.e. greater reliance
on strategic protection methods, are less important in inuencing cooperative innovation
in the service sector than in manufacturing in France, Germany and the UK, but are im-
portant in both sectors in Spain. Second, in the UK and to a lesser extent in France, the
signicant positive correlation between public support and the probability of cooperation is
only present for rms in the manufacturing sector and not for rms in the service sector. For
the UK, this again ts in with the orientation of policy at this time towards collaboration
with the research base on basic research and new technologies, which are more likely to
be of direct relevance to manufacturing rms. Third, the negative (although in some cases
insignicant) relationship in Table 2.6 between R&D intensity and the likelihood of coop-
eration appears to be largely driven by the service sector in all countries except for France,
implying that cooperative innovation and intramural R&D intensity might be substitutes
to a greater extent in the service sector than in manufacturing in Spain, Germany and the
UK.
Finally, in Spain the positive and signicant relationship between the importance of
constraints (as hampering factors for innovation) and cooperation in Table 2.6 is largely
88
driven by the manufacturing sector. I nd that this relationship disappears for services.
Moreover, rm size is only statistically signicant for the manufacturing sector in Spain.
2.5. Conclusions
I investigate the determinants of cooperative innovative activity using comparable rm-
level data for four major EU economies. I nd evidence of a positive relationship between the
extent to which rms are able to benet from external information ows, i.e. from incoming
spillovers, and the likelihood of undertaking cooperative innovation. This is strongest with
respect to collaboration with the research base and weakest with respect to cooperation with
competitors in the same industry, suggesting that rms that place a high value on external
information ows are more likely to collaborate with rms outside their own industry or
with research institutes, enabling them to access a broader range of knowledge.
I also nd some evidence that rms that nd strategic methods important in appro-
priating the returns to innovative activity, i.e. those facing appropriability problems, are
more likely to make cooperative arrangements with the research base and with upstream
and downstream rms. The estimated relationship is weaker for cooperation with com-
petitors, implying that for rms facing appropriability di¢ culties free-riding may be more
problematic within agreements with other rms operating in the same market.
Findings for Spain di¤er to some extent from those for Germany and the UK. In Spain I
nd that, particularly in the manufacturing sector, larger rms are more likely to engage in
cooperative innovation, and that rms may be undertaking cooperative innovation in order
to overcome nancial constraints and excessive perceived economic risks, (I also nd some
evidence of this for France in the case of cooperation with the research base). This may be
driven by di¤erences in capital markets and in the availability and cost of external private
nance for innovative activity, between Spain and the other countries. For example, in 2001
venture capital investment in Spain was approximately one third of investment in Germany
or in the UK. Moreover, Loan Guarantee Programs are not well developed in Spain65.
65Cotec (2004) and European Commission (2003).
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Finally I nd that receipt of public support is positively related to the probability of un-
dertaking cooperative innovation particularly with regard to cooperation with the research
base, for example with universities and public sector research institutions. This is very
much in line with the orientation of public funding for innovation, which targets this type
of cooperative activity and promotes technology transfer from universities to business. The
relationship between receipt of public support and collaborative innovation is weakest for
cooperation with competitors. This is not surprising given that this type of cooperation
might be the most likely to raise concerns with competition policy authorities, and given
that public support schemes are much less orientated towards this form of collaboration.
Although I nd a positive relationship between cooperation and public nancial support,
it is not possible to make denitive statements about the size of additionality of such schemes
using my results. It maybe that at least some of those rms receiving support would have
engaged in some form of cooperative innovation (albeit perhaps on a smaller scale) in any
case. The extent to which such schemes do overcome market failures and enable additional
and economically e¢ cient cooperative innovative activity to take place is an important
research question given the direction of public policy in this area.
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Appendix 2.A. Variable denitions
Absolute basicness of R&D : Sum of the scores of the importance of the following infor-
mation sources for innovation process (number between 0 (not used) and 3 or 4 (high)):
universities; government or private non-prot research institutes. Rescaled between 0 (not
used) and 1 (high).
Appropriability : Sum of indicator variables that take the value 1 if the rm uses the
following methods for protecting inventions or innovations (0 (not used) and 1 (used)):
secrecy; complexity of design; lead-time advantage on competitors. Rescaled between 0
(not used) and 1 (used all methods).
Cooperation: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the rm cooperates with suppli-
ers, customers, competitors or other rms within the same industry, universities, government
or private non-prot research institutes, or commercial laboratories/R&D enterprises.
Cooperation with competitors: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the rm coop-
erates with competitors or other rms within the same industry.
Cooperation with research base: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the rm coop-
erates with universities, government or private non-prot research institutes, or commercial
laboratories or R&D enterprises.
Cooperation with suppliers or customers: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the
rm cooperates with suppliers or customers.
Constraints: Importance of the following obstacles to the innovation process (number
between 3 or 4 (high) and 0 (not relevant)): innovation costs too high; lack of availability
of nance; excessive perceived economic risks. Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) and 1
(high). The questions used to construct the variable constraint are not available in the
French survey. Hence, for the French case I use an alternative indicator variable that takes
the value 1 if the rm considers that innovation activity was burdened/encumbered with
serious problems.
Export intensity : Exports divided by turnover in 2000.
Incoming spillovers: Sum of the scores of the importance of the following information
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sources for innovation process (number between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)): professional
conferences, meetings and journals; fairs and exhibitions. Rescaled between 0 (not used)
and 1 (high).
Industry level of legal protection: Mean of legal protection at the industry level. Legal
protection is the sum of indicator variables that take the value 1 if the rm uses the following
methods for protecting inventions or innovations (0 (not used) and 1 (used)): patents;
registration of design patterns; trademarks; copyright. Rescaled between 0 (not used) and
1 (used all methods).
Industry level of variable: Mean of the variable at the 2-digit NACE level.
Public support : Variable that takes the value 1 if the rm has received any kind of public
nancial support for innovation activities from local or national sources.
R&D intensity : Ratio of intramural R&D expenditure in 2000 over turnover in 2000.
Size: Log of number of employees in 2000.
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Industries included in the analysis
Description NACE Code
Manufacturing
Food and tobacco 15, 16
Textiles 17, 18, 19
Wood and wood products 20, 21, 22
Chemicals 23, 24
Plastics 25
Non-metallic mineral products 26
Machinery 29
Electronics and computer equipment 30, 31, 32, 33
Vehicles 34, 35
Metallic mineral products 27, 28
Manufacturing n.e.c. 36, 37
Services
Wholesale trade 51
Transport 60, 61, 62, 63
Telecoms 64
Finance 65, 66, 67
Computer, R&D, other technical services 72, 73, 74.2, 74.3
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Appendix 2.B. Additional tables
Table 2.A1. Percentage of innovative rms with di¤erent types of
cooperative agreements. National samples. 1998-20001
France Germany Spain U.K.
Innovative rms 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145
Cooperating 1,286 408 612 324
(as % innovative rms) (36%) (34%) (22%) (28%)
Cooperating with the research base 859 317 533 200
(as % innovative rms) (24%) (27%) (19%) (18%)
Cooperating with customers or suppliers 973 268 427 265
(as % innovative rms) (27%) (23%) (15%) (23%)
Cooperating with competitors 359 146 242 67
(as % innovative rms) (10%) (12%) (9%) (6%)
1Figures calculated from the CIS3 sample for each country. Firms with more than 20
employees. The total number of innovative rms reported in this table is smaller than
the total sample of innovative rms in each country as I only include those with
non-missing values for the variables used in the subsequent analysis.
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Table 2.A2. Resu lts of rst step OLS regressions: Incom ing sp illovers and Appropriab ility
Dep endent variab le: Incom ing sp illovers Dep endent variab le: Appropriab ility
France Germany Spain U .K . France Germany Spain U .K .
S ize 0.019 0.016 -0 .144 0.088 -0 .019 0.004 0.037 0.095
(0 .018) (0 .023) (0 .052) (0 .032) (0 .022) (0 .037) (0 .085) (0.053)
S ize squared -0 .002 -0 .001 0.024 -0 .007 0.005 0.004 0.002 -0 .006
(0.002) (0 .002) (0 .010) (0 .003) (0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .018) (0.004)
Industry level legal protection 0.053 0.144 0.109 -0 .044 0.047 -0 .443 0.110 -0 .105
(0.096) (0 .159) (0 .182) (0 .104) (0 .110) (0 .232) (0 .259) (0.197)
Public support 0 .028 -0 .019 0.033 -0 .016 0.077 0.019 0.013 -0 .025
(0.010) (0 .017) (0 .011) (0 .017) (0 .014) (0 .022) (0 .016) (0.032)
Absolute basicness of R&D 0.479 0.298 0.387 0.508 0.224 0.182 0.189 0.328
(0 .020) (0 .030) (0 .021) (0 .034) (0 .027) (0 .041) (0 .030) (0.062)
Export intensity -0 .035 0.008 -0 .027 -0 .016 0.100 0.258 0.150 0.078
(0 .017) (0 .034) (0 .022) (0 .022) (0 .024) (0 .049) (0 .032) (0.039)
Industry level o f co op eration -0 .154 -0 .227 -0 .111 -0 .106 -0 .324 -0 .188 -0 .107 -0 .105
(0.051) (0 .103) (0 .069) (0 .087) (0 .066) (0 .138) (0 .089) (0.163)
Industry level incom ing sp illovers 0 .843 1.004 0.867 0.663 0.015 -0 .045 0.011 -0 .286
(0.147) (0 .171) (0 .118) (0 .210) (0 .178) (0 .239) (0 .153) (0.398)
Industry level appropriab ility 0.034 -0 .147 -0 .094 -0 .059 1.109 1.203 0.774 0.969
(0 .094) (0 .122) (0 .144) (0 .092) (0 .109) (0 .164) (0 .193) (0.189)
Industry level R&D intensity -0 .347 0.135 -0 .143 -0 .078 -0 .050 0.366 0.042 0.143
(0.127) (0 .222) (0 .109) (0 .300) (0 .174) (0 .301) (0 .149) (0.458)
Industry level constra ints -0 .054 -0 .035 -0 .146 -0 .091 -0 .008 -0 .094 0.039 -0 .048
(0.074) (0 .147) (0 .110) (0 .133) (0 .096) (0 .177) (0 .140) (0.249)
Constant -0 .023 0.027 0.255 -0 .064 -0 .054 -0 .050 -0 .121 -0 .132
(0.062) (0 .112) (0 .089) (0 .125) (0 .077) (0 .151) (0 .210) (0.210)
R2 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.15
No. observations 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145
sign icant at 1% level, sign icant at 5% level, sign icant at 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.A2 (continued). Resu lts of rst step OLS regressions: Constra ints and R&D intensity
Dep endent variab le: Constra ints Dep endent variab le: R&D intensity
France Germany Spain U .K . France Germany Spain U .K .
S ize -0 .005 -0 .054 -0 .231 -0 .022 0.002 -0 .007 -0 .026 0.006
(0.030) (0 .023) (0 .063) (0 .034) (0 .006) (0 .010) (0 .014) (0 .012)
S ize squared 0.003 0.004 0.036 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0 .001
(0.003) (0 .002) (0 .013) (0 .003) (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .001)
Industry level legal protection 0.037 0.133 0.037 0.082 0.009 -0 .013 0.023 -0 .023
(0.144) (0 .172) (0 .192) (0 .118) (0 .038) (0 .027) (0 .039) (0 .026)
Public support 0 .059 0.038 0.025 0.030 0.011 0.024 0.017 0.002
(0.018) (0 .018) (0 .012) (0 .021) (0 .04) (0 .006) (0 .004) (0 .007)
Absolute basicness of R&D 0.196 0.122 0.196 0.192 0.016 0.023 0.035 0.013
(0 .034) (0 .032) (0 .022) (0 .041) (0 .008) (0 .009) (0 .021) (0 .007)
Export intensity 0.077 -0 .071 -0 .008 -0 .014 0.005 -0 .005 -0 .001 0.029
(0 .030) (0 .035) (0 .023) (0 .027) (0 .005) (0 .012) (0 .010) (0 .010)
Industry level o f co op eration -0 .249 -0 .017 -0 .015 -0 .057 -0 .022 -0 .015 -0 .002 -0 .023
(0.084) (0 .108) (0 .076) (0 .107) (0 .016) (0 .018) (0 .032) (0 .018)
Industry level incom ing sp illovers -0 .006 0.061 -0 .108 -0 .142 -0 .004 -0 .018 -0 .019 0.002
(0.234) (0 .170) (0 .130) (0 .240) (0 .051) (0 .033) (0 .020) (0 .048)
Industry level appropriab ility 0.083 -0 .041 -0 .053 -0 .081 0.008 0.005 -0 .027 0.003
(0.131) (0 .124) (0 .153) (0 .110) (0 .037) (0 .027) (0 .025) (0 .017)
Industry level R&D intensity -0 .053 -0 .325 -0 .115 0.123 0.993 1.001 0.970 1.019
(0 .197) (0 .240) (0 .122) (0 .341) (0 .139) (0 .280) (0 .099) (0 .231)
Industry level constra ints 0 .987 0.840 0.873 0.863 -0 .004 -0 .026 -0 .028 -0 .003
(0.121) (0 .138) (0 .116) (0 .147) (0.019) (0 .027) (0 .058) (0 .040)
Constant -0 .057 0.202 0.381 0.192 -0 .011 0.042 0.049 -0 .004
(0.100) (0 .114) (0 .094) (0 .135) (0.020) (0 .027) (0 .026) (0 .039)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.31 0.23 0.30 0.21
No. observations 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145 3,590 1,183 2,747 1,145
sign icant at 1% level, sign icant at 5% level, sign icant at 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF OUTSOURCING ON FIRM
PERFORMANCE
3.1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that innovation is a primary source of productivity growth. Lit-
erature on this topic has focused on the impact of investment on knowledge and the role
of technological innovations. Since Griliches (1979), many empirical studies have focused
on the link between R&D and productivity66 and on the role of technological process and
product innovations as productivity shifters67.
However, as it is pointed out in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005): In order to identify
the full range of changes that rms undertake to improve performance and their success in
improving economic outcomes, a framework broader than technological product and process
innovation is needed. Including marketing and organizational innovations gives a more
complete framework that is better able to capture the changes that a¤ect rm performance
and contribute to the accumulation of knowledge.
Organizational innovations can have an important e¤ect on productivity on their own.
In this sense, organizational innovations can increase the quality and e¢ ciency of work and
improve the information sharing and the ability of the rm to use new technologies, as such
increasing the productivity of investment in knowledge.
Broadly speaking, an organizational innovation is dened as the adoption of a new idea or
behavior by an organization (see Daft, 1978). More precisely, and following the Oslo Manual
(OECD, 2005) organizational innovations refer to the implementation of new organisational
66See Griliches (1995) for a survey.
67Crépon et al. (1998) propose a structural model that describes the link between R&D expenditure,
innovation output and productivity. This model, widely used, has been recently applied by Gri¢ th et
al. (2006) using internationally comparable rm-level data from four major European countries, France,
Germany, Spain and the UK.
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methods. These can be changes in business practices, in workplace organisation or in the
rms external relations.
In this chapter, I consider one of the most relevant organizational methods in rms
external relations, outsourcing. Outsourcing is a make or buy decision and implies the
modication of the boundaries of the rm. It must be seen as part of the organizational
innovation process, carried out in the search for increasing exibility and e¢ ciency.
There is no standardized denition of the term outsourcing. A general denition of out-
sourcing refers to those material inputs or services necessary to produce a nal output
obtained outside the rm. One strand of literature focuses on the outsourcing of mate-
rials. In this sense, McMillan (1995) enumerates the main changes introduced by U.S.
rms in their supplier relationships. Among the most relevant changes is the increment in
the contracting out of manufacturing activities or production subcontracting. Several pa-
pers analyze the evolution of material outsourcing. See, for example, Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), Hummels et al. (2001), Yeats (2001), Hanson et al. (2004), and Borga and Zeile
(2004). In another strand of literature, several papers address the substantial growth in ser-
vice outsourcing. See, among others, Abraham and Taylor (1996), Goodman and Steadman
(2002), Abramovsky et al. (2004) and Amiti and Wei (2005).
In addition, outsourcing can be local (an external supplier in the domestic market) or
international (a leading example is the outsourcing by rms in developed countries to rms
located in low-wage countries).
What is more, from an empirical perspective outsourcing is too broad a concept. In this
sense, outsourcing has been measured in many di¤erent ways and using di¤erent perspec-
tives. Most of the measures collect information at the industry level and from input-output
tables, rather than rm-level data. Moreover, many of them are rough measures.
Among the most used measures of outsourcing is Feenstra and Hansons (1996) ap-
proach68. These authors dene outsourcing share for each industry as the share of imported
intermediate inputs (services) over total non-energy inputs. Other measures of outsourcing
used are, among others, imported intermediate inputs within each industry obtained from
68For example, see Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), and Canals (2006a, 2006b).
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input-output tables, expenditure on a number of specic services purchased on the market,
fraction of the work in business services contracted out, material inputs relative to internal
labour costs and external contract work.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between a particular form of orga-
nizational innovation (outsourcing) and productivity. Specically, this chapter deals with
outsourcing at the rm level and focuses on the role of contracting out of manufacturing
activities (production subcontracting). I adopt an econometric approach, i.e., I focus on the
econometric estimation of production functions. In this sense, rstly, I introduce a simple
framework that species a production function considering the possibility of production
subcontracting. The framework developed leads to the estimation of a production function
depending on traditional inputs (labour, capital and materials) and an index of production
subcontracting. Specically, both the e¤ect of rst-time outsourcing on productivity and
the e¤ect of the intensity of production subcontracting can be analyzed. This simple frame-
work has shortcomings and the last section deals with them. In this sense, this section is
a rst attempt at modelling and estimating a more structural framework for the specica-
tion of a production function considering the possibility of production subcontracting. This
framework allows to identify two labour uses (labour used directly in the production
of the nal output and labour used in the production of the intermediate input).
Estimation is carried out using an unbalanced panel survey of Spanish manufacturing
rms. The main equation is estimated using a sample of 1,728 rms, observed during the
period 1990-1999. This sample is representative of the manufacturing population of rms.
The contribution of this study to the empirical literature on the relationship between
outsourcing and productivity is three-fold. First, I analyze both the e¤ect of the decision
to outsource and the e¤ect of outsourcing intensity. In doing this, I develop a simple the-
oretical framework justifying the introduction of an outsourcing measure to the estimation
of a traditionalproduction function. Second, my analysis is performed at the rm level
and uses panel data. Panel data allows us to account for unobserved heterogeneity and
analyze temporal e¤ects. Third, I use a directmeasure for outsourcing of manufacturing
activities. In this sense, I have information on rmspurchases of elaborated products and
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customized components from external suppliers. Outsourcing of intermediate inputs takes
on greater importance when the products being exchanged are not raw materials, but have
some degree of elaboration. In this case, it is plausible that outsourcing of manufactur-
ing activities implies the externalization of stages of the production process (potentially
increasing exibility and e¢ ciency). But this practice will also involve the costs of nding
a suitable supplier and imperfect contracting.
In what follows, I present some related literature. I focus on two strands of empirical
literature69: (i) Literature studying the e¤ect of (the broad concept of) organizational
innovation on productivity, and (ii) Literature focused on productivity e¤ects of outsourcing.
Although this revision does not aim to be comprehensive, I present the main trends in
empirical literature and relevant ndings.
Organizational innovation and productivity growth
There are an increasing number of studies that suggest a signicant and positive e¤ect
of various measures of organizational innovation on productivity. At this point, I will focus
on some relevant examples of this literature.
A strand of literature focuses on the e¤ect of the adoption of alternative human resource
management practices, such as exible job denitions, training, work teams, and incentive
pay70. Most of this studies nd that the adoption of a coherent system of human resource
management practices results in substantially higher levels of productivity than more tradi-
tional human resource management practices. Moreover, the existence of synergies among
69Regarding theoretical studies on outsourcing, the early literature treated the industry environment as
given and has focused on the relation between a single producer and a potential supplier (see, among
others, Kamien, Li and Samet, 1989; Lewis and Sappington, 1991; and Spiegel, 1993). Recently, Grossman
and Helpman (2002) developed a model in which integration and outsourcing are treated as equilibrium
phenomena (taking into account the interdependence among the rms choices). These authors focus on
the trade-o¤ between the costs of running a larger and less specialized rm and the costs of search frictions
and imperfect contracting. Subsequently, Grossman and Helpman (2003) develop a model in which rms
in an industry choose their organization structures and the location of their suppliers, and Grossman and
Helpman (2005) study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium
model of outsourcing and trade.
70See Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a recent review of this literature.
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workplace practices is also found.
Black and Lynch (2001, 2004) also examine the impact of workplace practices on the
productivity of rms. These authors dene organizational innovation as including human
resource management practices such as organizing workers in teams, job rotation, training
for non-managerial workers, and re-engineering. They nd for the manufacturing sector
that implementing these organizational innovations in a unionized setting resulted in higher
productivity than doing the same thing in a non-unionized setting. They also nd that what
is more important for productivity is the di¤usion of a practice inside an organization rather
than the simple adoption of the practice.
Most interesting, Black and Lynch (2004) use the estimates of the impact of organizational
innovation on productivity in a growth accounting framework to see how much of the growth
in output from 1993-1996 in US manufacturing might be accounted for by organizational
practices. It appears that workplace practices and re-engineering e¤orts accounted for as
much as 30 percent of output growth over this period of time.
Using rm level data from the U.S., Bresnahan et al. (2002) nd that investments in
certain specic types of work organization71 are associated with high measured productiv-
ity. Moreover, these authors nd that information technology, complementary workplace
reorganization and human capital are positively correlated.
Gera and Gu (2004), using micro data from Canada, nd that three organizational
changes (the restructuring of production processes, human resource management practices
and product/service quality-related practices) are positively related to productivity perfor-
mance.
Finally, a large body of literature focuses on the indirecte¤ect of organizational changes
on rm performance through investment in information technology. In this sense, Brynjolf-
sson and Hitt (2000) review the evidence on how organizational innovations (such as new
business processes, new skills or new organizational structures) are major drivers of the
71Variables measuring organization are related to team-based work organization (for example, use of self-
managing teams, use of team-building activities) and individual decision authority (who decides the pace of
work and who decides the method of work).
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contribution of information technology to productivity.
Outsourcing and productivity growth
Although it has not received much attention, outsourcing and its productivity e¤ect is
a growing research topic. Heshmati (2003) and Olsen (2006) present detailed surveys of
recent contributions to the relationship between outsourcing and productivity growth in
manufacturing and services.
Therefore, at this point, and given the existence of these surveys, I just stress the main
issues and ndings in this literature. First, the empirical literature has traditionally fo-
cused on productivity e¤ects at the industry and country levels (see, among others, Baumol
(1967), Siegel and Griliches (1992), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Fixler and Siegel (1999),
Ten Raa and Wol¤ (2001), Amiti and Wei (2006)). Evidence on the relationship between
outsourcing and productivity growth is not conclusive. For example, Siegel and Griliches
(1992), in assessing whether outsourcing leads to an overstatement of manufacturing pro-
ductivity growth, nd a weak correlation in the use of selected purchased services during
the 1980s. Meanwhile, Ten Raa and Wol¤ (2001) nd a positive association between the
rate of outsourcing and productivity growth in the goods sector. And Amiti and Wei (2006)
nd that both service outsourcing and material outsourcing have a positive and signicant
e¤ect on productivity in the U.S. and that the e¤ect of service outsourcing is greater in
magnitude.
Second, some of the earliest papers estimating the relationship between outsourcing and
productivity use rm-level data. Using a panel data of German manufacturing rms, Görzig
and Stephan (2002) estimate the e¤ect of three measures of outsourcing on rm performance
(measured by both the returns per employee and the returns on sales). The three measures
of outsourcing are: (i) material inputs relative to internal labour costs, (ii) external contract
work relative to internal labour costs, and (iii) other costs not related to production relative
to internal labour costs. These authors nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of all three
measures of outsourcing on returns per employee, and a negative e¤ect on returns on sales.
Another example of rm-level evidence is Girma and Görg (2004). These authors use
manufacturing establishment level data for the U.K. and dene outsourcing as the cost
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of industrial services72 received by an establishment. They nd that an establishments
outsourcing intensity is positively related to its labour productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity growth.
Thirdly, existing empirical literature on outsourcing deals in good part with other topics.
Many papers focus on labour market issues (see, among others, Feenstra and Hanson (1995,
1996, 1999), Estevao and Lach (1999), Anderton and Brenton (1999), Falk and Koebel
(2000)), while another strand of literature analyzes the determinants of outsourcing. For
example, Abraham and Taylor (1996) report empirical ndings of employersmotives for
contracting out business services in U.S. industry. These authors nd empirical evidence
supporting the inuence of wage savings, economies of scale and smoothening production
cycles on the decision to outsource.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical
framework. Section 3.3 details the econometric equation to be estimated. Section 3.4
introduces the data set and the variables, and describes the main facts about production
subcontracting for Spanish manufacturing rms during the 1990s. Section 3.5 presents
the empirical results. Section 3.6 is a rst attempt at modelling and estimating a more
structural framework. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. Theoretical framework
This section is aimed at introducing a simple framework to be used when specifying a
production function considering the possibility of production subcontracting. As I said
before, I start from the econometric estimation of a production function, and I need some
theoretical background to justify the changes in the traditionalproduction function due
to the introduction of variables measuring outsourcing.
For simplicity, I assume that rm j produces a single output Y at time t with a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
72These industrial services includes activities such as processing of inputs which are then sent back to the
establishment for nal assembly or sales, maintenance of production machinery, and engineering or drafting
services.
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Yjt = AjtK

jtL

jtI
1  
jt (3.1)
Dropping rm and time subscripts for simplicity, A is an index of Hicks-neutral technical
progress. K represents the capital stock and L the labour input. Given technology, it is
necessary to use an input I. This input can be produced within the rm (If ) or can be
purchased (Is).
Input I can also be obtained combining in-house production and outside sources. To
control for substitution between If and Is, I express the procurement of I as follows:
I = Is I
1 
f (3.2)
Parameter  determines the substitutability between in-house production and production
subcontracting of the intermediate input I.
Finally, production within the rm of input I can be written as:
If = L
M1  (3.3)
where L represents labour input andM row materials plus external services (intermediate
consumptions excluding subcontracted purchases). For simplicity, the capital input (K ) is
not included in the internal production of I.
Given equation (3.2) I can write that:
I = If

sr
1  sr

(3.4)
where sr = IsIf+Is . The variable sr represents the proportion of intermediate input I that
is subcontracted. Therefore, ratio sr1 sr is an index of production subcontracting. The higher
sr is, the higher sr1 sr is, and hence the higher the intensity of production subcontracting
is. This index is one measure of the relative importance of production subcontracting
(relative in the sense that it is not a direct measure of subcontracted purchases. It is a
measure of the importance of subcontracted purchases with respect to total intermediate
consumptions).
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Given (3.2) and (3.4) I can write
I =
8<: If ; if there is no outsourcingIf  sr1 sr ; if there is outsourcing (3.5)
Substituting (3.3) and (3.5) in (3.1), I can write:
Y =
8<: AK
L1M2 ; if there is no outsourcing
AKL1M2

sr
1 sr
3
; if there is outsourcing
(3.6)
where 1 = + (1    ); 2 = (1  )(1    ) and 3 = (1    ). Show that
 + 1 + 2 + 3 = 1 + 3: And hence  + 1 + 2 = 1: This constraint implies constant
returns to scale in the conventional inputs (K, L, M ).
Note that the term

sr
1 sr
3
is the only di¤erence between the specication of a produc-
tion function with and without production subcontracting.
3.3. Econometric model
Taking logarithms in expression (3.6), I can write:
log Y =
8<: logA+  logK + 1 logL+ 2 logM; if there is no outsourcinglogA+  logK + 1 logL+ 2 logM + 3 log  sr1 sr ; if there is outsourcing
(3.7)
To estimate a production function for rms with and without production subcontracting
simultaneously, I write the production function adding a dummy variable indicating non-
outsourcing. Now, I can write:
log Y = logA+  logK + 1 logL+ 2 logM + 3 logSUB + subdum (3.8)
where:
logSUB =
8<: 0, if there is no outsourcinglog sr1 sr , if there is outsourcing (3.9)
subdum =
8<: 1, if there is no outsourcing0, if there is outsourcing (3.10)
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I carry out all estimates in di¤erences. Therefore, variables are in log di¤erences. The
specication in log di¤erences or rates of growth implies that any level time-invariant indi-
vidual or heterogeneous e¤ects are di¤erenced out. Taking di¤erences in expression (3:8),
two caveats should be noted:
1. logSUB is not a continuous variable. And hence, the rate of growth (i.e., log di¤er-
ences) corresponding to a change in the outsourcing decision is not dened.
2. Di¤erences of variable subdum (ddums) takes the values:
ddums=
8>>><>>>:
1, if the rm stops outsourcing (with respect to the previous period)
0, period without change in the outsourcing decision
 1, if the rm starts outsourcing (with respect to the previous period)
(3.11)
Solving these problems, rstly, a rate of growth for sr1 sr equal to zero is assigned to those
observations corresponding to periods with changes in the outsourcing decision.
sub =
8<: log

sr
1 sr

t
  log

sr
1 sr

t 1
; if there is outsourcing at t and at t  1
0, otherwise
(3.12)
Secondly, to identify changes in the outsourcing decision, two dummy variables (substop,
substart) are considered:
substop=
8<: 1 , if ddums=10, otherwise (3.13)
substart=
8<: 1 , if ddums=  10, otherwise (3.14)
The relevant equation to be estimated may be expressed as follows:
ey = a+ ek + 1el + 2 em+ 3sub+ 1substop+ 2substart+ 'cu+D+ e (3.15)
where ey, ek, el and em are, respectively, the rates of growth or log di¤erences of output,
capital, labour and intermediate consumptions (excluding subcontracted purchases). The
variable sub is the rate of growth of the index of production subcontracting (see expression
(3.12)).
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Equations in levels are assumed to present an error term (u) that can be decomposed
as uit = i + it, where i is the time-invariant term that accounts for the heterogeneity
across rms. As I said before, the specication in rst di¤erences implies that the term i
is eliminated from the residual. The term  is assumed to be an uncorrelated zero mean
error term, and eit = it   it 1.
The estimation of a production function makes it important to control for input utiliza-
tion, and hence the inclusion of the capacity utilization variable (cu). D represents the set
of dummy variables included. Theoretical constraint  + 1 + 2 = 1 can either be tested
or imposed on the estimation in order to gain e¢ ciency.
To summarize, expression (3.15) is the relevant equation to be estimated. In addition
to traditional inputs, an index of outsourcing intensity and a couple of dummy variables
representing changes in the outsourcing decision are taken into account. Since this study is
aimed at analyzing the relationship between outsourcing and productivity, I am interested
in estimating parameters ; 1; 2; 3; 1 and 2. The estimation of other parameters of
the model (i.e., ,  and ) exceeds the purpose of this section. Briey, I cannot estimate
these parameters because I do not distinguish between labour used in the production of Y
and the labour used in the production of If (note that L in expression (3.8) measures the
total amount of labor used by the rm). In Section 3.6 I deal with this issue.
3.4. Data, variables and description
I present estimates based on an unbalanced sample of 1,728 Spanish manufacturing rms
during the period 1990-1999. The data used correspond to the o¢ cial survey Encuesta
sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE, (Survey on Firm Strategies). ESEE is an unbal-
anced panel survey of Spanish manufacturing rms with 10 or more workers, starting in
1990 and sponsored by the Ministry of Industry. At the beginning of the survey, all rms
with more than 200 workers were requested to participate, while a representative sample
of 5% of the rms with fewer than 200 workers was randomly selected. The nal sample
employed depends on the data available and the number of consecutive time observations
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required. Table 3.A1 (see Appendix 3.C) shows the composition in terms of time obser-
vations of the unbalanced panel sample used. The sample employed to estimate equation
(3.15) consists of all the rms that have been surveyed for at least three consecutive years
after dropping all the time observations for which the data needed are not available.
ESEE provides detailed information on rmsoutput, capital, labour (measured through
total hours of work) and intermediate consumptions. Moreover, the data provide infor-
mation about the outsourcing of manufacturing activities (production subcontracting).
Specically, I have information indicating whether the rm subcontracts production and
information about subcontracted purchases (rmspurchases of elaborated products and
customized components to external suppliers.). This information allows me to dene the
ratio between subcontracted purchases and (total) intermediate consumptions (which will
be used as a proxy for the theoretical variable sr). Hence, the theoretical index of production
subcontracting,

sr
1 sr

, can be constructed.
A unique feature of this data set is the availability of information on the changes in the
prices set by the rm, and on the changes in the prices that the rm pays for its non-
labour inputs. Detailed denitions of all employed variables can be found in Appendix
3.A. Moreover, Table 3.A2 (see Appendix 3.C) gives some descriptive statistics of the key
variables.
In what follows, I present the main facts regarding production subcontracting for Spanish
manufacturing rms during the 1990s73. I analyze it along two dimensions: the percentage
of rms that contract out manufacturing activities (Tables 3.1 and 3.2), and outsourcing
intensity among performers (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).
Table 3.1 shows the percentage of rms contracting out manufacturing activities during
the period 1990-99. Big rms are more likely to subcontract, and this gap does not decrease
during the period. Moreover, it seems that there is a positive relationship between the
decision of production subcontracting and the Spanish industrial cycle during the 1990s.
The period analyzed coincides with a complete industrial cycle. In 1991, manufacturing
73See López (2002) for a more detailed description of production subcontracting and externalization of
services by Spanish manufacturing rms during the 1990s.
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Table 3.1. Percentage of rms contracting out of manufacturing activities
Total manufacturing (by year)
All rms Up to 200 workers More than 200 workers
1990 39:9 31:7 53:1
1991 50:6 42:9 65:3
1992 46:2 41:8 55:9
1993 44:0 39:2 55:9
1994 41:9 36:6 54:6
1995 42:6 37:3 54:8
1996 42:6 37:2 55:0
1997 45:6 41:1 55:8
1998 47:5 42:7 58:3
1999 43:7 36:9 58:8
Total1 44:7 39:9 55:6
1Average of period 1990-99
experienced an important downturn. Recovery started in 1994 with only a minor halt in
1996 and in 1999. The percentage of rms contracting out manufacturing activities reects
a similar evolution (see Figure 3.1).
Regarding di¤erences between industries74, Table 3.2 shows that rms from Ind. and
agric. machinery (industry 4), O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods (industry 5), Transport
equipment (industry 6), and Other manufacturing products (industry 11) are highly active
in outsourcing.
Four industries are in an intermediate position: Metals and metal products (industry 1),
Chemical products (industry 3), Textile, leather and shoes (industry 8), and Paper and
printing products (industry 10).
Three industries -Non-metallic minerals (industry 2), Food, drink and tobacco (industry
7), and Timber and furniture (industry 9)- exhibit lower percentages.
74 I consider 11 industries. Industry breakdown is dened in Appendix 3.B.
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of rms contracting out of manufacturing activities
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Table 3.2. Percentage of rms contracting out of manufacturing activities1
Total manufacturing (by industry)
All rms Up to 200 workers More than 200 workers
1. Metals and metal products 47:0 46:3 48:5
2. Non-metallic minerals 26:5 24:1 36:5
3. Chemical products 43:6 35:3 59:3
4. Ind. and agric. machinery 65:4 65:2 64:1
5. O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods 61:5 55:2 66:1
6. Transport equipment 59:9 50:4 63:1
7. Food, drink and tobacco 21:5 13:4 39:8
8. Textile, leather and shoes 50:4 47:4 62:6
9. Timber and furniture 33:0 33:0 45:0
10. Paper and printing products 53:9 51:7 61:0
11. Other manufacturing products 63:6 62:7 77:4
Total manufacturing 44:7 39:9 55:6
1Average of period 1990-99
To analyze the outsourcing intensity, I use the ratio between subcontracted purchases (a
rms purchases of elaborated products and customized components) and (total) intermedi-
ate consumptions. I restrict my attention to those rms active in outsourcing. This ratio is
18.0% for rms with than 200 workers and 14.0% for rms with more than 200 workers (see
Table 3.3). I nd out that small rms are more intensive in production subcontracting than
big ones. This result may be shown in the bidirectional relation between outsourcing and
the rms structure, specically between outsourcing and rm size (measured by the num-
ber of workers). The higher the intensity in subcontracting is, the higher the substitution
of intermediate consumptions for labour is.
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the ratio between subcontracted purchases and interme-
diate consumptions over time. In this case, there is not a straight relationship between the
intensity of production subcontracting and the industrial cycle. Moreover, there appears to
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Table 3.3. Subcontracted purchases1 over Intermediate consumptions (%)
Firms contracting out of manufacturing activities (by year)
All rms Up to 200 workers More than 200 workers
1990 16:9 17:4 16:4
1991 14:4 18:0 9:7
1992 16:6 19:0 12:6
1993 16:3 17:8 13:7
1994 15:3 17:3 12:0
1995 15:6 16:7 13:7
1996 17:5 19:8 14:0
1997 16:8 18:5 13:9
1998 16:7 18:0 14:6
1999 18:2 20:3 15:3
Total2 16:5 18:0 14:0
1Firms purchases of elaborated products and customized components
2Average of period 1990-99
be di¤erences between small-medium rms and big rms.75
Table 3.4 shows intensity in production subcontracting by industry. There are di¤erences
between the share of rms active in outsourcing and outsourcing intensity. In this sense, the
industries with the highest outsourcing intensity are: Ind. and agric. machinery (industry
4), Transport equipment (industry 6), Textile, leather and shoes (industry 8), Timber and
furniture (industry 9) and Paper and printing products (industry 10). Industry 9, however,
exhibits a low percentage of rms active in outsourcing.
Three industries are in an intermediate position: Metals and metal products (industry
1), O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods (industry 5) and Other manufacturing products (industry
11), and three industries -Non-metallic minerals (industry 2), Chemical products (industry
75See Delgado et al. (1999), and López (2002) for evidence on the relationship between outsourcing and
the Spanish industrial cycle during the 1990s.
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Table 3.4. Subcontracted purchases1 over Intermediate consumptions2 (%)
Firms contracting out of manufacturing activities (by industry)
All rms Up to 200 workers More than 200 workers
1. Metals and metal products 15:3 16:7 13:0
2. Non-metallic minerals 11:6 12:7 10:1
3. Chemical products 9:8 10:4 9:7
4. Ind. and agric. machinery 22:3 23:7 18:4
5. O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods 17:1 18:1 15:7
6. Transport equipment 19:8 21:4 18:8
7. Food, drink and tobacco 10:5 12:4 9:9
8. Textile, leather and shoes 18:7 19:5 15:5
9. Timber and furniture 19:8 20:0 15:9
10. Paper and printing products 21:5 24:2 13:2
11. Other manufacturing products 14:0 12:5 18:7
Total manufacturing 16:5 18:0 14:0
1Firms purchases of elaborated products and customized components
2Average of period 1990-99
3), and Timber and furniture (industry 9)- exhibit lower outsourcing intensities.
3.5. Empirical results
Equation (3.15) is a linear equation with predetermined and endogenous variables. GMM
techniques76 are applied for their estimation. The instruments used in each estimate are
detailed in the notes to the tables. Sargan tests of the overidentifying restrictions are
reported for each estimate.
Each estimate includes m1 and m2 Arellano and Bond (1991) test statistics for rst and
second-order serial correlation77. As I said before, equations in levels are supposed to present
76See Arellano and Honoré (2002) for a recent review of this method.
77m1 and m2 test statistics are asymptotically distributed as a N (0; 1) under the null hypothesis of no
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an uncorrelated zero mean disturbance, and hence, disturbances of the di¤erenced equation
are expected to show a signicant negative rst-order autocorrelation, but an absence of
correlation of higher orders.
Estimation of the production function is carried out taking capital as predetermined,
and labour, non-subcontracted intermediate consumptions and subcontracted purchases as
endogenous variables.
Equations include eighteen industry dummies and yearly time dummies. These industry
and time dummies are included with their coe¢ cients constrained to add up to zero (Suits
method). I include a dummy indicating whether the rm was created during the period,
and one dummy indicating whether the rm is going to exit during the period. Moreover, to
control for discrete changes, dummies indicating merger/acquisition or scission are included.
3.5.1. Manufacturing level results
Table 3.5 presents the results for the estimation of equation (3.15) for manufacturing as
a whole. Estimate a presents OLS results, while estimates b, c and d take into account the
endogeneity of input choices and present GMM results. The preferred outcome is estimate
d. Estimates b and c are used to check their robustness.
On the one hand, constant returns to scale in the conventional inputs -capital, labour
and intermediate consumptions (excluding subcontracted purchases)- are accepted (see the
Wald test for this restriction in estimate b). Estimates c and d impose this constraint. On
the other hand, inclusion of capacity utilization does not change the coe¢ cients of the other
variables, but it is an important variable for explaining production shifts and it improves the
result concerning second-order serial correlation (compare estimates c and d). The Sargan
test allows me to accept the set of instruments employed.
Estimated elasticities for traditional inputs show plausible values. Low and insignicant
capital coe¢ cient in estimate b is consistent with traditional ndings using GMM tech-
autocorrelation.
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Table 3.5. Production function estimates
Equation: ey = + ek + 1el + 2 em+ 3sub+ 1substop+ 2substart+ e
Sample period: 1992-1999
No of rms: 1728
Dependent variable: ey
Independent variables2 a b c d
(OLS) (GMM1) (GMM1) (GMM1)
Constant 0:03(9:7) 0:02(2:0) 0:02(2:4) 0:02(2:2)ek 0:05(4:9) 0:13(1:38) 0:13 0:15el 0:29(10:9) 0:36(3:8) 0:37(4:0) 0:36(3:8)em 0:40(16:4) 0:49(7:2) 0:50(8:0) 0:49(8:0)
sub 0:07(10:7) 0:14(4:5) 0:14(4:7) 0:14(4:6)
substop  0:07( 7:9)  0:08( 7:2)  0:08( 7:3)  0:08( 7:4)
substart 0:06(6:5) 0:07(5:2) 0:07(5:4) 0:07(5:4)
cu 0:10(4:9) 0:06(2:5)   0:06(2:6)
Industry dummies3 Included Included Included Included
Time dummies3 Included Included Included Included
m1    9:0  9:2  9:3
m2    1:5  1:67  1:5
Sargan test (df)   21:7(22) 21:6(23) 21:6(23)
Wald test (df)   0:02(1)    
Heteroskedasticity robust t-ratios shown in parentheses.
1Instruments are: l, m and sub-lagged levels t-2; lagged log-di¤erences of k; and one size
dummy (>200 workers).
2Wald test allows us to accept  + 1 + 2 = 1: Estimates c and d impose this constraint.
318 industry dummies (ESEE Industries) and 8 year dummies, with the coe¢ cients of each
set constrained to add up to zero; dummies for entering and exiting rms, as well as mergers
and scissions, also included.
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niques78.
As expected, the index of production subcontracting,

sr
1 sr

; appears to be signicantly
associated with productivity. All estimates show that intensity of outsourcing has a positive
and signicant e¤ect on total factor productivity. In other words, keeping the traditional
factors of production constant, increasing the share of production subcontracting (mea-
sured as rms purchases of elaborated products and customized components over total
intermediate consumptions) leads to higher output.
It is not only the intensity that has a positive e¤ect on production, but also the subcon-
tracting decision. The coe¢ cient of the substart variable is positive and signicant, saying
that the decision to start production subcontracting has a positive e¤ect on production.
The substop variable goes the other way around. Moreover, these results are robust to the
use of a di¤erent set of instruments (see Table 3.A3 in Appendix 3.C).
Therefore, I nd evidence supporting the importance of production subcontracting as a
production shifter. This practice (viewed as an organizational innovation) increases exi-
bility and e¢ ciency, having its nal e¤ect on rm-level productivity.
3.5.2. Results by industry
Production behavior and technology are very likely to vary across industries. Table
3.6 presents the results of estimating equation (3.15) using GMM techniques and under
the assumption of constant returns to scale for each industry. The industry breakdown
considered is dened in Appendix 3.B. I exclude industry 11 because of a lack of observations
(only 35 rms belong to this industry. See Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.C for further details).
Before discussing the main industry level results, Table 3.7 reports specication tests
to check the validity of the estimates by industry. First, constant returns to scale in the
conventional inputs are accepted by a wide margin for industries 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9. Constant
returns to scale are accepted for industries 1, 3 and 7 with a little ground for concern.
78See Blundell and Bond (2000), and Griliches and Mairesse (1998) for a discussion about this problem.
See García, Jaumandreu and Rodríguez (2002) for a similar result on capital coe¢ cient using ESEE.
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Second, I test for overidentifying restrictions or validity of the moment conditions. The
Sargan test very clearly indicates the validity of the moment conditions.
Industry level results indicate (see Table 3.6) that industry di¤erences in the estimated
factor elasticities are quite sizeable. Estimated elasticities of output with respect to labour
go from 0.17 (industry 7. Food, drink and tobacco) to 0.66 (industry 8. Textile, leather
and shoes), while materials elasticity estimates are spread over a narrower range, and go
from 0.26 (industry 5. O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods) to 0.52 (industry 7. Food, drink and
tobacco).
Regarding outsourcing variables, rstly, outsourcing intensity appears to be signicantly
associated with productivity for ve industries (industry 1. Metals and metal products;
industry 5. O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods; industry 7. Food, drink and tobacco; industry 9.
Timber and furniture; and industry 10. Paper and printing products). Signicant estimated
coe¢ cients of the sub variable are quite similar, and go from 0.08 to 0.14. Moreover,
outsourcing intensity has a positive e¤ect on productivity, mainly for rms belonging to
light industries (industries 5, 7, 9 and 10).
This nding is not surprising since light industries are labour-intensive. For these in-
dustries, outsourcing intensity (substitution of intermediate consumptions for labour) has
a greater e¤ect on productivity growth (increasing exibility and e¢ ciency).
Secondly, dummy variables related to outsourcing decisions (substop and substart) are, in
most of the cases, signicant and have the expected e¤ect on productivity. These variables
have the greatest e¤ect in Industry 6. Transport equipment. In this case, the negative e¤ect
of the decision to stop outsourcing is particularly important.
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3.6. Estimating production functions when there is outsourcing
As I said in the introduction to this chapter, outsourcing is a make or buy decision. In
this sense, the buydecision implies that a rm is purchasing an intermediate input with
a certain degree of elaboration. Outsourcing implies that rms have access to intermediate
inputs with di¤erent degrees of elaboration. The degree of elaboration is related to the
quality of the intermediate input: the higher the degree of elaboration is, the higher the
quality is79.
In spite of its importance, outsourcing is not taken into account in the estimation of pro-
duction functions. In this sense, intermediate inputs enter the production function without
taking into account di¤erences in the degree of elaboration (without taking into account
quality di¤erentials). Quality di¤erences in the measures of inputs are important. Since the
seminal paper by Griliches (1957), a key idea in the literature has been that productivity
dispersion across rms may arise because rms use inputs with di¤erent qualities.
As pointed out by Griliches (1957), a kind of specication error occurs when inputs are
measured without taking into account quality di¤erentials. This author focuses on the
e¤ects of the disregard of quality di¤erences in the measure of labour input, but argues that
the same analysis can also be applied to the problem of disregarding the quality of other
inputs.
This section is aimed at modelling and estimating a more structural framework than the
model introduced in Section 3.2. It is based on two related ideas: (i) Outsourcing is a make
or buy decision; and (ii) There are intermediate inputs with di¤erent degrees of elaboration.
As I said in Section 3.3, this framework allows me to estimate all the parameters of interest
of the model.
79Note that I am only considering the quality related with the degree of elaboration. Of course, there can
be quality di¤erentials across intermediate inputs with the same degree of elaboration. However, the data
that I have does not allow me to control for this kind of quality di¤erentials.
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3.6.1. Theoretical model
Specication of production technology
Similar to expression (3:1), assume that rm j produces a single output Y at time t with
a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
Yjt = AjtK

jtL

p;jtI
1  
jt (3.16)
Dropping rm and time subscripts for simplicity, as in expression (3:1), A represents an
index of Hicks-neutral productivity shift parameter, K the capital input, Lp the labour
input used directly in the production of the nal output, and I an intermediate input.
Obtaining the intermediate input I, a rm can choose between inputs with di¤erent degrees
of elaboration.
To consider the possibility of outsourcing, I take into account two basic features of this
practice: (i) Outsourcing is a make or buy decision. In this sense, as in Section 3.2, I assume
that a rm can opt to produce I within the rm, say If , but a rm can also combine in-
house production of I with outside sources; and (ii) Intermediate input I contains inputs
with di¤erent degrees of elaboration.
Given these special characteristics of outsourcing, I assume that the procurement of
intermediate input I can be expressed as follows:
I = Ife
is (3.17)
To measure the degree of elaboration of I, I introduce an indicator of the importance of
outsourcing in a rm (variable is). In this sense, the higher is is, the higher the importance
of outsourcing is (i.e., the higher the degree of elaboration of the intermediate input is). This
specication allows us to consider rms with outsourcing (is > 0) and without outsourcing
(is = 0) simultaneously.
Note that eis is an e¢ ciency term that indicates how much input I can be obtained
by in-house production according to the degree of outsourcing. In other words, holding is
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and I xed (is and I; respectively), the higher  is, the lower in-house production (If ) is
necessary to achieve I (see Figure 3.3, where h > l).
Figure 3.3. Combining in-house production and outsourcing. I = Ifeis
Finally, as in Section 3.2, production within the rm of input I can be written as:
If = L

fM
1  (3.18)
where M indicates the quantity of intermediate input measured without taking into ac-
count quality di¤erentials. Lf represents labour input used in the production of If . For
simplicity, capital input is not included in the production of If .
From (3.17) and (3.18) I can write:
I = LfM
1 eis (3.19)
Rewriting the production function
The production of If responds to the following cost minimization problem:8<: Min wLf + p0MMs:t: LfM1  = If (3.20)
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where p0M is the price of M . Note that this price does not incorporate information on
the degree of elaboration (i.e., it is the price without possible quality improvements). This
price is not observable.
Solving (3.20), I get the conditional factor demand functions of Lf and M :
Lf (w; p
0
M ; If ) = If

w

 1 p0M
1  
1 
(3.21)
M(w; p0M ; If ) = If

w

  p0M
1  
 
(3.22)
From (3.21) and (3.22), I can write:
Lf
M
=

1  
p0M
w
(3.23)
Substituting (3.17) and (3.18) in (3.16), I can write:
Y
M
= A

K
M
 Lp
M
Lf
M
(1  )
e(1  )is (3.24)
From (3.23), I can write:

Lf
M
(1  )
=


1  
(1  )p0M
w
(1  )
(3.25)
Dene L = Lp + Lf (note that neither Lp nor Lf are observable. I can only observe the
total amount of labour used, L): Now, I can write:

Lp
M

=

L
M
  
1  
p0M
w

=

L
M

1  
1  
p0MM
wL

(3.26)

p0M
w
(1  )
=

L
M
(1  )p0MM
wL
(1  )
(3.27)
Substituting (3.25), (3.26) and (3.27) in (3.24), I can write:
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YM
= A

K
M
  L
M
+(1  )
1  
1  
p0MM
wL


1  
(1  )
(3.28)
p0MM
wL
(1  )
e(1  )is
Finally, dening s = wL
p0MM+wL
, I can write p
0
MM
wL =
1 s
s . And substituting in (3.28), I
obtain:
Y
M
= A

K
M
  L
M
+(1  )
1  
1  
1  s
s
 
1  
(1  )
(3.29)
1  s
s
(1  )
e(1  )is
3.6.2. Empirical strategy
Empirical specication
Taking logs in expression (3.29) and using the approximation log

1  1  1 ss

   1  1 ss
, I obtain:
y  m = a+ (k  m) + [+  (1    )] (l  m)   
1  
1  s
s
(3.30)
+ (1    ) log


1  

+  (1    ) log

1  s
s

+  (1    ) is + u
where y, m, k, and l are the logs of Y , M , K and L, respectively. The term u is an error
term dened as in Section 3.3.
Expression (3.30) is the relevant equation to be estimated. It is an augmentedproduc-
tion function. The analysis is carried out in a framework where the production function is
augmented with a variable measuring the quality (degree of elaboration) of the intermediate
input (term  (1    ) is).
Expression (3.30) embodies nonlinear restrictions in the parameters and, therefore, it is
estimated using non-linear GMM estimation. Finally, I carry out all estimates in di¤erences.
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Estimation method
As I said before, expression (3.30) is estimated using non-linear GMM estimation. A
GMM estimator minimizes a quadratic form in
NP
i=1
Z 0iui(). The objective function is:
min


NP
i=1
Z 0iui()
0


NP
i=1
Z 0iui()

(3.31)
where Zi is the matrix of instruments and  the set of parameters: A consistent estimator
of  (say b) can be obtained with
 =

1
N
NP
i=1
Z 0iZi
 1
(3.32)
where N is the number of rms, so that b solves
min


NP
i=1
Z 0iui()
0 
1
N
NP
i=1
Z 0iZi
 1  NP
i=1
Z 0iui()

(3.33)
The optimal estimator uses the weighting matrix  =

1
N
NP
i=1
Z 0iui(b)ui(b)0Zi 1 :
In practice, expression (3.30) can be concentrated outfor the estimation of parameters
which enter linearly, and the non-linear search is over ; ;  and :
Testing overidentication restrictions
The objective function (3.31) evaluated at the optimal estimator and divided by N has
an asymptotic chi-square distribution with L-K degrees of freedom, where L is the number
of instruments and K the number of parameters to be estimated. I use it as a test of
overidentifying restrictions.
Data and variables
Again, the data used correspond to the o¢ cial survey Encuesta sobre estrategias em-
presariales, ESEE, (Survey on Firm Strategies). In this case, I use a balanced panel. The
sample used includes 198 rms with 10 consecutive observations per rm (1,980 observations
are used).
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To estimate equation (3.30), the data required for each rm include its output, capital,
labour (measured through total hours of work) and intermediate inputs (see Appendix 3.A
for detailed denitions). Moreover, to measure the importance of outsourcing in the rm
(variable is), I use the proportion of intermediate consumptions that are subcontracted (see
variable sr in Section 3.2)80.
Finally, as I said before, p0M is not observable, and hence p
0
MM is not observable. I
use four di¤erent variables to approximate p0M : (i) deated M (to approximate p
0
MM); (ii)
output price index; (iii) energy price index; (iv) services price index.
Table 3.A4 (see Appendix 3.C) gives some descriptive statistics of the key variables used
(dependent variable, independent variables and instruments).
3.6.3. Estimation results
Table 3.8 presents the results of the non-linear GMM estimation of expression (3.30) in
di¤erences. All estimates include time dummies and some of them the capacity utiliza-
tion variable (to control for input utilization). Across this table, a deated M is used to
approximate p0MM .
Estimates in Table 3.8 are carried out taking labour and intermediate consumptions as
endogenous variables. Lagged log-levels t-2 at each cross-section of both these inputs are
used as instruments. Capital is treated as a predetermined variable, and hence, its lagged
log-di¤erences are valid instruments. I use as additional instruments the log-di¤erences of
hourly wage and the log-di¤erences of materials price index.
Estimate a considers the proportion of intermediate consumptions that are subcontracted
to be an exogenous variable, while estimates b, c, d, e and f consider it to be endogenous.
Lagged di¤erences of the proportion of intermediate consumptions that are subcontracted,
log-di¤erences of utilization of capacity, lagged log of utilization of capacity and the pro-
80The ESEE also provides information on service outsourcing, but it is four-year and qualitative infor-
mation (use/no use of outside suppliers). The incorporation of service outsourcing into the measure of the
indicator of the importance of outsourcing (is) is left to future research.
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portion of temporary workers are used as instruments for this variable. The instruments
used in each estimate are detailed in the notes to the table.
I obtain sensible and similar results for  and , i.e., coe¢ cients for both uses of
labour are similar. The elasticity of capital, which is di¢ cultly estimated with variables in
di¤erences, seems particularly well estimated. Moreover, results for ,  and  are robust
to the use of di¤erent instruments for is.
However,  coe¢ cients are estimated imprecisely, obtaining high standard errors. When
the proportion of intermediate consumptions that are subcontracted is considered to be an
exogenous variable (see estimate a), a very low coe¢ cient is obtained. Furthermore, results
for  are not robust to the use of di¤erent instruments for is. In terms of , the preferred
outcomes are estimates b, d and e. In these cases,  takes a value around 1, although it
is not signicant. Further research is needed on improving estimation. An important step
forward will be to obtain results for an unbalanced panel.
Regarding the test for overidentifying restrictions (or validity of the moment conditions
based on the instruments), the test statistic is too high for the usual signicance levels in
the case of estimate f. The other values indicate the validity of the moment conditions,
although there are di¤erences in the signicance levels.
Finally, Table 3.9 analyzes the robustness of the results to di¤erent measures for p0M .
Estimate a is the same as estimate f in Table 3.8 (a deated M is used to approximate
p0MM), while an output price index, an energy price index and a services price index are
used to measure p0M in estimates b, c and d, respectively. Again, results for ,  and  are
robust to the di¤erent specications.
The preferred outcome is estimate a. In this case, I obtain the most precise estimation
of  (a high standard error, but smaller than the estimated coe¢ cient) and the best result
in terms of the test of overidentifying restrictions.
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To sum up, the main results up to here are as follows. Firstly, coe¢ cients on both labour
uses, capital and intermediate consumptions are well estimated. Secondly,  is estimated
imprecisely, obtaining high standard errors. Moreover, results for this parameter seem to be
less robust to di¤erent specications. And thirdly, given b, b, and b, the coe¢ cient onthe
indicator of the importance of outsourcing (variable is) can be obtained. For example, using
the results of estimate e in Table 3.8, the coe¢ cient on is is equal to 0:467. However, this
result should be viewed with some caveats (as I said before,  is estimated imprecisely).
This line of research can be improved in at least three ways: by obtaining results for an
unbalanced panel, by improving instrumentation (especially instruments for variable is),
and by adding information on service outsourcing to improve the measure of the weight of
outsourcing in the rm.
3.7. Conclusions
Innovation is a primary source of productivity growth, but a concept of innovation broader
than technological product and process innovation is needed. As it is pointed out in the
Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), the concept of innovation should include marketing and or-
ganizational innovations. Organizational innovations on their own can have an important
e¤ect on productivity. In this sense, organizational innovations can increase the quality
and e¢ ciency of work, improve information sharing and the ability of the rm to use new
technologies, as such increasing the productivity of investment in knowledge.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between organizational innovation
and productivity growth. I focus on the role of one of the most relevant organizational
methods, outsourcing. Specically, this study deals with outsourcing at the rm level and
focuses on the role of contracting out manufacturing activities (production subcontracting).
In the existing empirical literature, outsourcing has been measured in many di¤erent
ways. Most of the measures used are rough and there are few studies using data at the
rm level. A feature of the rm-level data set that I use is the availability of a straight
measure of production subcontracting. In this sense, I have information on rmspurchases
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of elaborated products and customized components from external suppliers.
In analyzing the e¤ect of outsourcing on a rms productivity, I rst introduce a simple
framework that species a production function considering the possibility of production
subcontracting. The framework developed leads to the estimation of a production function
depending on traditional inputs (labor, capital and materials) and an index of production
subcontracting. Specically, both the e¤ect of rst-time outsourcing on productivity and
the e¤ect of the intensity of production subcontracting can be analyzed.
Results for manufacturing as a whole show a positive e¤ect of both the outsourcing
decision and outsourcing intensity on productivity. When analyzing industry-level results,
I nd that outsourcing intensity has a positive e¤ect on productivity, mainly for rms
belonging to light industries (labor-intensive industries), while the decision to start (stop)
outsourcing has, in most of the cases, the expected positive (negative) e¤ect on productivity.
The chapter ends with a rst attempt at modelling and estimating a more structural
framework. This framework allows to identify two labour uses(labour used directlyin
the production of the nal output and labour used in the production of the intermediate
input). Results show plausible values for the elasticities of both labour uses, capital and
intermediate consumptions.
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Appendix 3.A. Denitions of Variables
Capacity utilization: Yearly average rate of capacity utilization reported by the rm.
Capital stock : Capital at current replacement values is computed recursively from an
initial estimate and the data on rmsinvestments in equipment goods (but not buildings
or nancial assets), actualized by means of a price index of capital goods, and using sectorial
estimates of the rates of depreciation. Real capital is then obtained by deating the current
replacement values. Details on this variable can be found in Martín-Marcos and Suárez
(1997).
Entrant rm: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the rm has been created
during the period.
Exiting rms: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the rm is going to exit
during the period (stop activity or stop manufacturing).
Hours of work : Total normal hours of work plus overtime minus lost hours, computed by
multiplying hours per worker by the number of workers.
Hours per worker : Normal hours of work plus overtime minus lost hours per worker.
Industry dummies: Eighteen industry dummies (ESEE Industries. See Appendix B).
Intermediate consumption: Sum of purchases of materials and external services minus
the variation of intermediate inventories. Nominal intermediate consumption is deated by
the rms specic price index of intermediate consumption.
Merger and acquisition: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years subsequent
to a merger or acquisition.
Output : Goods and services production. Sales plus the variation of inventories deated
by the rms output price index.
Production subcontracting : Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the rm subcontracts
production.
Price of energy : Paasche-type price index computed by starting from the percentage
variations in the price of energy reported by the rms.
Price of intermediate consumption: Paasche-type price index computed by starting from
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the percentage variations in the prices of purchased materials, energy and services reported
by the rms.
Price of output : Paasche-type price index computed by starting from the percentage price
changes that the rm reports to have made in the markets in which it operates.
Price of services: Paasche-type price index computed by starting from the percentage
variations in the price of services reported by the rms.
Scission: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years subsequent to a scission.
Size: Two size dummies (fewer than or equal to 200 workers; and more than 200 workers).
Subcontracted purchases: Purchases of elaborated products or customized components.
Nominal subcontracted purchases are deated by the rms specic price index of interme-
diate consumption.
Wage: Firms hourly wage rate (total labour cost divided by e¤ective total hours of
work).
Workers: Approximation of the average number of workers during the year.
137
Appendix 3.B. Industry denitions
NACE Code ESEE Industries Industry breakdown
(3-digit)
221 to 224 Ferrous and non-ferrous metals 1. Metals and metal products
311 to 319 Metal products
240 to 249 Non-metallic mineral products 2. Non-metallic minerals
251 to 255 Chemical products 3. Chemical products
481, 482 Rubber and plastic products
321 to 329 Industrial and agricultural machinery 4. Ind. and agric. machinery
330, 391 to 399 O¢ ce and data processing machinery 5. O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods
341 to 347, Electrical goods
351 to 355
361 to 363 Motor vehicles 6. Transport equipment
371, 372, Other transport equipment
381 to 389
413 Meats, meat preparation 7. Food, drink and tobacco
411, 412, Food products and tobacco
414 to 423, 429
424 to 428 Beverages
431 to 439, Textiles and clothing 8. Textile, leather and shoes
453 to 456
441, 442, Leather and leather products
451, 452
461 to 468 Timber, wood products 9. Timber and furniture
471 to 475 Paper and printing products 10. Paper and printing products
491 to 495 Other manufacturing products 11. Other manufacturing products
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Appendix 3.C. Additional tables
Table 3.A1. Firms by industry and number of observations
Industry breakdown No. of observations
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1. Metals and metal products 40 23 37 13 21 25 13 36 208
2. Non-metallic minerals 22 12 22 12 9 15 6 24 122
3. Chemical products 42 29 35 25 26 26 16 29 228
4. Ind. and agric. machinery 23 15 9 11 11 7 5 15 96
5. O¢ ce mach. and elec. goods 29 26 20 18 14 8 7 29 151
6. Transport equipment 21 21 22 8 11 12 3 18 116
7. Food, drink and tobacco 37 42 32 35 35 22 16 55 274
8. Textile, leather and shoes 69 31 31 25 25 36 9 43 269
9. Timber and furniture 20 13 15 18 9 16 4 12 107
10. Paper and printing products 20 16 16 14 13 16 11 16 122
11. Other manufacturing products 3 3 4 5 4 8 0 8 35
Total Industry 326 231 243 184 178 191 90 285 1728
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Table 3.A2 Variable descriptive statistics
Symbol Mean St. dev Min Max
Dependent variable
Output (growth rate) ey 0.038 0.259 -3.220 2.569
Explanatory variables
Capacity utilization (growth rate) cu 0.001 0.194 -2.833 2.944
Capital stock (growth rate) ek 0.086 0.297 -2.619 4.362
Hours of work (growth rate) el -0.002 0.193 -2.833 1.758
Intermediate consumptions1 (growth rate) em 0.026 0.402 -4.375 3.682
Index of production subcontracting (growth rate) sub 0.001 0.747 -8.650 9.171
Dummy indicating stopping outsourcing substop 0.084 0 1
Dummy indicating starting outsourcing substart 0.087 0 1
Industry dummies (ESEE Industries)
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals 0.023 0 1
Metal products 0.100 0 1
Non-metallic mineral products 0.073 0 1
Chemical products 0.072 0 1
Rubber and plastic products 0.059 0 1
Industrial and agricultural machinery 0.054 0 1
O¢ ce and data processing machinery 0.008 0 1
Electrical goods 0.077 0 1
Motor vehicles 0.046 0 1
Other transport equipment 0.019 0 1
Meats, meat preparation 0.030 0 1
Food products and tobacco 0.114 0 1
Beverages 0.021 0 1
Textiles and clothing 0.119 0 1
Leather and leather goods 0.030 0 1
Timber, wood products 0.060 0 1
Paper and printing products 0.072 0 1
Other manufacturing products 0.023 0 1
1Without rms purchases of elaborated products and customized components
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Table 3.A2 (continued) Variable descriptive statistics
Explanatory variables
Size dummies
 200 workers 0.690 0 1
> 200 workers 0.310 0 1
Time dummies
1991 0.076 0 1
1992 0.088 0 1
1993 0.110 0 1
1994 0.120 0 1
1995 0.121 0 1
1996 0.125 0 1
1997 0.125 0 1
1998 0.126 0 1
1999 0.110 0 1
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Table 3.A3. Production function estim ates. Robustness checks
Equation : ey =  + ek + 1el + 2 em + 3sub + 1substop + 2substart + e
Sample p eriod : 1992-1999
No of rm s: 1728
Estim ation m ethod: GMM 1
Dependent variab le: ey
a b c
Indep endent variab les2 a:1 a:2 b:1 b:2 c:1 c:2
Constant 0:02(2:5) 0:017(2:5) 0:018(2:2) 0:016(2:2) 0:02(2:1) 0:015(1:96)ek 0:13(1:45) 0:17 0:15(1:6) 0:19 0:15(1:59) 0:20el 0:39(4:1) 0:39(4:2) 0:38(4:0) 0:38(4:0) 0:39(4:2) 0:40(4:3)em 0:42(5:6) 0:44(6:3) 0:42(5:1) 0:43(5:9) 0:37(5:2) 0:40(6:0)
sub 0:11(3:7) 0:12(2:9) 0:11(3:4) 0:11(3:6) 0:10(3:2) 0:10(3:4)
substop  0:07( 6:3)  0:07( 6:7)  0:07( 6:0)  0:07( 6:4)  0:06( 5:8)  0:07( 6:3)
substart 0:06(4:2) 0:06(4:4) 0:06(3:9) 0:06(4:2) 0:05(3:8) 0:05(4:1)
cu 0:08(3:0) 0:07(2:9) 0:08(2:9) 0:07(2:9) 0:09(3:4) 0:08(3:4)
Industry dumm ies3 Included Included Included Included Included Included
T im e dumm ies3 Included Included Included Included Included Included
Size dumm ies3 Included Included Included Included Included Included
m1  8:8  9:2  8:8  9:2  8:2  8:6
m2  1:7  1:6  1:7  1:6  1:8  1:7
Sargan test (d f ) 30:5(28) 30:6(29) 22:6(21) 22:2(22) 24:4(21) 24:0(22)
Wald test (d f ) 0:35(1) 0:22(1) 0:6(1)
Heteroskedastic ity robust t-ratios shown in parentheses.
1Instrum ents are:
E stim ate (a): l lagged levels t-2 and t-3 ; m and sub-lagged levels t-2 ; and lagged log-d i¤erences of k .
E stim ate (b): l, m and sub-lagged levels t-2 ; and lagged log-d i¤erences of k .
E stim ate (c): l, m and sub-lagged levels t-2 ; lagged log-d i¤erences of k ; and log of price of interm ediate consumptions.
2Wald test a llow s us to accept  + 1 + 2 = 1: Estim ates a.2 , b .2 , and c.2 impose th is constra int.
318 industry dumm ies (ESEE Industries), 8 year dumm ies and 2 size dumm ies, w ith the co e¢ cients of each set
constra ined to add up to zero ; dumm ies for entering and exiting rm s, as well as m ergers and scissions, a lso included .
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Table 3.A4. Variable descriptive statistics
Balanced Panel
(198 rms)
Symbol Mean St. dev Min Max
Variable
Output (logs) y 13:723 1:710 8:862 17:748
Capital stock (logs) k 11:869 2:039 4:727 17:560
Hours of work (logs) l 4:862 1:364 1:946 8:987
Intermediate consumptions (logs) m 13:210 1:805 6:842 17:571
Index of production subcontracting is 0:096 0:172 0:000 0:997
Capacity utilization (logs) cu 4:375 0:207 2:890 4:605
Output price index (logs)  0:004 0:087  0:470 0:368
User cost of capital 0:025 0:046 0:000 0:200
Hourly wage (logs) 7:472 0:465 5:143 8:825
Energy price index (logs)  0:004 0:094  0:435 0:286
Services price index (logs)  0:006 0:110  0:544 0:318
Temporary workers proportion 0:197 0:199 0:000 0:934
E¤ective hours per worker (logs) 7:486 0:061 6:380 7:800
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APPENDIX. RESUMEN: OBJETIVOS, RESULTADOS, APORTACIONES
Y CONCLUSIONES
A.1. Introducción
Las actividades de innovación realizadas por las empresas y el impacto de dichas activi-
dades son de interés primordial tanto para economistas como para responsables de política
económica. El análisis de estas actividades requiere el conocimiento tanto de los factores
que afectan a la capacidad innovadora de las empresas como el conocimiento del impacto de
las actividades innovadoras en la actividad económica de las empresas a través de cambios
en la demanda y en sus costes.
Esta tesis estudia dos de los temas de investigación más relevantes de la Economía de la
Innovación: (i) la cooperación en actividades innovadoras, y (ii) la relación entre innovación
y productividad.
A.1.1. Cooperación en actividades innovadoras
Las actividades innovadoras de las empresas dependen en gran medida de la variedad y
estructura de sus vínculos con las fuentes de información y conocimiento, fuentes
tecnológicas, y fuentes de recursos humanos y nancieros. Cada uno de estos vínculos
conecta a la empresa con otros agentes del Sistema de Innovación, tales como laboratorios
comerciales, universidades, departamentos de política económica, reguladores, institutos de
investigación públicos, competidores, proveedores y clientes. Estos ujos de conocimiento
entre las empresas y otras organizaciones tienen un papel importante en el desarrollo y la
difusión de innovaciones.
El Manual de Oslo (OCDE, 2005) identica tres tipos de vínculos entre las empresas y su
entorno: (i) fuentes de información abiertas, (ii) adquisición de conocimiento y de tecnología,
y (iii) cooperación en actividades innovadoras. En primer lugar, las fuentes de información
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abiertas proveen la información disponible que no requiere la compra de tecnología o de
derechos de propiedad intelectual, ni de la interacción con la fuente. En segundo lugar,
la adquisición de conocimiento y tecnología es la compra de conocimiento externo, bienes
de capital (maquinaria, equipo, software) y servicios. En tercer lugar, la cooperación en
actividades de innovación consiste en la cooperación activa con otros agentes del Sistema
de Innovación (por ejemplo, universidades, empresas o institutos de investigación públicos)
con el objetivo de realizar actividades innovadoras. Es decir, estas actividades consisten en
acuerdos con otros agentes por los cuales las empresas comparten los costes y los benecios
de proyectos de innovación.
Con el n último de fomentar la innovación, recientemente se ha prestado un interés
creciente a la cooperación en actividades de innovación (véase, entre otros, a Dodgson
(1994), Hagedoorn et al. (2000), Hagedoorn (2002), y Tyler y Steensma (1995)).
Una característica importante de esta tipo de actividades de cooperación es su
interacción con temas de Política de la Competencia. Desde el trabajo seminal de
Schumpeter (1943), la relación entre competencia e innovación ha sido una cuestión de
interés tanto para economistas como para responsables de política económica. En este sen-
tido, el nivel de competencia en los mercados tiene una gran inuencia en el surgimiento y
la difusión de la tecnología y de la innovación.
El análisis económico sugiere la existencia de una serie de dicultades para alcanzar el
nivel óptimo de las actividades innovadoras bajo competencia perfecta en los mercados81.
El carácter del input conocimiento(libremente disponible una vez revelado), la existencia
de costes jos altos, y en muchos casos costes hundidos, y la incertidumbre asociada a los
resultados de las actividades de innovación hacen que las empresas tengan pocos incentivos
a la hora de asignar recursos a este tipo de actividad que, al mismo tiempo, produce impor-
tantes externalidades positivas hacia otras empresas y consumidores. Por otra parte, tal y
como numerosos estudios empíricos han demostrado (Geroski (1995), Nickell (1996), Blun-
dell, Gri¢ th y Van Reenen (1999), entre otros), la presión competitiva parece en muchas
circunstancias estimular fuertemente las actividades innovadoras y la introducción de inno-
81Ver, entre otros, Martin (2002, Capítulo 14), Dasgupta y Stiglitz (1980), Aghion y Howitt (1992).
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vaciones por parte de la empresas.
En este contexto, uno de los aspectos más interesantes de la cooperación en actividades de
innovación es su importancia como factor de generación, mejora, apropiación y protección
de los ujos de información. Por lo tanto, este tipo de acuerdos es una guía útil en aspectos
de regulación normativa, que deben tratar de consolidar mecanismos de incentivos y, al
mismo tiempo, no obstaculizar la competencia en los mercados.
Por lo tanto, es importante entender qué tipo de empresas son propensas a cooperar
en actividades de innovación, los motivos de dicha actividad y hasta que punto la política
económica es ecaz como estímulo de estas actividades. En este sentido, los dos primeros
capítulos de esta tesis presentan evidencia sobre los determinantes de la cooperación en
actividades innovadoras. El primero explora los determinantes en el caso de las empresas
manufactureras españolas, mientras que el segundo investiga los determinantes de este tipo
de acuerdos en cuatro países europeos: Francia, Alemania, España y Reino Unido.
A.1.2. Innovación y productividad
El mal comportamiento de la productividad en Europa en relación a los EEUU ha sido
una de las principales preocupaciones de política económica en Europa. En este sentido,
uno de los objetivos de la Estrategia de Lisboa es corregir la baja productividad y el
estancamiento del crecimiento económico en la UE. Tal y como se señala en Sapir et al.
(2003): En la UE, ha habido una disminución constante del crecimiento década tras década
y el PIB per cápita se ha estancado alrededor del 70% del nivel de los EEUU desde el
principios de los 80.
En las primeras tres décadas después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Europa estableció
una reputación envidiable en relación a su crecimiento económico elevado y a su nivel alto de
protección social. El crecimiento económico en los países europeos durante la posguerra se
basó en la implantación generalizada de tecnologías maduras con implicaciones organizativas
bien conocidas y una difusión rápida de la mejor práctica. Es decir, la convergencia con
los niveles de los EEUU se basó en la inversión y acumulación de factores productivos, y en
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la imitación de tecnologías.
El bajo crecimiento económico en la UE durante las últimas décadas es síntoma de su fra-
caso en transformarse en una economía sustentada en la innovación. Un sistema construido
en base a la asimilación de tecnologías existentes, la producción en masa y una estructura
industrial dominada por empresas grandes no encaja en el mundo de hoy, caracterizado por
la globalización económica y por una fuerte competencia internacional (Sapir et al. (2003)).
Los países europeos necesitan orientarse hacia un crecimiento basado en la innovación. La
innovación afecta al funcionamiento y resultados de las empresas a través de una variedad
de canales, que van desde los efectos de la innovación sobre ventas y cuotas de mercado
a los cambios en la productividad y eciencia de las empresas. Además, la innovación
tiene otros efectos importantes a nivel industrial y nacional tales como: cambios en la
competitividad internacional y en la productividad total de los factores, la aparición de
ujos de información derivados de las innovaciones empresariales y el incremento de ujos
de conocimiento a través de las redes.
Tanto académicos como responsables de política económica han remarcado la importan-
cia de la inversión en Investigación y Desarrollo (I+D) como motor de crecimiento de la
productividad de largo plazo. En relación con la literatura académica sobre este tema,
desde Griliches (1979), muchos estudios empíricos se han centrado en la relación entre I+D
y productividad82, y en el papel de las innovaciones tecnológicas de proceso y de producto
como impulsores de la productividad83. En respuesta a estas inquietudes, la UE se ha jado
el objetivo de aumentar el gasto en I+D hasta el 3% del PIB antes de 2010 (este objetivo
es parte de la Estrategia de Lisboa).
Sin embargo, es necesario un marco más amplio que aquél en el que sólo se considera
la innovación de producto y de proceso. En este sentido, la tercera edición del Manual
de Oslo (OCDE, 2005) amplía la denición de la innovación para incluir, además de la
innovación de producto y de proceso, dos tipos adicionales de innovación: (i) la innovación
82Griliches (1995) contiene una revisión de esta literatura.
83Por ejemplo, Crépon et al. (1998) proponen un modelo estructural para analizar la relación entre gastos
en I+D, innovación y productividad.
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organizativa y (ii) la innovación de la comercialización. Considerando estos dos tipos de
innovación, se obtiene un marco más completo para tener en cuenta de forma más precisa los
cambios que afectan al funcionamiento de las empresas y que contribuyen a la acumulación
de conocimiento.
El tercer capítulo de esta tesis contribuye a la literatura que estudia la relación entre
innovación y productividad analizando el efecto que la innovación organizativa tiene sobre
la productividad. Una innovación organizativa (véase OCDE, 2005) es la puesta en prác-
tica de un nuevo método de organización. Éstos pueden ser: (i) cambios en las prácticas
empresariales (por ejemplo, sistemas de gestión de los conocimientos nuevos o mejorados
de manera signicativa), (ii) cambios en la organización del trabajo dentro de la empresa
(por ejemplo, la puesta en práctica de métodos nuevos para distribuir responsabilidades y
la autonomía en la toma de decisiones por parte de los trabajadores), o (iii) cambios en las
relaciones con el exterior (es decir, la puesta en práctica de maneras nuevas de organizar
las relaciones con otras empresas o instituciones públicas).
Los cambios en los métodos de organización pueden mejorar la eciencia y la calidad de
las actividades de las empresas, y de este modo pueden incrementar la demanda y reducir
los costes. Hay un número cada vez mayor de estudios que sugieren un efecto signicativo
y positivo de diversos tipos de innovación organizativa en la productividad. Por ejemplo,
Black y Lynch (2004) aportan uno de los resultados más signicativos sobre la relación entre
innovación organizativa y crecimiento. Estos autores encuentran que el 30% del crecimiento
del output en el sector manufacturero de EEUU durante el período 1993-1996 se debió a
prácticas organizativas.
El tercer capítulo se centra en el papel de uno de los métodos organizativos más relevantes,
el outsourcing (externalización o subcontratación). En este sentido, la tercera edición del
Manual de Oslo (OCDE, 2005) considera la externalización o subcontratación de activi-
dades económicas de producción, distribución, contratación de personal y contratación de
serviciosun método nuevo de organización en las relaciones exteriores de las empresas.
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A.2. Objetivos y metodología
Tal y como se dijo en la introducción, el objetivo de esta tesis es el estudio de dos de los
temas de investigación más relevantes relacionados con la Economía de la Innovación: (i) la
cooperación en actividades de innovación, y (ii) la relación entre innovación y productividad.
En concreto, el objetivo de la primera línea de investigación es el estudio empírico de los
determinantes de la cooperación en actividades de innovación. El primer capítulo de la tesis
se centra en el estudio de estos determinantes en el caso de las empresas manufactureras
españolas, mientras que el segundo capítulo realiza una comparación internacional de dichos
determinantes utilizando datos de Alemania, España, Francia y Reino Unido. En ambos
capítulos se utilizan datos procedentes de la Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
La segunda línea de investigación (tercer capítulo de la tesis) se centra en el análisis
del impacto de una de las innovaciones organizativas más relevantes, el outsourcing, sobre
la productividad a nivel de empresa. En este caso se utilizan datos de la Encuesta sobre
Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE).
Antes de resumir los objetivos y metodología de cada uno de los capítulos se realiza una
breve descripción de las bases de datos utilizadas.
A.2.1. Bases de datos utilizadas
Community Innovation Survey (CIS)
Los datos utilizados en los dos primeros capítulos corresponden a la tercera oleada de la
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) que tuvo lugar en el año 2001.
La CIS se realiza cada cuatro años y tiene como objetivo estudiar las actividades
innovadoras de los países europeos. La encuesta se realiza siguiendo las directrices
metodológicas denidas en el Manual de Oslo de la OCDE y su contenido está armonizado
entre los diferentes países europeos, lo que permite la comparabilidad internacional.
Esta encuesta facilita información a nivel de empresa sobre la estructura del proceso de
innovación (I+D y otras actividades innovadoras) y permite mostrar la relación entre dicho
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proceso y la estrategia tecnológica de las empresas, los factores que inuyen en su capacidad
para innovar y el rendimiento económico de la empresa.
La información que contiene se reere a adquisición de nuevas tecnologías, innovaciones
tecnológicas, actividades de I+D, gastos en innovación, regionalización de los gastos de
innovación, impacto económico de la innovación tecnológica, objetivos de la actividad
innovadora, fuentes de ideas innovadoras, obstáculos a la innovación y otras innovaciones
no tecnológicas.
La encuesta va dirigida a empresas industriales, de la construcción y de los servicios de
diez o más asalariados, cuya actividad económica principal se corresponde con las secciones
C a la O de la Clasicación Nacional de Actividades Económicas de 1993 Rev 1.
En España, la CIS toma le nombre de Encuesta sobre Innovación Tecnológica en las
Empresas y es realizada por el INE.
Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE)
En el tercer capítulo se utilizan datos procedentes de la Encuesta sobre Estrategias
Empresariales (ESEE).
La ESEE es una encuesta de panel a empresas industriales manufactureras que, iniciada
con los datos correspondientes a 1990, se ha venido realizando hasta la actualidad. Esta
encuesta fue diseñada por el Programa de Investigaciones Económicas (PIE) de la Fundación
Empresa Pública (FEP). En la actualidad es conanciada por el Ministerio de Industria,
Turismo y Comercio y por la Fundación SEPI.
La ESEE se basa en una muestra dinámicamente representativa (articulada en dos grandes
submuestras, empresas con más y menos de 200 trabajadores), a la que se ha investigado en
un conjunto amplio de aspectos relacionados con temas de economía industrial (incluyendo
las actividades innovadoras)84. La selección inicial de empresas se realizó combinando crite-
rios de exhaustividad y de muestreo aleatorio. En el primer grupo se incluyeron las empresas
de más de 200 trabajadores, a las que se requirió su participación. El segundo grupo quedó
formado por las empresas con empleo comprendido entre 10 y 200 trabajadores, que fueron
84Una descripción detallada de esta encuesta se encuentra en Fariñas y Jaumandreu (1999).
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seleccionadas por muestreo estraticado, proporcional con restricciones y sistemático con
arranque aleatorio.
En cuanto a su contenido, la ESEE está orientada a recoger información sobre las es-
trategias de las empresas, es decir sobre aquellas decisiones que adoptan en relación a los
instrumentos de competencia a su alcance. De una forma general, podemos clasicar la
información que proporciona la ESEE en los siguientes apartados: (i) Actividad de la em-
presa, productos y procesos de fabricación, (ii) Clientes y proveedores, (iii) Costes y precios,
(iv) Mercados, (v) Actividades tecnológicas, (vi) Comercio exterior, (vii) Empleo y (viii)
Datos contables.
A.2.2. Objetivos y metodología en el estudio de los determinantes de la
cooperación en I+D: El caso de las empresas manufactureras españolas
En comparación con el resto de países europeos, el sistema español de innovación está
en una fase de desarrollo menos avanzada. En un estudio reciente de Abramovsky et al.
(2004), en el que se comparan las actividades y resultados de la innovación para Alemania,
España, Francia y Reino Unido utilizando datos de la tercera oleada de la Community
Innovation Survey (CIS3), se pone de maniesto que España presenta el menor porcentaje
de empresas con gastos en innovación. Esta diferencia es especialmente importante en el
caso de los gastos de I+D interna. Además, la intensidad en I+D (ratio de los gastos en I+D
interna sobre cifra de negocios de la empresa) en España es, aproximadamente, un tercio del
esfuerzo en Alemania, Francia o Reino Unido, y esta diferencia es sistemáticamente mayor
en los sectores intensivos en tecnología. Igualmente, España presenta la menor proporción
de empresas con acuerdos de cooperación en actividades de innovación.
Este diferencial en el desarrollo de las actividades innovación hace aún más interesante
el estudio del fenómeno de la cooperación en innovación para el caso español. El fomento
de las actividades de cooperación, dado su carácter de catalizador de la innovación, puede
ser un instrumento útil y, por tanto, necesario en la convergencia de España con la media
europea.
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El objetivo concreto de este capítulo es el estudio empírico de los determinantes de la
cooperación en actividades de I+D utilizando datos de empresas españolas. El trabajo se
centra en el estudio de la importancia sobre la propensión a cooperar de factores tales como:
los ujos de información o spillovers, la capacidad de absorción de la empresa, el reparto
de costes y riesgo entre los socios del acuerdo, el intercambio de conocimientos, etc.
Como se dijo anteriormente, se utilizan datos de la Encuesta sobre Innovación Tecnológica
en las Empresas del año 2001.
En este estudio se aplican técnicas microeconométricas que permiten hacer tests sobre
la posible endogeneidad de variables explicativas que en otros estudios son consideradas
endógenas a priori. Concretamente, se aplica un método de estimación máximo verosímil
condicional que tiene en cuenta los posibles problemas de endogeneidad.
A.2.3. Objetivos y metodología en el estudio de los determinantes de la
cooperación en actividades de innovación: Evidencia para cuatro países
europeos
Este segundo capítulo analiza la cooperación en actividades de innovación en cuatro países
europeos, Francia, Alemania, España y Reino Unido. Una vez más la fuente de los datos es
la Community Innovation Survey, lo que permite comparar los resultados obtenidos entre
los diferentes países. En concreto, se utilizan datos de la tercera edición de la CIS (año
2001).
En este capítulo se examina, entre otros, el papel de los ujos de conocimiento, el reparto
de costes y riesgo, y la importancia de las ayuda públicas en la decisión de establecer
acuerdos de cooperación en actividades de innovación. En este estudio se utilizan datos
tanto de empresas manufactureras como de servicios.
El problema de endogeneidad de alguna de las variables explicativas es tratado aplicando
un método de estimación en dos etapas.
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A.2.4. Objetivos y metodología en el estudio del impacto del outsourcing en
la productividad
El tercer capítulo analiza la relación entre innovación organizativa y productividad. En
concreto, el estudio se centra en el papel de una de las innovaciones organizativas más
relevantes, el outsourcing. El outsourcing implica la modicación de la frontera de la
empresa y debe considerarse como un fenómeno de innovación organizativa cuya nalidad
última es incrementar la exibilidad y eciencia de las empresas. Especícamente, este
capítulo se centra en el outsourcing a nivel de empresa y en el papel de la subcontratación
de la producción (compras a terceros de productos terminados o componentes a medida
para la empresa).
Para realizar este análisis, se desarrolla y estima un marco teórico sencillo que justica la
incorporación de medidas de outsourcing a la especicación de una función de producción
tradicional. Este marco implica la estimación de una función de producción dependiendo
de los inputs tradicionales (trabajo, capital y materiales) y de un índice de subcontratación
de la producción.
La estimación de dicha función de producción se lleva a cabo teniendo en cuenta la exis-
tencia de variables endógenas y predeterminadas. Para ello se aplica el Método Generalizado
de Momentos, GMM (ver Arellano y Bond (1991) para una descripción de este método).
Este marco teórico sencillo tiene algunas limitaciones que son tratadas en la última parte
del capítulo. En este sentido, el tercer capítulo naliza con una primera tentativa de
modelizar y estimar un marco más estructural en el que se especica una función de
producción considerando la posibilidad de la subcontratación de la producción. Este marco
permite identicar dos usos para el trabajo (trabajo usado directamente en la
producción de bien nal y el trabajo usado en la producción de un input intermedio). En
este caso la ecuación relevante a estimar presenta restricciones no lineales en los parámetros,
por lo que en la estimación se utiliza GMM no lineal.
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A.3. Aportaciones y resultados principales
A.3.1. Determinantes de la cooperación en I+D: Evidencia para las empresas
manufactureras españolas
Aportaciones
En primer lugar, este trabajo pone de maniesto que un tratamiento riguroso de la
endogeneidad tiene una gran importancia. El método de estimación utilizado permite hacer
tests de endogeneidad sobre variables explicativas que en otros estudios se asumen endógenas
a priori. Se obtiene que la elección de una estructura apropiadade endogeneidad es crucial
y tiene consecuencias importantes para las estimaciones.
En segundo lugar, la muestra de empresas utilizada es muy interesante. Por una parte, se
utiliza una muestra amplia compuesta por 2.518 empresas. Este tamaño muestral permite
obtener estimaciones precisas y tests de hipótesis ables. Por otra parte, tal y como se
dijo anteriormente, el sistema español de innovación está en una fase de desarrollo menos
avanzada comparado con la mayoría de los países europeos. Debido a que la cooperación
en actividades en I+D es una práctica útil para mejorar el funcionamiento de la innovación
empresarial, este diferencial respecto al resto de países europeos hace aún más interesante el
estudio de los factores que estimulan la cooperación en este tipo de actividades. Además, el
sector manufacturero español está compuesto mayoritariamente por empresas pequeñas de
sectores poco intensivos en tecnología. En general, los estudios demuestran que las empresas
grandes y en sectores de tecnología alta presentan una mayor propensión a cooperar en
actividades de I+D, y por lo tanto es de gran interés estudiar este tipo de cooperación en
un contexto como el español, caracterizado por la existencia de empresas pequeñas y de
sectores poco intensivos en tecnología.
Resultados principales
Los resultados principales que se obtienen son los siguientes:
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i) Los spillovers recibidos85 tienen un efecto positivo en la probabilidad de cooperar.
En este sentido, cuanto mayor sea la información libremente disponible para la empresa,
mayores son los benecios que se pueden explotar a través de acuerdos de cooperación.
ii) La apropiabilidad a nivel de empresa tiene un efecto positivo en la propensión a
cooperar. Cuanto mayor sea el control a través de métodos estratégicos de protección86 de
los ujos de información por parte de la empresa, mayor es la propensión a cooperar (la
ecacia de los métodos estratégicos de protección disminuye el riesgo de comportamientos
oportunistas por parte de otras empresas). Sin embargo, el nivel de ecacia de los métodos
legales87 a nivel industria parece tener un efecto negativo sobre la cooperación. En este
sentido, una excesiva protección a través de estos métodos puede dicultar la internalización
de los ujos de información que se comparten con los socios de los acuerdos.
iii) Para España, la posibilidad de compartir costes y riesgos es el principal determinante
de la cooperación en actividades de I+D. Este hecho puede ser reejo de la falta de inversión
privada o la escasez de capital riesgo, lo que lleva a las empresas a compartir los costes y
riesgos de las actividades de innovación con otras empresas o instituciones.
iv) La capacidad de absorción de la empresa y la capacidad tecnológica de la empresa
tienen efectos positivos sobre la probabilidad de cooperar. Cuanto mayor sean estas
variables, mayores son los benecios potenciales de la cooperación con otras empresas o
instituciones.
v) Diferenciando por tipo de socio, caben destacar tres hechos. En primer lugar, en el caso
de la cooperación con empresas competidoras, la variable que tiene un efecto mayor sobre la
probabilidad de cooperar es la apropiabilidad. Es decir, la capacidad de control a través de
métodos estratégicos de protección de los ujos de información es crucial en la decisión de
85La variable spillovers recibidos se dene como la importancia para el proceso de innovación de las
empresas de las fuentes de información accesibles públicamente. En concreto, estas fuentes de información
son Conferencias profesionales, reuniones y revistas especializadas, y ferias y exhibiciones.
86Estos métodos incluyen: Secreto de fábrica, complejidad en el diseño y tiempo de liderazgo sobre los
competidores.
87Estos métodos incluyen: Patentes, registros de modelos de utilidad, marcas de fábrica y derechos de
autor.
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cooperar con competidores directos. En segundo lugar, los spilloversrecibidos sólo tienen
un efecto positivo en la probabilidad de cooperar con instituciones de investigación. En este
sentido, la información libremente disponible para la empresa sólo tiene un efecto positivo
en la cooperación con socios tales como universidades, laboratorios comerciales, organismos
públicos de investigación, etc. En tercer lugar, la posibilidad de compartir costes y riesgos
es el principal determinante de la cooperación en actividades de I+D con proveedores o
clientes y con instituciones de investigación.
A.3.2. Un análisis de los acuerdos de cooperación en innovación: Evidencia
para cuatro países europeos
Aportaciones
Las aportaciones principales de este estudio respecto a la literatura existente y respecto
al capítulo anterior son las siguientes:
i) Se obtiene resultados comparables para cuatro grandes países europeos (Alemania,
España, Francia y Reino Unido). Esto es posible gracias a la utilización de datos procedentes
de la tercera edición de la Community Innovation Survey (CIS), encuesta para la que se
dispone de un cuestionario armonizado entre los países europeos.
ii) Además de las empresas manufactureras, se analiza el sector servicios. La utilización
de datos del CIS es particularmente adecuado para analizar las actividades de innovación en
el sector servicios ya que esta encuesta considera una perspectiva amplia de la innovación
(más allá del concepto de gasto de I+D interna).
iii) Se analiza el efecto del apoyo nanciero público para actividades de innovación (prés-
tamos, subvenciones) en la propensión a cooperar en actividades de innovación.
Resultados principales
Los resultados principales obtenidos son:
i) Se encuentra evidencia a favor de una relación positiva entre el grado en el que las
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empresas pueden beneciarse de los ujos de información externos (spilloversrecibidos88)
y la propensión a establecer acuerdos de cooperación en actividades de innovación. Este
efecto es especialmente importante a la hora de cooperar con organismos de investigación,
mientras que esta propensión disminuye a la hora de cooperar con empresas competidoras
pertenecientes a la misma industria.
ii) También se encuentra evidencia a favor de un efecto positivo de la importancia de los
métodos estratégicos de protección (secreto de fábrica, complejidad en el diseño y tiempo
de liderazgo sobre los competidores). Este efecto es signicativo para el caso de acuerdos
de cooperación con organismos de investigación, con proveedores y con clientes. El efecto
es menos importante en el caso de cooperación con competidores.
iii) Los resultados para el caso español son sensiblemente diferentes, especialmente al
compararlos con los obtenidos para Alemania y Reino Unido. Para España se encuentra
que, especialmente en el sector industrial, la empresas más grandes son más propensas a
cooperar, y que las empresas cooperan para compartir los costes y los riesgos derivados de
las actividades de innovación. Este resultado puede derivarse de diferencias entre España y
el resto de países analizados en el mercado de capitales y en la disponibilidad y coste de las
fuentes de nanciación externas para actividades de innovación.
iv) El hecho de recibir apoyo nanciero público tiene un efecto positivo sobre la
probabilidad de cooperar. Este efecto es especialmente importante en el caso de la
cooperación con organismos de investigación (como universidades y organismos públicos
de investigación). Esto coincide con la orientación que se quiere dar a la nanciación
pública para la innovación, la cual intenta incentivar este tipo de acuerdos de cooperación
y promover la transferencia tecnológica desde las universidades a las empresas.
88 Importancia para el proceso de innovación de las empresas de las fuentes de información accesibles
públicamente Conferencias profesionales, reuniones y revistas especializadas, y ferias y exhibiciones.
164
A.3.3. Innovación organizativa y productividad: un análisis del impacto del
outsourcing en la productividad de las empresas
Aportaciones
En primer lugar, en este estudio se propone un marco teórico que permite estimar el
impacto del outsourcing en la productividad. Concretamente, el marco desarrollado permite
evaluar el impacto de la decisión de subcontratación (empezar y dejar de subcontratar) y
de la intensidad de la subcontratación.
En segundo lugar, mientras que la literatura empírica existente sobre este tema se ha
centrado en los efectos sobre la productividad a nivel industrial y nacional, este análisis se
lleva a cabo a nivel de empresa. Además se utilizan datos de panel, lo que permite tener en
cuenta la heterogeneidad inobservada entre las empresas y analizar efectos temporales.
En tercer lugar, la base de datos utilizada permite utilizar una medida directa de la
subcontratación de la producción. En concreto, se tiene información sobre compras a ter-
ceros de productos terminados o componentes a medida para la empresa. En este sen-
tido, en la literatura empírica, el outsourcing se ha medido de modos diversos y utilizando
diferentes perspectivas. La mayor parte de estas aproximaciones utilizan información a nivel
de industria y procedentes de tablas input-output. Además, en muchos casos se utilizan
medidas imprecisas.
Resultados principales
Las conclusiones principales de las estimaciones realizadas son las siguientes:
i) El outsourcing tiene un efecto positivo sobre la productividad. Se obtiene un efecto
positivo del índice de subcontratación en la productividad de las empresas. Concretamente,
se obtiene una elasticidad del output respecto a la intensidad de la subcontratación de 0,14.
ii) No sólo la intensidad en la subcontratación, sino también la decisión de empezar o
dejar de subcontratar tiene impacto. En este sentido, empezar a subcontratar tiene un
efecto positivo sobre la productividad de las empresas, mientras que dejar de subcontratar
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tiene el efecto contrario.
iii) El efecto positivo del outsourcing sobre la productividad es especialmente importante
en los sectores intensivos en trabajo.
iv) Se obtienen estimaciones razonables de las elasticidades de los inputs tradicionales
(capital, trabajo y materias primas).
A.4. Conclusiones e implicaciones de política económica
Los análisis de la productividad a nivel agregado muestran sistemáticamente un
crecimiento menor de la economía europea en comparación con los EEUU (ver, por
ejemplo, Scarpetta et al. (2000)). Este hecho, especialmente importante en ciertos sectores
de servicios intensivos en el uso de tecnologías de la información, es de gran preocupación
y ha sido objeto de numerosas discusiones sobre la capacidad de la economía europea para
desarrollar, difundir y aplicar las nuevas tecnologías, y sobre su capacidad para convertir
dichas tecnologías en fuente de crecimiento económico. La Estrategia de Lisboa, que es
la respuesta de los países de la UE a este reto, marcó el objetivo estratégico de convertir
antes del 2010 la economía de la UE en la economía del conocimiento más competitiva y
dinámica del mundo, capaz de alcanzar un crecimiento económico duradero acompañado
por una mejora cuantitativa y cualitativa del empleo y una mayor cohesión social. El
desarrollo de estas políticas continúa siendo en la actualidad un tema de interés primordial.
Los resultados de esta tesis doctoral, que se centran en el análisis de la cooperación en ac-
tividades de innovación y en el efecto de la innovación en la productividad, tienen algunas
implicaciones generales sobre estas políticas.
La premisa de partida es, tal y como muestran los resultados obtenidos en esta tesis, que
la innovación tiene un efecto positivo sobre la productividad. La cuestión es cómo reforzar
de forma adecuada este hecho. La investigación que se presenta en este estudio sobre
innovación y productividad ha contribuido a la literatura existente analizando el efecto de
uno de los tipos de innovación organizativa, el outsourcing, sobre la productividad.
La cooperación en actividades de innovación, aún desigualmente implantada en los
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diferentes países de la UE, se ha revelado como un vehículo adecuado para hacer frente
a los desafíos derivados del progreso tecnológico mediante la obtención de innovaciones.
Tanto la OCDE como la UE apoyan la idea de reforzar los lazos entre la industria y
la ciencia. En este sentido, en 2003 el gobierno británico llevó a cabo un análisis en
profundidad de la colaboración entre la universidad y las empresas, proponiendo fórmu-
las para mejorar el apoyo público a dicha actividad de colaboración89. En la actuali-
dad, en Reino Unido están en funcionamiento una serie de medidas destinadas a fomen-
tar actividades de colaboración en innovación entre empresas y organizaciones de inves-
tigación, y entre empresas. En Alemania, una cantidad importante de los fondos públi-
cos destinados a actividades de innovación se dedican a consorcios de investigación que
engloben a empresas y organismos de investigación. Las políticas en España y Francia
hacen también hincapié en la colaboración público-privada90.
Los resultados obtenidos en este estudio muestran que los spillovers recibidos (ujos
de información recibidos) y la capacidad de apropiación de los resultados de la innovación
tienen un efecto positivo sobre la probabilidad de cooperar en actividades de innovación.
A pesar de la importancia de los spillovers, en España se obtiene que el factor más
importante para las empresas a la hora de decidir si cooperan o no en actividades de
innovación es la existencia de costes y riesgos elevados vinculados con las actividades de
innovación. Este resultado puede ser reejo de la falta de inversión privada o la escasez de
capital riesgo en la economía española.
Los resultados que se han obtenido implican que el fomento de este tipo de acuerdos de
cooperación puede reforzar la innovación, y este fomento puede ser promovido por medidas
de política económica.
89HM Treasury (2003).
90Ver Abramovsky et al. (2004), Acosta y Modrego (2001), Fier et al. (2006) y MNRT (2005).
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